
















A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 












 Approved by:  
 Harry L. Watson 
 William L. Barney 
 W. Fitzhugh Brundage 
 Joseph T. Glatthaar 









































Brian K. Fennessy 
















Brian K. Fennessy: Reconstructed Rebels: Ex-Confederates in the Republican Party 
(Under the direction of Harry L. Watson) 
 
 
After Congress took control of Reconstruction in 1866, thousands of former Confederates 
migrated into the Republican Party. Though nowhere near a majority of former Confederates, 
these “reconstructed rebels” exerted an outsized influence on Congressional Reconstruction. Few 
have a place in popular memory other than James Longstreet, though scholars have written about 
a handful of others as forgotten heroes who represented a different path for the South. In contrast 
to that view, this dissertation argues that their impact was largely conservative and that they were 
complicit in the abandonment of Reconstruction.  
 An analysis of the roughly 4,600 former Confederates who received amnesty from 
Congress—that is, relief from the Fourteenth Amendment’s officeholding ban—shows that 
reconstructed rebels had much in common with Reconstruction’s opponents. Unlike Democratic 
Redeemers, however, they made a tactical decision that by joining forces with the Republicans, 
they could regain political power and attract northern economic investment in their states. 
Moreover, drawing on a long history of patron-client relationships with yeoman whites, they saw 
Black political participation as fully compatible with white supremacy and elite power. By 
joining the Republican Party, reconstructed rebels believed they could make Reconstruction 
more conservative and restore traditional white elites to power.  
 While a great many southern elites supported violence as a means to overthrow 




northerners that they were “reconstructed,” ex-Confederates in the Republican Party re-
legitimized the image of white southern elites. The Democratic Redeemers benefited from their 
actions and later followed in their footsteps by combining Black political participation and white 
supremacy in the decades leading up to Black disfranchisement at the end of the nineteenth 
century. This history should remind readers in the twenty-first century about the mutability of 
white supremacy and the vulnerability of institutions to capture by elites. An accurate 
understanding of reconstructed rebels is particularly important in the current context of racial 





















 “So, you’re saying you want to know who was reconstructed?” Clint Bagley asked me 
this as we drove from Jackson to Natchez. I was in between my junior and senior year of college, 
and my undergraduate advisor had connected me with Clint because I was working at the 
Vicksburg National Military Park for the summer and Clint was an archivist in Jackson. I didn’t 
realize it at the time, but Clint was right about where my research was headed. Besides leaving 
me this nugget of insight, he catered to all my requests at the state archives, took me to the best 
eateries in Mississippi, introduced me to other delightful people, and in later years let me stay in 
his guest room. This dissertation would have been impossible without the wisdom, generosity, 
confidence, and friendship that Clint and so many others showed toward me. Every one of them 
deserves a vignette, but I will hold to the tradition of keeping acknowledgements brief. 
A matchless succession of educators brought me to this point. In high school, Scott 
Maynard showed me that history was not just names and dates, but an interpretive field where I 
could leave my mark. The entire history department at the University of the South encouraged 
my passion, treating an ambitious youth like a fellow historian. John Willis took a leap of faith 
letting a freshman into his upper-level course on the Old South. His courses forced me to discard 
many erroneous ideas about the “Lost Cause.” Houston Roberson was not only a mentor, but a 
dear friend who frequently discussed personal topics like religion and romance with me over fine 
cuisine. I miss him dearly and wish more than anything that he could read this. When John 
McCardell Jr. arrived as vice-chancellor, he took me under his wing, co-authored a book 




Journal of Southern History. The memory of these early mentors still inspires me with the hope 
that one day I will have a chance to mentor others with the same intellectual rigor, generosity, 
sincerity, and compassion. 
Houston Roberson promised that at Chapel Hill I would find a supportive community, 
just as he had. He was right. My dissertation committee—Harry Watson, Joe Glatthaar, Bill 
Barney, Fitz Brundage, and Jerma Jackson—guided me throughout by correcting missteps and 
pointing me toward sure footing. In particular, Harry has been a model advisor. Since I met him, 
he has always been encouraging and patient, and his critiques have improved this dissertation in 
a hundred ways. Joe has been a constant advocate over the years, always in my corner. Jerma had 
a knack for taking my diffuse ramble of ideas, repackaging it neatly, and giving it back with a 
“So what you’re really saying is….” I have been incredibly blessed by people who knew what I 
was saying before I did. 
I am indebted to many others for reading chapters and offering feedback: Michael 
Fitzgerald, Ben Waterhouse, Joshua Lynn, Robert Richard, Robert Colby, Adam Domby, Joe 
Stieb, Melanie Sheehan, Jessie Auer, Sam Finesurrey, Jennifer Standish, Isabell Moore, Joshua 
Tait, Maikel Borrego, Garrett Wright, Caroline Newhall, Laurie Medford, Aubrey Lauersdorf, 
and Mishio Yamanaka. I also benefited from the insight of participants at the College of 
Charleston’s 2018 Carolina Lowcountry and Atlantic World conference on Reconstruction; Rice 
University’s “Re-Framing the Constitution” conference; the University of Mississippi’s Center 
for Civil War Research conference; and the North Carolina Civil War Sesquicentennial 
Symposium.  
Many more supported my labors in other ways. Abigail Belcher helped me to collect 




Numerous archivists helped make my work possible. I probably asked the most from William 
Davis at the National Archives, Matt Turi at the Southern Historical Collection, and Clint Bagley 
at the Mississippi Department of Archives and History. Those who opened their homes to me as 
I traveled the archive circuit include Clint, as well as Dorothea Gholson, Kevin Lynn, Patrick 
Vestal, and John Derrick. I am also grateful for financial support from the UNC History 
Department and the Center for the Study of the American South.  
My friends and family deserve everlasting thanks for their levity and emotional support. 
My parents Donna and Kenneth Fennessy always believed in me and covered whatever expenses 
my funding didn’t. Among my extended family, Egidio, Ruth, Susan, Michael, John, and Lisa 
Palmaccio, Donna Scuncio, Anna DeSousa, and Taylor and Michael Pagliarini have cheered my 
progress every step of the way. Fellow Watsonians Joshua Lynn, Robert Richard, and Robert 
Colby provided much needed solidarity during regular happy hours. Of the many others who 
kept me sane, special mention is also due to Danielle Bourn, John Derrick, Anjali Baliga, Eric 
Jin, Laurie Medford, Eric Burke, Lydia Neuroth, Michael Hickman, and Michelle Hudson. The 
final year of writing, which coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, might have been difficult 
were it not for my partner, Alice Blake. She never complained when I worked long into the 
evenings and on weekends. Later, she would read every word of this dissertation. The prose is 
many times better because of her edits. In so many other ways, I could not have finished or 
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INTRODUCTION: “GONE OVER” 
 
Confederate Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was “the highest in rank of the 
Southern men who have ‘gone over’ to the Northern side since the war.” The southern novelist 
who made this observation did so only a few short years after white southerners had overthrown 
Republican government in the South, ending the period known as Reconstruction. The writer 
contemplated the phrase “gone over” in this context. “The evident underlying meaning in this,” 
he mused, “if anything can be gathered from the tone, look, and bearing of those saying it, is that 
the man spoken of has committed a grave offence against good morals and the well-being of 
society.” 1 
Joining the Republican Party was not a popular move for a white southerner in the 
aftermath of Confederate defeat. At a time when most former Confederates opposed the 
Republican Congress’s plan of Reconstruction, Longstreet endorsed it. In 1868, he cast his vote 
for Ulysses S. Grant in the presidential election, and a year later the new president rewarded him 
with a plum patronage position in New Orleans. A few short years later, Longstreet was the 
commander of Louisiana’s biracial state militia. His troops took an oath to “accept the civil and 
political equality of all men.”2 Twice, Longstreet led the militia against white insurgents who 
were trying to overthrow the state government and reverse African American societal gains.  
	
1 Brinsley Matthews [pseud. for William S. Pearson], Well-Nigh Reconstructed: A Political Novel (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 2010), 8.  
2 James K. Hogue, Uncivil War: Five New Orleans Street Battles and the Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction 




Though Longstreet’s course made him unpopular at the time, now more than a century 
later, he looks like a progressive hero. In the age of Trump, activists have responded to systemic 
racism by toppling Confederate monuments, but Longstreet is an example of an ex-Confederate 
who was seemingly different. An opinion piece in the Washington Post from 2016 exemplifies 
the common view: “Longstreet risked his life for the worst cause Americans ever espoused, then 
for the best one. In short, he epitomized this nation’s saving grace, and humanity’s: the capacity 
to learn from our mistakes, and to change.” If New Orleans removed its statue to Robert E. 
Lee—which it did, a year later—the author suggested replacing it with one of Longstreet.3 
Longstreet was an exception among former Confederates, but he was not alone. There 
was an influential minority of ex-rebels who aided Congress and Black southerners in their 
attempts to transform the South. Historians have estimated that some 20 percent of white 
southerners voted with the Republican Party during Reconstruction.4 Some of them were 
wartime Unionists, but others like Longstreet had fought for the Confederacy. The latter were 
sometimes called “reconstructed rebels” during the 1860s. They were former Confederates who 
joined the Republican Party, or at the very least accepted the legitimacy of Congressional 
Reconstruction. Longstreet was the quintessential reconstructed rebel. 
The reminder that white Americans can redeem themselves from racial prejudice is a 
compelling one today. It is worth asking whether the Longstreets of the South might have led the 
	
3 Charles Lane, “The forgotten Confederates general who deserves a monument,” The Washington Post, 27 Jan 
2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-forgotten-confederate-general-who-would-make-a-better-
subject-for-monuments/2016/01/27/f09bad42-c536-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html>. 
4 For estimates of the white Republican vote during Reconstruction, see Allen W. Trelease, "Who Were the 
Scalawags?" The Journal of Southern History 29, no. 4 (1963): 458; William C. Harris, “A Reconsideration of the 
Mississippi Scalawag,” Journal of Mississippi History 32 (Feb. 1970), 38; Carl Degler, The Other South: Southern 
Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 193; Abbott, The Republican Party and the 
South, 1855-1877 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 137, 159; Hyman Rubin III, South 




region in a different direction than the one it pursued in the late nineteenth century, one that 
pointed to a much more genuine sectional and racial détente and away from the path to Jim Crow 
that made the white South more intensely sectional, racist, and violently repressive in 1900 than 
it had been in 1860. 
The answer presented here is that they could not, or at any rate, did not. Reconstructed 
rebels did not free themselves from their past as much as popular interpreters of Civil War 
memory might wish. For example, at the same moment that Longstreet was going over to the 
Republicans, he wrote privately, “Since the negro has been given the privilege of voting, it is all 
important that we should exercise such influence over that vote, as to prevent its being injurious 
to us, & we can only do that as Republicans.” He reasoned that “Congress requires 
reconstruction upon the Republican basis,” and “if the whites won’t do this, the thing will be 
done by the blacks, and we shall be set aside, if not expatriated. It then seems plain to me that we 
should do the work ourselves, & have it white instead of black & have our best men in public 
office.”5 Republican Reconstruction could and should still be managed by whites, Longstreet 
believed, if they joined the party in power. In 1875, after years at the head of Louisiana’s biracial 
militia, he wrote to an old friend, “the difference in our politics is not so great as appear [sic], if 
sifted to the bottom. The end that we seek I know is the same.—The restoration of the Southern 
people to their natural and proper influence.”6 
If celebrating Longstreet and other reconstructed rebels is an error, their stories can 
nevertheless teach us something important. Their stories can help historians answer a key 
	
5 James Longstreet to R. H. Taliaferro, 4 Jul 1867, Boagni Collection, quoted in William Garrett Piston, Lee’s 
Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in South History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1990), 106.  
6 Longstreet to T. J. Goree, 12 May 1875, Goree Papers LSU, quoted from Thomas R. Hay and Donald B. Sanger, 




question about the Reconstruction era: how did white southern elites ultimately regain power? 
One answer has been that white southerners actively resisted through the Democratic party, 
violent insurgency, and racial terrorism. Another answer by historians is that white Northerners 
grew apathetic about the situation in the South and withdrew their support for military 
intervention. These answers are not mutually exclusive, and they both provide partial answers to 
the question. In addition to these forces, reconstructed rebels played an essential part in restoring 
the legitimacy of the South’s prewar slaveholding elite.  
Reconstructed rebels adopted the party that had managed Confederate defeat and then 
provided citizenship and voting rights to African Americans. They accepted equality under the 
law and Black voting rights—but white elites had previously done the same for poor whites 
without actually accepting them as their social equals or expecting them to ever control the 
levers of governance. Many of their core assumptions, especially about race, had changed little. 
They supported Congressional Reconstruction because they saw it as a way to restore the power 
of white southern elites, prevent violent instability, and bring economic prosperity to their 
communities. Some of them abandoned the Republican Party when African Americans pressed 
for greater civil rights protections and a greater say in governance. Others, including Longstreet, 
stayed in the Republican Party, but their contributions to Reconstruction played a key role—in 
ending it.  
Unlike Democratic “Redeemers,” Reconstructed rebels did not use or condone violence 
to restore “home rule” to the South, but they helped to convince white northerners that men of 
their class were the region’s rightful leaders. When Democrats began to claim that they too were 
reconstructed and had accepted the results of Congressional Reconstruction, white northerners 




redeemed from their racism, but they did help to usher in the period that some historians still 
refer to as “Redemption”—the period after Reconstruction when southern states reestablished 
home rule, white supremacy, and elite power.  
 
How White Southern Elites Regained Power 
Historians have offered several reasonable explanations of Reconstruction’s failure to 
produce a lasting biracial democracy in the South. Dan Carter’s work on the “failure of self-
reconstruction in the South” explores the attempt of white southern elites to adapt during the 
early postwar period known as Presidential Reconstruction. Ultimately, he finds that they lacked 
imagination and became irrelevant when Republicans saw the South required a more thorough 
restructuring than Andrew Johnson and his southern supporters had intended. The lesson is that 
the white South could not have reconstructed itself.7  
If white southerners could not reconstruct themselves, they could certainly use violence 
to overthrow the project known as Congressional Reconstruction. From Allen Trelease’s 1971 
book White Terror to Douglas Egerton’s more recent The Wars of Reconstruction, scholars have 
thoroughly documented white southern racial terrorism and violent insurgency. Former 
slaveowners responded with violence wherever freedpeople sought to enjoy their freedom by 
relocating, working where and how they chose, and organizing politically. Especially angered by 
Black political organizing at the grassroots level, whites formed Ku Klux Klan units and 
conducted a campaign of intimidation, assault, and assassination. In the runup to the 1868 
presidential election, they murdered Black and white Republicans alike. For a short time in the 
	
7 Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1867 (Baton 




early 1870s, the federal government was able to tamp down on organized racial violence in some 
areas, but as the North wearied of Reconstruction, the defenders of white supremacy dropped the 
disguises, intimidated Black voters openly, and used local militias to overthrow Reconstruction’s 
biracial state governments.8  
Other historians have supplemented the white counterrevolution explanation of 
Reconstruction’s failure by looking at shifting attitudes in the North. Many scholars who study 
the Republican Party in this era have argued that its leaders abandoned African Americans when 
they found that they could carry the presidency without the South.9 Looking beyond party 
leaders, Heather Cox Richardson makes a strong case that an economic depression and labor 
unrest at home caused northerners to lose interest in matters down south, or even to explicitly 
oppose Reconstruction. Wealthy capitalists in particular feared that an empowered Black 
working class in the South would inspire the white proletariat in northern cities. The progressive 
tendencies of the North’s free labor ideology were thus tempered by its assumptions that both 
former slaves and white workers should rise and fall on their merits without government 
interference.10  
	
8 Allen W. Trelease, The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1971). Douglas R. Egerton, The Wars of Reconstruction: The Brief Violent History of America’s 
Most Progressive Era (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014). An abbreviated list of the many scholars who have 
added to this interpretation must also include George Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the 
Politics of Reconstruction (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984); James K. Hogue, Uncivil War: Five New 
Orleans Street Battles and the Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2006); Hannah Rosen, Terror in the Heart Of Freedom : Citizenship, Sexual Violence, and the Meaning of 
Race in the Postemancipation South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Gregory P. Downs, 
After Appomattox: Military Occupation and the Ends of War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
9 Vincent De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question—The New Departure Years, 1877-1897 (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1959); Stanley Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and 
the Southern Negro, 1877-1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Abbott, The Republican Party and 
the South; Heather Cox Richardson, To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014). For a different view see Charles W. Calhoun, Conceiving a New Republic: The Republican Party and 
the Southern Question, 1869-1900 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006).  
10 Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 




Racism also played a role in the North’s retreat from Reconstruction, as Carole Emberton 
makes clear in her recent work. African Americans did not deserve saving, some northerners 
reasoned, if they could not defend themselves from white violence. When they did resist, 
however, journalists associated Black violence with barbarism.11 Moreover, Laura Edwards and 
Andrew Slap have shown how ideas about race, class, and gender combined with a “liberal” 
movement against the political spoils system to convince many in the North that the Southern 
Republican governments were corrupt and that the region should be ruled by its “best men.”12 
Perhaps, as Mark Summers argues quite convincingly, white northerners had always been more 
concerned with stabilizing the country than bringing biracial democracy to the South.13    
To the mix of factors that brought down Reconstruction, historians like Michael 
Fitzgerald have added the debilitating factionalism within the southern Republican parties. 
Native white Republicans vied with more progressive arrivals from the North for African 
American support. This dynamic gave African American more influence during the 1870s, but at 
the same time, Democrats used Republican factionalism to their advantage. Moreover, African 
American gains in the intraparty disputes—a greater share of offices, more spending on schools, 
more attention to civil rights—stimulated the violent white reaction that ended Reconstruction.14  
	
11 Carole Emberton, Beyond Redemption: Race, Violence, and the American South after the Civil War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015).  
12 Laura Edwards, Gendered Strife and Confusion: The Political Culture of Reconstruction (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1997); Andrew L. Slap, The Doom of Reconstruction: The Liberal Republicans and the Civil War Era 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).  
13 Mark W. Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2014).  
14 The best works in this vein are by Michael Fitzgerald, particularly his Urban Emancipation: Popular Politics in 
Reconstruction Mobile, 1860-1890 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002) and Splendid Failure: 
Postwar Reconstruction in the American South (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008). Another important synthesis that 
analyzes party factionalism is Michael Perman, Road to Redemption, Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1984). Also see Jeffrey J. Crow, "Fusion, confusion, and Negroism: Schisms 





Reconstructed rebels hold the key to a new explanation of Reconstruction’s failures and 
how the South’s prewar elites regained power. This interpretation does not contradict the usual 
explanations, all of which build on the historiographical consensus in Eric Foner’s masterful 
synthesis, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution.15 The interpretation presented here 
is essential nonetheless because it helps further explain, to quote a recent title, “how the South 
won the Civil War.”16 It shows how defeated groups coopted the victors’ institutions and turned 
defeat into non-defeat. Finally, it demonstrates that reconstructed rebels, far from being forgotten 
prophets of racial justice, were in fact complicit in the nation’s great national failure.  
 
Motivations and Consequences 
Historians have spilled considerable ink analyzing the background and motivations of 
Southern Republicans. A lively debate once existed over whether the “scalawags” were 
persistent Whigs or hill-country Democrats. In the former view, they were elite men who wanted 
government support for business interests and hoped to strike back against the Democrats who 
had dominated southern politics in the 1850s. In the latter interpretation, they were poor whites 
and wartime Unionists who harbored longstanding resentment against the slaveholding elite.17 A 
closer focus on those who served the Confederacy will show that reconstructed rebels were often 
	
15 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988). 
 
16 Heather Cox Richardson, How the South Won the Civil War: Oligarchy, Democracy, and the Continuing Fight for 
the Soul of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).  
17 For attempts at quantitative analysis of partisan origins, see David H. Donald, “The Scalawag in Mississippi 
Reconstruction,” The Journal of Southern History 10, no. 4 (1944): 447-460, Thomas B. Alexander, “Persistent 
Whiggery in the Confederate South, 1860-1877,” The Journal of Southern History 27, no.3 (1961): 305-329. Allen 
W. Trelease, "Who Were the Scalawags?" The Journal of Southern History 29, no. 4 (1963): 445-468; Warren A. 
Ellem, "Who Were the Mississippi Scalawags?" The Journal of Southern History 38, no. 2 (1972): 217-240. For an 
analysis focused more on ideology, see Mitchell Snay, “Freedom and Progress: The Dilemma of Southern 





persistent Whigs. Nevertheless, in some in places like North Carolina, where former Whigs had 
governed during the war, former Democrats could be found perpetuating old rivalries from 
within the Republican Party. Regardless of their prewar party affiliation, the quantitative analysis 
in chapter one shows that reconstructed rebels were more likely to come from the slave-owning 
classes than their Unionist counterparts in the Republican Party. Moreover, their letters and 
speeches suggest that reconstructed rebels often joined the party for conservative reasons. By 
accepting political change, they hoped to stabilize southern society, revive the regional economy, 
and most of all, restore the elites like themselves to power.  
The impact of reconstructed rebels on southern politics was even more important than 
their motivations. Reconstructed rebels successfully convinced white northerners that prewar 
elites were fully reconstructed and able to rule at home. Some did so for their white Democratic 
counterparts even when they themselves did not abandon the Republican Party at the end of 
Reconstruction, though many did.  
Before anyone defected, reconstructed rebels first had to argue that they deserved 
political favor. The Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction Acts banned many of them from 
holding office. That penalty could be lifted from select individuals, but to receive that reward, 
they had to convince northerners that they accepted legal and political equality for African 
Americans. Few who successfully demonstrated this new faith were being outright deceptive; 
recipients of congressional amnesty had in fact joined the Republican Party and their fortunes 
became linked to those of Black constituents.  
Once in office, however, reconstructed rebels placed the economic interests of white 
southerners over those of Black freedpeople. They took steps to end racial terrorism, but believed 




expected. These positions did not suggest to Republican leaders in the North that white 
southerners were unreconstructed. In fact, the Republican Party was quickly becoming the party 
of big business, and party leaders still believed that political virtue resided in men of their own 
race and class. Once southern elites in the Republican Party could convince northerners that they 
were reconstructed, it became easier for southern Democrats to do so as well with the argument 
that white elites could be trusted to govern their own states.   
Part of the argument here is that ex-Confederates in the Republican Party paved the road 
to Redemption, and any interpretation of Redemption must confront not only the historiography 
of Reconstruction, but also the legacy of C. Vann Woodward. In his classic 1951 volume, 
Origins of the New South, Woodward challenged the traditional view that the Redeemers were 
backward-looking “Bourbons” who, like the French monarchists after the Revolution, had 
“learned nothing and forgotten nothing.” For Woodward, Redemption “was not a return to an old 
system nor the restoration of an old ruling class.” The basis for this claim was Woodward’s 
observation that the southerners who came to power after 1877 were mostly “of middle-class, 
industrial, capitalistic outlook, with little but a nominal connection with the old planter 
regime.”18 Origins continues to cast a long shadow, though its arguments have not gone without 
challenge. Other scholars have revealed within the post-Reconstruction Democratic Party a vital 
agrarian wing, which consistently aligned with western agrarians and exerted equal, if not more, 
pull than the industrial types who allied with northeastern capital.19 
	
18 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1951), 19-21. 
19 Carl V. Harris, "Right Fork or Left Fork? The Section-Party Alignments of Southern Democrats in Congress, 
1873-1897," The Journal of Southern History 42, no. 4 (1976): 471-506; James Tice Moore, "Redeemers 
Reconsidered: Change and Continuity in the Democratic South, 1870-1900," The Journal of Southern History 44, 
no. 3 (1978): 357-78 and “The Historical Context for ‘Redeemers Reconsidered,’” in Origins of the New South Fifty 




The interpretation here both supports and departs from Woodward’s argument about 
Redeemers. On the one hand, ex-Confederates who joined the Republican Party did look to move 
the South beyond its agrarian roots and one of their major goals was to attract northern and 
European investment. However, their connections to the antebellum slaveocracy were more than 
superficial. Even as they warmed to the “New South” gospel of industrial development, they 
were still determined to maintain a cheap, Black labor force. As much as they had in fact 
changed in response to Confederate defeat and Reconstruction, the accession of some former 
Confederates to the Republican Party did represent a restoration of prewar elites to power. Even 
when the Republican Party later lost the South, Redeemers benefited from reconstructed rebels’ 
“redemption” of southern elites into the political world, whether they were industrial or agrarian 
in outlook. The impact of reconstructed rebels on southern capitalism and race relations would 
be felt long after they left the stage.   
 
Reconstructed Rebels 
The following chapters draw heavily on the political writings, speeches, and private 
correspondence of ex-Confederates whose postwar activity made them “reconstructed rebels.” 
This is a more appropriate term than the conventional “scalawags” for several reasons. Along 
with the term “carpetbagger,” scalawag was a derogatory term created by Reconstruction’s 
opponents. “Scalawags” also refers to all white southern Republicans, including those who were 
former Unionists. Certainly, the views of some southern Unionists on politics and race were 
“reconstructed” during the 1860s and 1870s, and northern policy makers, including Abraham 
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Lincoln, expected them to form a nucleus for southern Republican parties. Many excellent 
studies have been written about their role in Reconstruction.20 Historians can gain new insights, 
however, by examining those southern Republicans who had once supported the Confederacy 
and had the unique experience of embracing defeat. Unlike white Unionists, whom the Northern 
press came to characterize as poor, illiterate, and excessively driven by class and wartime 
resentment, reconstructed rebels helped to reestablish the legitimacy of white southern elites.  
Most of the reconstructed states are represented here, though North Carolina gets more 
attention. Not only did 73 percent of its white Republican leaders hold Confederate military or 
civilian office according to James Baggett, more reconstructed rebels from North Carolina 
received congressional amnesty—29 percent—than those from any other state. Perhaps the fact 
that certain states like North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi did not experience 
Reconstruction until 1865 accounts for why there were more former Confederates in the 
Republican Party. In states like Louisiana and Arkansas, where Reconstruction began during the 
war, a protective government allowed for the early rise to power of white Unionists.  
The major characters presented here did not always correspond with each other unless 
they were in the same state. They behaved in similar ways, however, and they exerted a like 
influence over Reconstruction’s direction. Outsiders also tended to view them as a group with 
symbolic weight. By looking at them, northerners could measure their success in transforming 
the South. 
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In order to understand the larger national conversation on who was reconstructed, it is 
also necessary to analyze the words and actions of the other groups who had a stake in answering 
that question. Northern congressmen debated under what circumstances former rebels should be 
allowed to hold office. Northern settlers, southern Unionists, and African Americans frequently 
challenged the authority of reconstructed rebels, but less consistently than we might expect 
looking back from the twenty-first century. Often, they saw the value of wealthy, high-profile 
allies, only to be disappointed later. White Democrats charged white southern Republicans with 
betraying the South, the white race, their social class, and even their duty as men.  
The first chapter begins by considering the background of the reconstructed rebels before 
they joined the Republican Party. The list of former rebels who received congressional amnesty 
offers an opportunity for quantitative analysis. The Fourteenth Amendment and the federal test 
oath circumvented President Johnson’s early amnesty and banned certain ex-Confederates from 
holding political office. Nevertheless, Congress provided amnesty to 4,616 ex-Confederates 
between 1868 and the Amnesty Act of 1872, based on individual merit—that is, for supporting 
Reconstruction. After analyzing the census and military data on these men, chapter one continues 
with a more qualitative analysis based on manuscript collections and newspapers. Several 
recurring players make their first appearance as they navigate the war, Presidential 
Reconstruction, and the beginning of Congressional Reconstruction.  
Chapter two draws on a source base that few historians have touched. Congressional 
amnesty produced not only a list of names, but also thousands of documents related to how the 
reconstructed rebels saw themselves. Previous historians have used parts of the Records of the 
House Select Committee on Reconstruction, but none have combed through the largest section of 




officeholding ban.21 Unlike the earlier letters to Andrew Johnson where rebels exaggerated their 
wartime Unionism, these applications grounded their loyalty on postwar acts of open, public 
support for Congressional Reconstruction. Through congressional amnesty and political 
patronage, reconstructed rebels were restored to power.  
 The third chapter begins to consider the impact of reconstructed rebels on southern 
politics and society. Their highest priorities included attracting outside investment and 
preventing racial violence. These concerns were connected, since a thriving economy might 
make more whites willing to accept the Republican Party, and racial violence tended to scare 
away potential northern investors. Reconstructed rebels’ policy priorities foreshadowed the 
boosterism of “New South” industrialists in the 1880s, and though they failed to create a stable 
environment for investment, Democratic Redeemers would be more successful. 
Chapter four turns the focus on the unstable “friendship” between reconstructed rebels 
and African Americans in the South. Reconstructed rebels were able to simultaneously advocate 
legal equality and white supremacy because equal rights even among white people had never 
meant true political or social equality. Just as antebellum elites had cultivated patron-client 
relationships with poor whites, reconstructed rebels were willing to include Black freedpeople in 
a political system that was ostensibly democratic, but nonetheless warped by elite power. 
Reconstructed rebels spoke of racial equality, defended their Black “friends” on occasion, and 
solicited Black votes. Even having a few African Americans in office was acceptable, but 
ultimately, reconstructed rebels expected to set the agenda and run their states. When Black 
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southerners insisted on more than their white allies were willing to give, reconstructed rebels 
accused African Americans of making an unnecessary race issue.  
The final chapter completes the story of reconstructed rebels by analyzing how they 
grappled with Republican defeat and assessing their impact on Democratic Redemption. Many 
left the Republican Party and blamed either African Americans, “carpetbaggers,” or northern 
leaders on the way out the door. Others stayed in the party, even though they expressed similar 
views to those who left. In the end, many of them were able to make their peace with Democratic 
rule. At the same time, men like L.Q.C. Lamar and David Key successfully convinced white 
northerners that they were reconstructed too, despite never having joined the Republican Party. 
The chapter concludes by looking at the reconstruction rebels’ attitudes toward legal 
disfranchisement at the dawn of a new century.  
After America’s Civil War, democratic tradition and ideas about white racial superiority 
mandated against a prolonged period of military rule. The war had become one to destroy 
slavery, but white northerners were hardly certain about African Americans’ capacity to govern. 
Such considerations meant that there would have to be some role for former elites. Northern 
Republicans wisely required that elite participation be limited to those who were 
“reconstructed.” To what extent, however, did reconstructed rebels truly free themselves from 











SELF-RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH 
 
 In the summer of 1865, Edward Gantt was vigorously working for Arkansas’s restoration 
to the Union under President Johnson’s plan of Reconstruction. Arkansas, like other southern 
states, was organizing its government according to Johnson’s lenient terms, and Gantt wrote in 
June that soon not even Johnson’s “radical” opponents would “have the nerve to say that 
Arkansas is not a state.” Gantt disclaimed any desire for office. He promised Johnson, “I shall 
quietly but energetically endeavor to see that we get good sound men for congress—those who 
will strengthen the hands of the administration in the great work before it.” Like most southern 
elites who later joined the Republican Party, Gantt started out as a supporter of Presidential 
Reconstruction.1 
Presidential Reconstruction, as historian Dan Carter suggests, was the South’s failed 
attempt at “self-reconstruction.” Before Congress later insisted on a more thorough reworking of 
southern institutions, President Johnson allowed white southerners to take the lead in 
reconfiguring their own governments. Gantt’s readiness to participate in this project is not 
surprising. The people Carter studied generally repudiated secession, at the very least admitting 
that it was a mistake, and at most arguing that it was a crime. They also recognized the death of 
slavery and worked to lay the foundation for an economic order without it. However, as Carter 
argues, their imagination was limited by conservative racial ideology. They still imagined 
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African Americans as a menial labor force that needed to be strictly controlled with “black 
codes.” To white northerners, southern leaders increasingly looked unrepentant and 
unreconstructed. They clung to Johnson’s lenient terms and became intransigent when Congress 
demanded more. Self-reconstruction was a failure.2     
Gantt started out a supporter of Johnson’s policy, but his efforts to “self-reconstruct” did 
not end there. Even before his letter to Johnson, Gantt had told Pennsylvania Republican William 
D. Kelley that “the end of the Rebellion is not the mere breaking up of the physical forces that 
sustained it, but the extirpating of the ideas that made it!” He naively believed that loyal white 
southerners would grant Black southerners “the principle of suffrage and equality before the 
law,” and he wanted to help establish free labor institutions in the South.3 From September 1865 
to October 1866, he served as Freedmen’s Bureau superintendent of the southwestern district of 
Arkansas. In the summer of 1865, Gantt had been able to speak of “radicals” who opposed 
Johnson’s plan, but the conflict between the president and congress was still inchoate. Unlike the 
typical Johnsonian southerner, however, Gantt did not oppose Congress when it took control of 
Reconstruction in 1867, nor did he rejoin the Democratic Party, which had been his political 
home before the war. Instead he recruited for Republican clubs and campaigned for the 
Republican presidential nominee, Ulysses S. Grant, in 1868.4 As Gantt put it much earlier, 
“Revolutions shake up men’s thoughts and put them in different channels.”5  
	
2 Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1867 (Baton 
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Since the historiographical contributions of Michael Perman and Dan Carter, the 
consensus on Presidential Reconstruction has been that Andrew Johnson’s conservative policies 
emboldened white southerners to resist additional change.6 There is plenty of evidence to justify 
this interpretation. Most of the leaders of the South’s failed self-reconstruction went on to oppose 
Congressional intervention. Gantt’s support for Congressional Reconstruction was uncommon 
among white southern elites. However, Presidential Reconstruction is essential to understanding 
the making of “reconstructed rebels.” Their decision to embrace Confederate defeat when 
Johnson’s terms were the only ones on the table became a prelude to their support for 
Congressional Reconstruction.  
 In 1865, it would have been difficult to predict who out of the prewar elite would 
ultimately join the Republican Party. Members of the old ruling class would eventually be found 
in both postwar parties, and far more often among the Democrats. By analyzing the background 
of those who received Congressional amnesty, we can conclude that they had a similar 
background to those who opposed Reconstruction. Nevertheless, among those who did join the 
Republican Party, there were common patterns during the first couple years after the war. First, 
as they narrated their wartime experience, they frequently repudiated secession and described a 
Confederacy that had been riven by dissent and internal conflict. This constructed memory 
distanced them from the past and made it easier to accept new commitments. Not all 
reconstructed rebels, however, had been half-hearted Confederates; many were loyal to the end, 
like James Longstreet. Even more than anti-Confederate memory, the failure of Johnson’s plan 
convinced many to cast their lot with the rising power of Congress. Johnson had failed to 
convince northerners that the South was subdued, and as a result, Republicans would not admit 
	




southern representatives to Congress. A pragmatic assessment suggested that white southern 
home rule could not be had under Johnson. Finally, reconstructed rebels justified embracing 
defeat by articulating a version of masculinity based on restraint and pragmatic decision-making, 
which they juxtaposed with the unrestrained violence and emotional rhetoric of their critics. 
Embracing defeat became a point of pride connected to their sense of self as former soldiers and 
well-bred pragmatic men. When Congress took the reins, their self-reconstruction did not end, 
but instead entered a new phase.  
 
A Quantitative Profile 
The prewar antecedents of the reconstructed rebels gave little indication of the course 
they would pursue in 1867 and 1868 when Republican parties began to form in the South. Other 
studies of Southern Republicans have found that the leading men among them were less wealthy 
in 1860 than their opponents, but that they were still a respectable bunch. Perhaps their 
followers, the ordinary voters who are more anonymous because they never served in party 
leadership, had more lowly origins. However, the Democratic Party in the South clearly drew 
from poor and middling whites as well, many of whom associated Black political inclusion with 
the higher taxes imposed by Republican state governments. Rather than trying to distinguish 
party allegiance based on background, historians can learn more if they begin by admitting that 
the supporters and opponents of Reconstruction shared similar prewar origins.   
A fresh way of looking at Southern Republicans is to analyze those who received 
congressional amnesty. The Fourteenth Amendment’s third section barred prewar officeholders 
who later served the Confederacy from holding any postwar office—local, state, or federal. The 




office. Since some of those former rebels had actually become supporters of Reconstruction, 
Congress provided amnesty to 4,616 of these new allies. Among those relieved by the 40th 
Congress, only one was a known Democrat. The 41st Congress relieved Republicans as well as 
some Democrats who vocally supported the 14th and 15th Amendments as the legitimate law of 
the land. All their names were recorded in the congressional statutes, and often printed in 
newspapers as well.  
Matching a sample of these names with census and military records yields a quantitative 
profile for former elites who supported Reconstruction. The following analysis is based on a 
random, statistical sample of 355 persons who received congressional amnesty from either the 
40th or 41st Congress. Compared to the average white southerner, they were clearly a privileged 
group. While the average soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia owned roughly $1000 of 
property in 1860, the median household wealth for those who benefited from congressional 
amnesty was $9,200. According to the 1860 census, only a quarter of white southern households 
owned slaves, but 63 percent of the elite group that needed and received congressional amnesty 
held slave property.7  
The comparison here should not be too surprising. All of those who were subject to 
Fourteenth Amendment disqualifications were prewar officeholders, and those affected by the 
test oath had ambitions to hold a federal office. By definition they were a political elite, and their 
economic background reflected that status. One would expect these men who served in the 
Confederate military to be commissioned as officers, and indeed, 41 percent held commissions.  
More can be learned by comparing this group with other studies of the southern elite. Historian 
James Baggett collected data on 732 Southern Republicans and 666 of their Democratic 
	




opponents. All of the names came from newspapers, which frequently reported the delegates to 
party conventions at the state and local level. In other words, they represent party activists, not 
ordinary voters, and can be more fruitfully compared with the list of rebels who received 
congressional amnesty.8  
On the one hand, the numbers on amnestied Confederates validate Baggett’s conclusion 
that Southern Republicans came from a somewhat more modest background than Democrats. On 
the other hand, the comparison indicates that when southern Republicans had a Confederate 
record, civilian or military, they were more likely to share a common economic background with 
their opponents.  
 
Table 1: Status Categories of Reconstructed Rebels, White Southern Republicans, and 
Redeemers (in percentages) 
 1860 Wealth (thousands)  Slaveholdings in 1860 
 <10 10-19.999 >20 0 1-19 20+ 
Reconstructed Rebels* 51 17 32 46 42 11 
"Scalawags"** 54 20 26 59 31 10 
"Redeemers"*** 37 22 37 44 38 17 
*Based on a random statistical sample of 355 persons from the statutes on congressional 
amnesty. 
**Adapted from James A. Baggett, The Scalawags, 274-279.  
*** Adapted from James A. Baggett, The Scalawags, 274-279.  
 
Compared with Baggett’s southern Republican “scalawags,” a similar percentage of the 
amnestied “reconstructed rebels” could be found in the lowest two of three wealth brackets. The 
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percentage of those amnestied rebels with over $20,000 in property, however, is squarely 
between Baggett’s southern Republican “scalawags” and Democratic “Redeemers.” As for 
slaveholding, the percentage of non-slaveholders among amnestied rebels is similar to that for 
Redeemers and thirteen percentage points below that of Baggett’s “scalawags.” The 
reconstructed rebels on the amnesty list were more likely than either group to own fewer than 
twenty slaves, which is the traditional cutoff for who counted as planters. Democratic Redeemers 
counted more plantation owners among their leadership, though even these were less than a 
quarter of Redeemers. Overall, it seems clear that southern Republicans with a Confederate 
background were more similar than different from their Democratic opponents when it comes to 
economic origins.  
 Reconstructed rebels varied in how they made their wealth, both before and after the 
Civil War. James Alcorn was one of the wealthiest men in Mississippi, owning a quarter million 
dollars of property in 1860, including seventy-seven slaves on his Delta cotton plantation. Others 
like Arkansan Edward Gantt, who owned eight enslaved people in 1860, were born outside the 
planter class, but hoped to join it. The end of slavery opened some southerners’ eyes to new 
opportunities. Joseph E. Brown of Georgia made the switch from agriculture to new extractive 
industries like mining after the Civil War. Williams C. Wickham partnered with railroad 
magnate Collis Huntington after the war. Wickham’s father had owned almost three hundred 
enslaved people in the Richmond area, but finding that avenue cut off, he sought other kinds of 
power. Like most politically-inclined elites, reconstructed rebels on the amnesty list often 
entered the legal profession. A smaller number chose different professions, such as physician 
James Ramsay and Methodist minister John H. Caldwell. By 1870, thirty-seven percent of those 




considered themselves planters or farmers, and fourteen percent thought of themselves as 
commercial men.  
 When more political historians began employing quantitative methods in the 1960s and 
1970s, there was a vigorous debate over whether the “scalawags” had been antebellum Whigs or 
old-time Democrats. In Mississippi, many of the wealthiest Delta planters were former Whigs, 
and some of them like Alcorn joined the Republican party. Western North Carolina was also a 
prewar stronghold for Whigs, which later gravitated toward the Republicans. However, Whig 
leaders in the North Carolina piedmont also dominated the leadership of the anti-Reconstruction 
opposition and for a time helped rename the Democrats as the “Conservative Party.” In reaction, 
some former Democrats in the central and eastern parts of the state joined the Republicans. 
Likewise, in Alabama, upstate counties that were traditionally Democratic became bastions of 
wartime Unionism and then postwar Republicanism. It may be worth at some point analyzing the 
congressional amnesty list according to prewar party allegiance. For now though, it seems clear 
that the dynamics of interparty movement varied by region and were very idiosyncratic.9  
In all likelihood, there is more in their prewar background to separate reconstructed 
rebels from wartime Unionists than from Redeemers. Before the war began, Unionists included 
many big planters who accurately predicted that secession would risk their investments in 
slavery. After the fighting started, however, such men usually became Confederates and those 
who remained loyal to the Union were a humbler sort. One study of North Carolina’s wartime 
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Unionists found that almost twenty percent owned slaves. In the hill country sub-region of 
Alabama, another area with a high number of Unionists, the rate of slaveholding was only five 
and a half percent.10 These numbers come from the Southern Claims Commission, a body that 
attracted claims from many non-elite southerners who had been loyal to the Union and suffered 
because of the proximity of the Union army. Therefore, a comparison to the list of amnestied 
rebels, all politically experienced or politically ambitious, must be made with care. Still, the 
much higher incidence of slaveholding for amnestied rebels—sixty-three percent—strongly hints 
at the economic gap between the two groups who would later disagree about what direction to 
take the Republican Party in their states. 
The elite status of the reconstructed rebels did not determine which party they chose after 
the war, though it does ultimately help to explain their conservative influence from within the 
Republican Party. Moreover, these former Confederates were able to exert more influence than 
wartime Unionists, even to the extent of crafting their own anti-Confederate narrative that 
repudiated southern nationalism and embraced defeat for their own benefit.  
 
Confederate Service and Anti-Confederate Dissent 
Wartime Unionism was a strong indicator of postwar support for the Republican Party.11 
However, the number of Unionists cannot be counted in full toward the Republicans, since some 
were unable to swallow the party’s support for biracial citizenship. It should also be clear that 
white supporters of the Republican Party could not have all been wartime Unionists. The 
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electoral support for Republicans in various southern states exceeds most estimates of wartime 
Unionists. For example, in North Carolina, Republicans received at least twenty-three percent of 
the white vote in 1868, but only four to six percent of the 1860 white male population were 
Unionists.12 Additionally, of the former rebels whom Congress considered reconstructed, at least 
a third actually served in Confederate or state forces. Why would some former Confederates 
adopt a cause seemingly so antithetical to their past commitments? Part of the answer is that the 
postwar actions of reconstructed rebels, like those of Unionist-Republicans and unreconstructed 
rebels, had roots in wartime experience. 
 Historians have created a rich portrait of Confederate nationalism and anti-Confederate 
dissent. Numerous scholars have argued, with strong evidence, that attachment to slavery, the 
Confederate nation, and its armies, is what sustained resistance through four long years. In many 
cases, suffering, hardship, and the loss of slavery deepened white southern antipathy toward the 
North. Historians have also made a convincing case that Confederate nationalism, at least for 
some, endured beyond the failure of the Confederate state and fed into the resistance to 
Reconstruction.13 Another group of scholars have probed the extent and nuances of anti-
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Confederate white southern resistance. Thousands of white southerners fought an inner civil war 
against the Confederacy from beginning to end. For even more white southerners, national 
allegiance was conditional, responding to battlefield developments, and competing with other 
loyalties to state, community, and family.14 Reconstructed rebels did not emerge as a distinct 
group until after the war, but their origins often lay in this context of conditional loyalty. Despite 
the nominal adherence to the Confederacy of the overwhelming majority of white southerners, 
the conditional nature of their allegiance provides one explanation for why some of them later 
joined the Republican Party.  
 North Carolina harbored many southerners who were reluctant secessionists; it also was 
the home of a spirited peace movement that emerged halfway through the war. Newspaper editor 
William Woods Holden was a reluctant secessionist and the peace movement’s leader. Before 
the war, he had demonstrated considerable upward mobility. Born the illegitimate son of a mill 
owner, he got his start as a printer’s apprentice, slowly accumulated capital and connections, 
married well, and eventually became the editor of the Raleigh Standard. Like most professional 
and commercial southerners, Holden was also a small slave-owner. He owned 6 enslaved 
persons in 1860, and given his occupation, likely hired out their labor around town. Though he 
never held political office until after the war, he was considered an influential leader in the 
state’s Democratic Party.15  
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  Holden’s experience of disunion exemplified that of a conditional Confederate. In early 
1861, he helped to defeat the state’s first call for a convention to take North Carolina out of the 
Union. After the beginning of hostilities, however, voters sent him to a constitutional convention 
and he voted for secession. In the columns of The Standard, he then urged a united front against 
Lincoln’s armies. At the same time, though, he criticized Confederate and state leaders who 
appeared to be excluding reluctant secessionists from patronage appointments. Holden 
denounced the state’s ruling faction as “Destructives” and organized the “Conservative Party” in 
opposition. The Conservative Party’s victorious candidate, Zebulon Vance, soon proved too 
dedicated to the Confederate war effort for Holden, and in 1863, the editor began to encourage 
local “peace” meetings. A year later, he ran an unsuccessful campaign to unseat Vance, 
purposefully leaving it unclear whether his platform of peace meant reconstruction into the 
Union. While not overtly disloyal to the Confederacy, he was not a Confederate nationalist.16  
By early 1865, there were plenty of pragmatic Confederates who thought that diehard 
nationalists were insane. In April, Samuel F. Phillips, a former Whig from Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, was enraged by a friend’s suggestion that white southerners needed to “rouse” 
themselves to victory. “Have they not been roused,” Phillips asked, “were they not intoxicated 
by political nostrums before 1861, & stimulated to volunteer in running amok with Christendom 
upon the subject of slavery; & when that fever was wearing off, were they not then spurred 
forward without mercy in the same cause?” They had been “coerced by the Confed. 
Administration” and “all their means of force & fraud” employed on its citizens. Phillips felt 
astonished that anyone would think “a few words of encouragement, a few words of warning—
	




an Address, or a Proclamation can have the smallest effect in restoring vital energy.”17 Both 
Holden and Phillips became reconciled to reunion, and later, the Republican Party.  
 Holden and Phillips were Confederate civilians, but dissent was not limited to the home 
front. Edward Gantt of Arkansas was a Confederate colonel when he switched sides halfway 
through the war. To diehard rebels, he was the Benedict Arnold of the Confederacy—though 
unlike Arnold, he picked the winning cause. His defection in late 1863 and subsequent speaking 
tour of northern cities brought him both fame and notoriety. Northern newspapers sometimes 
referred to him as a “Unionist,” ignoring Gantt’s past, even though Gantt himself never dodged 
the fact that he was an ex-Confederate officer.18 The Unionist label said more about how many 
northerners understood loyalty during the war years. To Abraham Lincoln and a large swath of 
northern opinion, Unionism meant anyone presently loyal to the United States, including the 
returning loyalty of rebels. What it meant to be a “Unionist” and “reconstructed” would change 
during the postwar years, and Gantt would eventually become a supporter of Congressional 
Reconstruction, but his personal reconstruction began with wartime disillusionment.  
 Like Holden, Gantt was a man-on-the-make in the decade before the Civil War. In 1853, 
at the age of twenty-four, he moved from his native Tennessee to Arkansas, following the pattern 
of many ambitious young southerners moving westward. Rather than fighting to penetrate the 
Delta elite on the eastern border of the state, he ventured further to the southwestern corner and 
settled in the new, but growing town of Washington. A lawyer, like his father before him, he 
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quickly set up practice and successfully ran for the office of prosecuting attorney. Two years 
later he married the daughter of a planter who had moved to Arkansas the same year he had.19 
 The sectional conflict presented even greater opportunities for Gantt. In 1860, he was 
elected to Congress as a Democrat, though this victory was overshadowed by the presidential 
election. After the Republican victory, Gantt stoked the fires of secession by appealing to white 
manhood. The following year, the 12th Arkansas infantry chose Gantt as its colonel. Observers 
speculated that he would ascend higher still. However, on April 7, 1862, Union troops 
surrounded and captured Gantt and his men at an outpost on the Mississippi River. Five months 
in a Massachusetts prison were followed by his exchange and return to Arkansas, and then, 
nothing, as he waited in vain almost a year for a new commission. Perhaps Gantt’s injured pride 
collided with a realistic assessment of the Confederacy’s falling star and the mortal toll on white 
Arkansans. After the defeat at Vicksburg on July 4, 1863 cut Arkansas off from the rest of the 
Confederacy, Gantt crossed into Union lines and surrendered.20  
 A week later, Gantt was in Washington, D.C., conferring with President Lincoln. At the 
end of the trip, he put some of the points he raised in the meeting on paper. He began by saying 
that he was not looking for a political or military position. Perhaps he was sincere—his only 
offices after 1863 were a short stint in the Freedmen’s Bureau, and later, his old job as state 
prosecutor. Gantt then expressed his opinion that Arkansas could not be restored to loyalty 
through military power. An effort would have to be made to change the hearts of white 
Arkansans. A loyal newspaper, he argued, “would be worth more than a corps of soldiers.” 
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Practicing some of the arguments he would later make directly to white Arkansans, Gantt told 
Lincoln that the war had destroyed the wealth of slaveholders, ravaged the poor, and would soon 
wipe out the fortunes of the middle classes too. “Though,” Gantt continued, “we might not at 
once cut through their prejudices & educate them to the belief that the old flag and the old 
Government are their best friends & best protectors; yet having them once back, we can trust to 
Time, confident in all hope for results.”21 Gantt’s conversion, along with his faith that others 
would renew their loyalty, appealed to Lincoln’s beliefs about white southerners. Gantt was the 
first Confederate officer who Lincoln pardoned, and the Arkansan would continue to advise the 
president on Reconstruction.22   
    In a pamphlet dated October 7, 1863, Gantt addressed white Arkansans with his new 
views. He asked them to reject the Confederate nationalist policy of “let the last man die” and 
instead submit to Union authorities. He argued that the national armies could give more 
protection to life and property than the Confederacy. As for slavery, he contended that it stunted 
economic development and the South would be better without it. Though Gantt had owned eight 
slaves himself and had played an active role launching a war to protect the institution, he blamed 
the war’s continuation on the wealthy and interpreted its consequences in class terms. “The rich 
have mostly fallen,” he wrote. “The poor have drunk deep of the cup of sorrow.” Now, he 
warned “tide of ruin, in its resistless surge, sweeps toward the middle classes.”23  
Gantt held out hope, however, that in a post-emancipation South, Arkansas’s industrial 
manufactures “will reverberate to the music of machinery in New-England, and the whir of 
	
21 E. W. Gantt to Abraham Lincoln, 15 Jul 1863, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC, Washington, D.C. 
22 William C. Harris, With Charity for All: Lincoln and the Restoration of the Union (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1997), 132-33.  




Georgia spindles will meet responsive echo upon the slopes of the far off Pacific.” Economic 
development and national reunification would proceed together. He prophesied that without the 
peculiar institution of slavery, “the next generation [will] be more homogeneous and united than 
any since the days of the Revolution.” Homogeneity had negative connotations for white 
southerners who associated it with the loss of whiteness, as well as manhood, due to racial 
mixing. For Republicans, however, it suggested national unity. Homogeneity became a mantra 
for Gantt and other reconstructed rebels.24  
After addressing Arkansans, Gantt commenced on a tour of northern cities to bolster 
support for the Union war effort, Lincoln’s reelection, and recognition of a free state government 
back home. In January 1864, he spoke in Cincinnati and Harrisburg. The following month, he 
addressed audiences in New York City and Brooklyn.25 Mixing providential and industrial 
language, he said that God had determined “that we should be blasted together by the furnace of 
civil war, and welded into one great homogeneous and powerful government.” Union victory 
would bring a “new order of things,” “regeneration,” a “new destiny of greater importance,” and 
“a grander march of power and progress.” He predicted increased white immigration to the South 
once slavery was removed, and he advertised the region’s natural resources to his northern 
audiences. At the Cooper Institute in New York, he even recommended white Arkansas women 
as “some of the prettiest girls in the world,” suggesting that inter-sectional marriage would help 
bring homogeneity. He marveled at the future: “The American genius will spread all over this 
land, will climb the hills of the West and roam on the shores of the Pacific, and the time will 
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come when your Yankees, and Germans and Irish will settle all over that beautiful land of 
ours.”26  
Gantt did not address the future of freedpeople during his speaking tour. He boasted that 
there was room enough on the Oachitta River for every freedperson in Arkansas as well as 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, thus reserving the rest of the state for whites. Native 
Americans, he said, were doomed to fade before the westward expansion of white Americans. 
Homogeneity meant the assimilation of northerners, southerners, and European immigrants into 
a single people, but whether African Americans also could be assimilated was unclear.27 A 
month after Confederate defeat, Gantt wrote in a public letter to Pennsylvania Congressman 
William Kelley that he believed Black southerners were “capable of culture and improvement.” 
He also noted “that all loyal men should accord to [them] the principle of suffrage and equality 
before the law is becoming a wide-spread conviction.”28 His concept of uplift was paternalistic, 
but by including African Americans in a vision of national citizenship, he was already far 
removed from the ideas he held in 1860. 
By March, Gantt was back in Arkansas. A Union colonel wrote to Lincoln, “Mr. 
Gantt has returned, having been as far North as my native county in New-Hampshire. He says if 
he had known as much of the North three years ago as he does now he never would have favored 
secession. I give him credit for being truly sincere in the sentiment.”29 Despite Gantt’s previous 
appeals to white racism and his wartime participation in the Confederacy, he never went back on 
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his new position. He supported Johnson before Congressional Republicans fully broke with his 
policy, and he remained a committed Republican until his early death in 1874.  
Gantt was atypical in the extent to which he carried his disillusionment during the war 
itself. More frequently, Confederates who criticized the insurgent government’s policies 
remained loyal to the cause of slavery and independence at least until the war’s end. 
Nevertheless, wartime dissent was important in shaping the postwar reconstruction of former 
rebels. Even in less extreme cases where it did not produce an early break with Confederate 
allegiance, dissent provided a path for rationalizing later actions. Gantt belonged to a section of 
wartime society that was only conditionally Confederate. Lincoln looked to them for leadership 
in reconstructing the South. Not all conditional Confederates became Republicans, but those who 
did frequently dwelled on their wartime experience and disillusionment.  
 
Anti-Confederate Memory 
Given the later dominance of “Lost Cause” collective memory, one might be surprised 
that many Confederates attempted to repudiate the southern nation in the immediate aftermath of 
defeat. Some emphasized their opposition to secession or dissatisfaction with Confederate 
policies. Others described a conversion experience, by which they realized that slavery had 
inhibited southern economic development. In all cases, their retrospection represented a break 
with the past. It placed them in an antagonistic position to the diehard rebels and the earliest 
apostles of “Lost Cause” memory. Embracing defeat in this way was a key step toward joining 
the Republican Party.  
 Edward Gantt was the highest-ranking Confederate officer to defect during the war, but 




equally shocking to diehards. Born and raised outside Richmond, he had been elected as a Whig 
to the Virginia senate in 1859 and voted against secession at the convention that took the state 
out of the Union. Nevertheless, he raised his own company of Confederate soldiers and was 
commissioned as colonel of the 4th Virginia regiment. By the middle of the war, he was 
promoted to brigadier general, but at the same time that Gantt fled to the North, Wickham took a 
seat in the Confederate Congress, where he advocated an early peace with the Union.30 Then, on 
April 23, 1865, he wrote a public letter telling Virginians that the Confederacy had “met with a 
deserved and violent death.”31  
 Wickham blamed secessionists for wrecking the state’s prosperity and expressed a hope 
that Virginians would now choose wiser leaders who would devise speedy means for the state’s 
recovery. Wasting no time mourning the Confederacy, he listed as subjects for immediate 
attention “the reorganization of our system of labor, the resuscitation of our internal 
improvement system, and the establishment of a financial and monetary system.”32 Later, he 
would deny a story circulated by one of his Republican friends that during the war he had shed 
tears whenever he saw the United States flag. Nevertheless, he admitted that the sight always 
inspired in him “emotions of regard,” that he was pained when he saw a Confederate soldier 
dragging it in the dust after Manassas, and that "there was no day during the late war on which I 
would not have hailed with pleasure an announcement of the restoration of peace and the 
Union."33 In his 1865 letter, Wickham did not explicitly align himself with the Republican Party, 
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but his party loyalty would be confirmed after the breach between the president and congress 
emerged.34  
John H. Caldwell was another Confederate who embraced defeat, though he had never 
been a fighting man. By 1865, Caldwell had been a Methodist minister for the past twenty years. 
Living in the Georgia piedmont, he had gained two slaves through marriage, but sold them to pay 
off the debts on a women’s college he founded. During the war, Caldwell told his congregation 
that God was on the Confederacy’s side.35 In contrast, a couple months after defeat, he 
reconsidered where he and “[his] people” fit in God’s plan.36 Starting with the epiphany that God 
had been against the Confederacy, he reasoned that God had allowed white southerners to be 
defeated because of the evils of slavery. In a sermon on June 11, 1865, Caldwell explained to 
former slaveowners like himself that they had sinned, that they were being punished, and that 
they must repent.37  
Caldwell’s sermon also provided hope for the future. If slavery and the Confederacy were 
immoral, southerners both Black and white could rejoice in the dawn of “a new era.” The future 
would be “an era of light and knowledge, dispelling the shades of a long darkness. New light 
flows in upon our minds; new ideas are afloat in our midst; a new regime takes the place of the 
old; and society, upturned in its foundations by war, revolution, social and moral disorder, will 
settle down at last upon a new basis.”38 His language of light and darkness was biblical, and it 
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also mirrored the way antebellum Republicans described the benefits that free labor would bring 
to the South.39 Caldwell went on to describe a future South characterized by wage labor, equal 
justice under the law, a homogenous culture shared with the North, and a thriving economy.40   
Caldwell’s congregation refused to abide his repudiation of the Confederate cause. They 
condemned him as a traitor, assailed his motives, and ultimately forced him out of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, South. However, he was not alone in his decision to embrace defeat, nor were 
his new views ephemeral. He joined the northern branch of the Methodists, served in the Georgia 
legislature as a Republican, and later worked as a detective for the Justice Department, ferreting 
out Klan activities.  
At the same time that Caldwell was repudiating slavery, a former Confederate ordnance 
officer expressed concern over a similar sort of revisionism among his peers. An Alabama dinner 
host disturbed the man with “retrospection of his opposition to the doctrine of secession,” and 
what he considered “the necessary deduction that we fought so valiantly & bled so freely in a 
cause radically wrong.” The dinner guest attributed such reflections to a sort of cognitive 
dissonance: “he has I learn however done his share to sustain the war, & perhaps that 
consciousness makes him talk the more freely of his former views.”41  
Repudiation of the Confederate cause was most common in states with considerable 
wartime dissent like Georgia and North Carolina. A Macon judge admitted publicly that he had 
defended the legality of secession and slavery as both necessary and morally right. After the war, 
however, he considered the war a “chasm which separates the old South from the new.” He 
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hoped that an “improved and enlightened civilization” would grow out of defeat and urged 
fellow white southerners that they “let not pride, prejudice and folly blind us, and lead us 
stumbling backward over a wilderness of graves to meet the embrace of death; for we must be 
men, not monuments.”42 One white North Carolinian was even less gracious about the past. 
When his state held a new constitutional convention to repudiate secession, he declared it his 
view that “secession has wellnigh ruined the country,” and he did not care “how strong the 
language in which I express my detestation of it.” A reluctant secessionist who saw himself as 
having been forced into rebellion, the delegate drew a distinction between himself and “the 
leaders of the Rebellion.” Since they had forced him to swallow “a bitter pill,” he would have 
them take a strongly-worded resolution repudiating secession “without the least sweetening.”43  
William Woods Holden became one of the most vitriolic repudiators of the Confederacy, 
and his transformation gives deeper illustration to the role of memory in shaping postwar 
political divisions. Wartime dissent took on new meanings when the war was over. A record of 
conflict with Confederate and state leadership allowed Holden to recast his old opponents as 
villains and imagine himself as the herald of a “new order.”44 In a proclamation printed in his 
newspaper, Holden told white North Carolinians that they had “been delivered by the armies of 
the Union from one of the most corrupt and rigorous despotisms that ever existed in the world.” 
Confederate authorities had violently conscripted them to fight for slavery “and also for a state of 
slavery for yourselves and your children.” Families had been deprived of “freedom of speech and 
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of the press, and of every essential guarantee of liberty and of protection to person and property.” 
Thankfully, under the Union, they were once more “free citizens.”45  
Ex post facto Unionism dominated North Carolina’s first postwar election. President 
Andrew Johnson, taking over for the assassinated Lincoln, appointed Holden provisional 
governor of the state in May 1865. In October, Holden hoped to win the same position by regular 
election. The Standard, now managed by Holden’s son, described the provisional governor as 
“an unflinching national Union man” and maintained that his patronage appointments likewise 
“have been during the war consistent Union men, so far as they could be.”46 The qualification, 
“so far as they could be,” suggested both the complexity of political loyalty during the Civil War 
and the constructed nature of postwar Unionism. Holden’s secretary of the treasury, Jonathan 
Worth, challenged him for the position of governor, asserting that Andrew Johnson “would 
rather a Union man, of any consistent record, were elected over Mr. Holden.” Worth had 
reluctantly accepted secession, taken an oath to the Confederacy as state legislator and treasurer, 
and managed wartime finance until the surrender. Nevertheless, like Holden, Worth underscored 
his opposition to disunion, disdain for the Confederacy leadership, and nostalgia for the old 
union.47  
Ultimately, public perceptions of Holden and Worth determined the legitimacy of their 
claims. Both diehard Confederates and wartime Unionists rejected Holden’s claims on the past. 
One diehard rebel considered Holden “the lowest, most abject, & degraded man [northerners] 
could find among us,” “a base born bastard with neither the breeding nor the instinct of a 
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gentleman.”48 As Holdenites predicted, the counties that had once provided the strongest support 
for secession turned out for Worth. For Worth’s supporters, reconstructed Union loyalty did not 
mean repudiating the “Lost Cause,” as Holden had done.  
The Standard used satire to reflect on Holden’s defeat and underline the increasing 
ambiguity of postwar loyalty. “We ar all union men now,” a fictional backwoods yeoman 
observed with mock resignation. “Uncle Jim says his old coon dog lyon has got to be union, and 
its union every whar and every body, some how or somehow else.” The captain of the home 
guard who “ketched the desarters, and sich as he could’nt ketch he shot, he’s union.” The 
fictional narrator thought back on his own record—he had opposed secession, supported peace, 
voted for Holden in 1864, took the oath of loyalty—but when he went to cast his vote in the 
recent election, he was shocked to hear that Holden had once voted for secession, that he was the 
disloyal candidate, and that anyone who supported Holden was a secessionist. “I sum times look 
at the glass and wonder ef its me….Are you union? Am I union? ...Have I gone astray, or am I 
what I was? This is a distressin question.”49 Claims to Union loyalty could appear deceptive, 
even empty, when individuals disagreed on what kind of Union the postwar United States was to 
become. 
Competing definitions of postwar Unionism were a reflection of national disagreements 
over what it meant for an ex-rebel to be reconstructed. To Andrew Johnson, someone like 
Jonathan Worth was fully reconstructed and North Carolina deserved full status in the Union. To 
moderate Republicans, however, Worth was an unreconstructed rebel who refused to protect the 
civil rights of Union men—Black and white, northern and southern. The ambiguity of postwar 
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loyalty can thus explain the sarcasm with which northern newspapers used the term 
“reconstructed rebels” in the first year after the war. In July 1865, The Pittsburg Gazette 
provided a “graphic picture of reconstructed rebels” in Washington, D.C.: “He was long of limb, 
broad of shoulder, hollow of chest, loose of joint, unkempt of hair, sallow of face, dirty of finger 
nails, and gray of clothing. He used very broad accent of speech, was loud and coarse of voice, 
begged tobacco of anybody, drank whisky by the glass full at the expense of the Northern man 
with Southern principles, and was, in a word, every way obnoxious to cleanliness, liberty, 
manhood and loyalty.” The man was “as great a stickler now as ever for State rights.”50 In other 
words, he was not reconstructed at all.  
During the war, there was some agreement that Union loyalty included white southerners 
who ceased their resistance to the United States authorities—hence, why papers could write 
about Gantt as a “Unionist.” After the war, however, northerners gave increasingly greater 
consideration to what kind of nation they wanted to build. While Democrats were largely content 
with prewar federalism, Republicans had already in the prewar years developed a nation-building 
vision based on common institutions, such as free labor, public schools, and the bourgeois 
household. For former Confederates, repudiating secession and slavery did not necessarily mean 
giving up on regionalism, states’ rights, or white supremacy. However, for those who continued 
to reconstruct themselves, like Gantt, Caldwell, and Holden, embracing the past was an essential 









Embracing the Republican Party 
The political conflict between President Johnson and Republicans in Congress forced 
white southerners to take sides. Though most sided with Johnson, those who eventually joined 
the Republican Party gradually came to the conclusion that opposing Congress would prevent 
them from attaining their goals: returning the South to the Union, restoring economic prosperity, 
and stabilizing the social and political order in their local communities.  
In 1866, Johnson attempted to form a “National Union Party” that would bring together 
Democrats and conservative Republicans in opposition to more radical Republicans who wanted 
to transform the South. Republican gains in the midterms showed that Johnson was not an 
effective standard bearer against Congress. Congress continually overrode Johnson’s vetoes, and 
in 1867, passed the Reconstruction Acts, which would require the southern states to write new 
constitutions that included Black voting rights. Democrats promised to overturn everything that 
Congressional Republicans had started. Though most reconstructed rebels did not start out as 
supporters of Congressional Reconstruction, the Democrats’ rhetoric gradually convinced them 
that a Democratic administration could only lead to greater conflict and ruin. 
Ex-Confederate elites wanted their states readmitted to the Union and longed for an 
economic recovery. Some even saw Confederate defeat as an opportunity. DeBow’s Review, a 
New Orleans journal that had advocated agricultural and industrial reforms prior to the war, 
proposed a plan to “revive the former prosperity of these states.”51 In an 1867 article titled, “New 
Era for Southern Manufactures,” Alabama’s Johnsonian Governor Robert M. Patton insisted on 
the necessity of shifting from cotton agriculture to textile mills.52 Atlanta’s aptly named New Era 
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declared its mission to become “an acceptable auxiliary to business men” by having “less to do 
with politics than with markets, North and South.”53 In another editorial, it argued that the state 
needed “more railroads, more rolling mills and foundries, more machine shops, more mining 
operations, more cotton mills, more mechanics, more scientific and industrial energy.”54   
Slavery had made considerable wealth for planters, but as historians and economists have 
noted, it depressed farm values and left the region underdeveloped.55 The editor of the New Era 
understood this. “We have,” he wrote, “been in the rear ranks of progress long enough. We have 
never been sufficiently active, and have never had active capital enough.—Heretofore our wealth 
has been locked up in negroes; hereafter wealth must be invested in profitable enterprises.” 
Moreover, he predicted that if Georgia adopted a more industrial political economy, “animosities 
will die out more rapidly” and there will “no longer [be] any sections, but that the interests of 
every part [will be] identical.”56 In the South’s loss of its sectional identity, it would find new 
economic life.  
Commercial-minded elites like the editor of the New Era embraced the early postwar 
order under Johnson while still asserting white dominance. In 1866, the New Era broke its 
promise to eschew partisan politics by criticizing the Fourteenth Amendment and declaring itself 
an “unyielding advocate of Constitutional equality to the white race.”57 When Robert Patton had 
earlier announced his candidacy for governor, he referred to Alabama as a “white man’s 
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government” and said “we must keep this a white man’s state.”58 Arkansas’s ex-Confederate 
“Unionist,” Edward Gantt, distinguished himself from “radicals” but still hoped that he could 
prove to Congress that Arkansas was ready to be brought back into the Union promptly with full 
congressional representation and minimal changes to government.59 William Holden, even after 
losing to Jonathan Worth in late 1865, did not immediately embrace the radical cause. Early the 
next year, he opined in his newspaper that Black suffrage “ignores hundreds of thousands of 
white Unionists in the South” and “puts the freedmen above them.”60 
By 1867, all of these men changed their tune. Republicans added to their majority in the 
1866 midterms, and then in March 1867, passed their plan for reorganizing the southern state 
governments. To reconstructed rebels, it was apparent that their states would not be readmitted to 
Congress under Johnson’s terms. They would have to “accept the situation,” as many southern 
elites began to say. Making an about-face, the New Era embraced the Congressional terms in 
May. The goal was to restore southern political power and economic prosperity. Restoration to 
the Union, with congressional representation, it noted, would mean “stability, confidence, 
increase of capital and population and productiveness, and general prosperity.”61 
Others reached similar conclusions after speaking with northern investors. Alabama 
Governor Robert Patton, returning from a trip to New York City in early 1867, reported that 
capitalists there were unwilling to lend money because of the state’s “disjointed condition.”62 
When Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts in March, Patton grounded his pleas for 
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cooperation with the Republican plan on economic development. In a public letter, Patton told 
Alabamians that the state’s resources “are known and appreciated by capitalists who are eager to 
come among us and make investments, but who will not do so in the present condition of 
uncertainty.”63  
Conceding the authority of Congress did not always mean joining the Republican Party, 
but the options were limited. Johnson’s National Union movement was a failure, and the 
Democratic Party made Reconstruction a campaign issue. The Democratic nominee for the vice-
presidency, Frank Blair, published a letter in early July 1868 where he announced his opinion 
that “there is but one way to restore the Government and the Constitution, and that is for the 
President elect to declare [the Reconstruction Acts] null and void, compel the army to undo its 
usurpations at the South, disperse the carpetbag Southern government, allow the white people to 
reorganize their own governments and elect Senators and Republicans.”64 Many soon-to-be 
southern Republicans found this sentiment too extreme.  
North Carolina physician James G. Ramsay had opposed Black suffrage earlier that year, 
but he could not swallow Blair’s position. North Carolina had already formed a government with 
Black suffrage and to overturn it, he reasoned, would take a military coup. He noticed that 
besides Blair’s letter, there were southern newspapers defending secession and predicting a new 
war. Ramsay predicted that a Democratic counterrevolution would only lead to another 
Republican revolution, and the nation would be “Mexicanized and ruined.” He said he could not 
fully endorse either party, but having concluded “that it is neither wise, politic, nor safe to 
attempt to unsettle and subvert the present order of things,” he declared that in the upcoming 
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election he would support Grant and Colfax, the Republican candidates. Once in the Republican 
camp, he never left.65  
Williams C. Wickham was all-in for Grant. At a Republican meeting in Richmond, he 
labeled Grant “the peace candidate” and Seymour and Blair “the war candidates, in view of 
Blair’s declaration.” The attempt by a Democratic president to disband the South’s Republican 
governments would “launch the country again into civil war more bloody, more brutal, and more 
disastrous in its consequences than that through which we have passed.” He believed that the 
terms Johnson offered to the South “were the best” and that they would have been accepted “had 
not the unfortunate variance between Mr. Johnson and Congress aroused in the breasts of the old 
leaders of the Democracy the hope of re-establishing their way.” The election of Grant, he 
promised, would repair the state’s fortunes and show people “that they must look at Grant and 
the Republican party alone for restoration,” relieving them of “the uncertainty that now bears 
them down,” giving “confidence in investments in the South to capital seeking employment,” as 
well as providing “a fresh impetus to business of every kind.”66 
Other prominent rebels joined in the fear that the Democratic Party might do more harm 
to the economic and social order of the South than if southerners simply allowed things to settle. 
James Longstreet wrote that he could find nothing in the Democratic Party “except the issues 
that were staked upon the war and there lost.”67 James Alcorn of Mississippi called the 
Democrats’ theories on states’ rights “mummies” and “fossils of the pre-secession period.” He 
urged white Mississippians to collaborate with African Americans under Congressional 
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Reconstruction as a practical necessity. Both Longstreet and Alcorn joined the Republican Party 
shortly after making these statements—and after experiencing heavy criticism for making them. 
Democratic newspaper editors in the South made sure that there was no place for cooperation 
with Congressional Reconstruction outside the Republican Party.   
Former rebels also joined the Republican Party because they feared it was the only way 
to prevent racial violence or Black control of government. Wickham advised other Virginia 
Republicans to adopt policies that would “prevent the success of the effort to array the races 
against each other.” Longstreet believed that by joining the party, ex-Confederates could 
influence Black voters and prevent them from injuring the interests of white southerners. They 
could do the work of Reconstruction themselves and “have it white instead of black.”68 James 
Alcorn compared his cooperating with Congressional Reconstruction to what one does in the 
case of a runaway horse: “first run on with it for a distance sufficient to check its speed.”69 
Ramsay, the North Carolina physician, wrote that “with the advantages we have of race, 
education and property, it will be the fault and disgrace of the white race if the negro dominates.” 
He exhorted white southerners, “let us move onwards and upward, leading and elevating the 
negro as we ascend, and prove our vaunted superiority, not by keeping him back, but by keeping 
ourselves in the van.”70  
Reconstructed rebels did not see a contradiction between these views and Republican 
shibboleths like legal equality and national homogeneity. Former Confederate colonel William 
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B. Rodman of North Carolina summed up the goals of the Republican Party as “one law, one 
civilization, one government for the whole United States.”71 A former member of Confederate 
General James Longstreet’s staff, Rodman considered “there can be no evil so baleful as local 
self-government.” He reached this conclusion because of the racial strife in the South. Black and 
white southerners continually feared that the other race would gain control, and only national 
power could prevent violence.72  An anonymous letter to the Raleigh Standard read, “The road to 
reconstruction, recuperation, and power for the South lies only in the loyal and political equality 
of the races. I did not formerly think so, but am now a CONVERTED CONFEDERATE.”73  
Republican converts criticized their anti-Reconstruction opponents for holding onto a 
“Lost Cause” that would hold the South back from recovery and stability. Conservative anti-
reconstructionist Edward Pollard had coined the term “Lost Cause” in an 1866 book in which he 
argued, ironically, that the Confederate cause was not lost because white southerners could 
preserve white supremacy within the restored Union. A military conflict had become “a war of 
ideas.”74 By contrast, Amos Akerman, a reconstructed rebel from Georgia, considered 
Confederate defeat to mean the surrender “not only of our persons and territory but also of our 
local governments and of the political theories on which the rebellion rested.”75 He believed that 
“a surrender in good faith really signified a surrender of the substance as well as the form of the 
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Confederate cause.”76 At the same time, however, reconstructed rebels were able to restore the 
power of white elites by joining the Republican Party. Embracing defeat had led them to 
embrace the Republican Party, but they did so because they could not rely on the Democratic 
Party to achieve their goals: economic growth, racial stability, the restoration of antebellum 
elites. By capturing the Republican Party, they might turn defeat into victory.  
 
Manly Allegiance and Unmanly Submission 
James Longstreet told the editor of the New Orleans Times that he would speak his mind 
with the “bluntness of a soldier.” Former Confederates had two choices: they could rejoin the 
Union “by returning to our allegiance, in good faith” and adhering to Congress’s terms, or they 
could “seek protection under some foreign government.” Returning to allegiance was the action 
of men who still had the power to control their destiny. By contrast, seeking protection abroad 
implied that they had lost an essential trait of manhood: the ability to protect themselves and 
their families.77 With his choice of words, Longstreet suggested that embracing Reconstruction 
was the more manly course.    
 Reconstruction’s southern opponents offered a different interpretation of what makes a 
man. To Democrats, abandoning their party meant unmanly submission to the North. Lucius 
Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, a relation of Longstreet’s by marriage, wrote that the general had 
“gone over bag and baggage to the conquerors.”78 A Virginia newspaper interpreted Williams C. 
Wickham’s Reconstruction letter as “counselling submission.”79 Such an action also incurred a 
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loss of whiteness. Another paper chided Wickham for his “desertion of the White and adherence 
to the Negro party.”80 When William Holden joined the Republican Party, opponents called him 
a “damned negrofied son of a bitch.”81 Others insisted that he was a “mulatto.”82 A group of 
North Carolina Republicans were called “Flounders or white sided Negros” by members of the 
opposition.83 Verbal assaults on reconstructed rebels were gendered as well. One North Carolina 
Conservative, hearing a rumor that a prominent citizen had joined the Republicans because he 
needed money, asked how “a man, who has any manhood at all” could do so “and expect a 
gentleman to treat him with civility.”84  
Ultimately, whiteness and manliness were bound together. To Reconstruction’s 
opponents, joining the Republican Party meant abdicating white men’s duty to protect white 
women from Black men. One anti-Reconstruction cartoon depicted men and women of both 
races in close proximity. The artist drew their leader, “Simon Pure,” with his arms around two 
African Americans. The men and women also have similar facing features, effectively 
degendering them.  
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Figure 1: “My name is Simon Pure, Esq. : I am the greatest man that ever 
lived,” [c.a. 1870], <https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/93505760/>. 
 
 Even northern voices tended to undermine the manliness of reconstructed rebels, however 
unintentionally. Popular fiction of the postwar era frequently used the romantic pairing of a 
northern man with a southern woman to symbolize “the romance of reunion.” For example, John 
W. De Forest used this trope in his Miss Ravenel’s Conversion from Secession to Loyalty. Lillie 
Ravenel, the rebellious daughter of an exiled southern unionist, meets Edward Colburne, an 
emotionally temperate northerner, in a fictional New England state. After failing to convince 




free labor and American nationalism. Her conversion comes after a romance with chivalric 
Union colonel from Virginia, social ostracism in occupied New Orleans, her father’s assault by 
rebels, a troubled marriage to the colonel, and finally courtship by Colburn after the colonel’s 
death. By the end she confesses that she does not want to return to her native New Orleans, 
emphatically declaring her preference for the North.85  
  As historian Nina Silber has argued, stories like Miss Ravenel reflected what postwar 
northerners thought about power relations between the sections. The North would reassert its 
authority over the South, while simultaneously restoring bonds of nationalism. Miss Ravenel’s 
conversion also reflected northern ideas about appropriate gender roles in the two sections. War 
had proven that southern manliness, despite its explosive sensitivity to slights against honor, was 
no match for northern self-discipline. Southern men had also allowed women to become 
excessively political, as De Forest showed through the violently aggressive women of New 
Orleans. To the victors, the northern model of restrained manhood and domestic womanhood 
was necessary to restore order in the South.86  
 Such portrayals mattered to reconstructed rebels for multiple reasons. For one, if the new 
power relations between North and South were gendered male and female respectively, then 
reconstructed rebels were abandoning their manliness by submitting to northern authority. 
Diehard rebels who clung to political resistance said as much, and reconstructed rebels would 
need to find a way to respond, both to establish legitimacy and for their own sense of dignity. 
Secondly, reconstructed rebels would tap into the conception of manliness in novels like De 
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Forest’s—the idea that men were reserved and emotionally disciplined. What De Forest 
portrayed as a regional conception of masculinity, rooted in Yankee culture, reconstructed rebels 
still understood very well because there existed a similar understanding among white southern 
elites. In the way they presented themselves and explained their conversion to loyalty, 
reconstructed rebels implied that they were not being submissive, but rather acting out the 
bourgeois norms of masculinity. They also suggested that their male opponents were acting like 
hysterical women.  
 For example, Richard C. Badger, an elite North Carolinian, attributed his decision to join 
the Republican party to the opposition’s effeminacy. He said he might still belong to the 
Conservative Party—as the anti-Republican opposition in North Carolina was still calling 
itself—if they had possessed the manliness to accept defeat in the 1868 presidential election, 
worked to “preserve the peace,” and “quiet[ed] the passions” of those still bitter about 
Confederate defeat. Conservatives, he said, “have been adding fuel to the flame by a fool-hardy 
and childish ‘kicking against the pricks.’” He likewise considered the recent activities of the Ku 
Klux Klan, which served as the Conservatives’ military arm, “cowardly and unmanly.” 
Republican manhood was peaceful and restrained by contrast. When he described a speech by 
Samuel F. Phillips, the Republican nominee for attorney general of North Carolina, as 
“unimpassioned,” Badger meant it as a compliment.87   
The man Badger so highly endorsed was neither a staunch Unionist, nor a staunch 
Confederate, and not even a publicly committed Republican until he received the nomination. 
Nevertheless, Sam Phillips had a reputation for personal integrity and shared Badger’s view that 
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the Conservative penchant for heated emotion betrayed a lack of true manhood. In 1865, Phillips 
had described the rhetoric of Confederate politicians as “the language of officials…of 
speculators…of many ladies.” In other words, it was the language of people who asked others to 
sacrifice in a way they personally would not. Phillips even discounted the manhood of the 
Confederate president, writing that Jefferson Davis “talks like a school miss about the enemy 
polluting our soil & capital.”88 Though martial valor and resolve were manly virtues to many in 
the South, Phillips tapped into more bourgeois gender norms, defining reason as masculine and 
passion as feminine.  
When the war was over, Phillips still considered it wrong to array the people against 
unalterable realities. In response to a constitutional argument against the legality of 
Reconstruction, he asked “Is it kind to our people who are now suffering from calamities which 
come in great measure from ill-considered declamations of this sort—to arouse their passions 
against a matter which they can no more help now than they can the eclipse of the sun?” He 
believed that the lesson behind defeat was the need for restraint.89 In 1870, he deprecated the 
continued “heat and intemperance” of political rhetoric and argued that it had incited the people 
to vigilante violence. Rather than appealing to martial manhood, Phillips called for a return to 
“moderation and tolerance.” He suggested that “all quiet men who wish to establish a foundation 
upon which the fabric of private fortune, for themselves and their children, may be erected” 
would join him in cooperating with the Republican party. Samuel Phillips believed that the 
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interests of future peace and prosperity required reconstructed men who exhibited restraint and 
approached the future pragmatically.90  
Williams C. Wickham agreed, and told Virginians who would listen that it took more 
“moral courage” to announce oneself as a Republican. He would rather be called a “scallawag” 
than a Democrat, because “no scallawag could legislate more injuriously for the interests of the 
South and of the whole country, than, when in power, did this same Democratic party, which is 
now struggling to regain the reins of Government.”91 Gentlemen did not choose a party based on 
popular emotion and a desire to maintain good public standing; they placed their community’s 
interests above their own reputation and wisely divined the best course of action for the public 
good.   
Reconstructed rebels did not lack pride in their martial abilities, but they were more 
likely to recognize the state’s monopoly on violence, exercised through legal institutions and the 
militia. James Longstreet is the most obvious example. He led the Louisiana state militia on 
multiple occasions to protect the Republican state government against insurrection. James 
Alcorn’s exhortation that white Mississippians treat Reconstruction as a runaway horse, which 
they must run alongside to control, framed his political platform as a manly one. In eastern 
Mississippi, former Confederate Colonel Greene Chandler explained that the conversion of both 
of these men convinced him to join the Republican Party.92 Chandler twice refused to meet an 
opponent on the dueling field. In one case, Chandler responded by calling his opponent’s threats 
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of violence “unmanly.” He also mocked the notion “that every gentleman is bound in honor to 
turn and kick the cur that bays him,” something he considered a “peculiarly Southern idea.” 
Refusing to ask for a duel in one case, he declared that “it requires a higher courage to brave a 
wrong public sentiment than to punish a ruffian.” By showing restraint and criticizing men who 
lacked it, Chandler was articulating a different conception of manliness from that of diehard 
rebels.93 
In another case where Chandler refused a duel, he argued that Congressional 
Reconstruction and amnesty made him more of a man. His Democratic opponent, Chandler 
pointed out, was under political disabilities due to the Fourteenth Amendment, while he had been 
relieved from his. White southern men frequently took their disenfranchisement and 
disqualification for office under Reconstruction policies as an insult to their manhood. They 
would be stripped of the political privileges of being a white man, while those same privileges 
would be conferred on former slaves. Chandler’s rationale for refusing a duel reinforced the 
notion that political disabilities made a white man less of a man, and that being a reconstructed 
southerner meant a reconstructed manhood.94 
The onslaughts of abuse directed at reconstructed rebels sometimes brought unwanted 
attention to the power dynamics in their households. Camilla Rodman became distressed by a 
rumor going around that her husband, William Rodman, had joined the North Carolina 
Republican Party to satisfy her ambition. William trusted her with the business of his plantation 
business, and one can imagine that she was heavily invested in her husband’s political career.95 
	
93 Chandler, Journal and Speeches, 117, 119. 
94 Jackson Clarion (Mississippi), 21 Apr 1870. 





In other cases, the political conversion of reconstructed rebels seems to have placed them at odds 
with their wives. Greene Chandler, after mingling with other Republicans in Jackson, 
Mississippi, noted that Governor Alcorn’s wife was a Democrat. However, Chandler did not 
express contempt or even surprise at this difference between husband and wife. Instead, 
Chandler continued his commentary to his own wife, “Says she was raised [a Democrat], but 
when they abuse her husband so badly, she falls out with them, but forgives them directly.” 
According to Chandler, her politic identity was relational, the result of her family and friends, 
not particular convictions, and it could be compromised by insults toward her husband. She 
would support him, even if she did not share a Republican identity.96    
Reconstructed rebels actively worked to present a united household, and this sometimes 
meant silencing their wives. This was the case for William J. Clarke and Martha Bayard Clarke 
of North Carolina. Martha was the daughter of an elite planter family. From an early age, she 
was determined to make a career as a professional writer, and in her marriage to William she 
found a partner who would support those ambitions.97 William encouraged Martha’s literary 
career, which took off after the war when she published a series of bitterly satirical pieces in poor 
white dialect under the name “Betsey Bittersweet.” One topic that Betsey tackled was the 
South’s postwar gender crisis: northern Republicans had “turned our men into wimen—or tried 
to do it by disfranchising of ‘em,” and because of this, she argued, “we wimen, who was always 
counted politically with the niggers, you know, is got demoralized, and has gone into politics.”98 
Martha’s unreconstructed politics, however, conflicted with the public stand that her husband 
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took in 1868 by joining the Republican Party. It is not clear to what extent William discussed the 
decision with his wife. Perhaps she became reconstructed as well. After Democrats took the state 
legislature in 1870, she deprecated their “meanness” and added that “they can say nothing of the 
Republicans that cannot be said of them with equal truth now.” She even expressed the fear of 
many who joined the Republican Party that the actions of Democrats would result in Congress 
returning them to military rule.99 Whatever her views, she stopped writing on topics of a political 
nature and let her husband be the sole political voice of the family after 1868.100   
 Perhaps for William Clarke, joining the Republican Party was a way to reclaim some 
power for himself. It was commonly said in the North that unnaturally political southern women 
had pressured men to secede. In one of her early postwar articles, Martha lent credence to this 
idea, writing that “the women of the Southern Confederacy were the unrecognized ‘power 
behind the thrown,’ during its whole existence.”101 Then, as Betsey Bittersweet pointed out, 
disenfranchisement could be understood as emasculation. Added to this, the Clarkes seem to 
have had a marriage that was loving, companionate, but also sexually open. Mary wrote to 
another romantic interest that she and her husband gave each other “the largest liberty…neither 
expecting the other to do more than observe the proprieties and avoid scandal.”102 William does 
not appear to have resented the arrangement, but given the larger questioning of southern male 
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authority after 1865, perhaps Clarke’s political activities allowed him to recapture the sense of 
personal independence so key to conceptions of manhood at this time.  
If the dynamics of reconstructed rebels’ households were unclear, it is far more certain 
that manly pride played a key role in reinforcing Republican Party identity. One reconstructed 
southerner responded to criticism that he was flip-flopping by telling a rally, “I shall ever have 
the manliness to surrender opinion when I am convinced that I am in error.” After being insulted 
by a female acquaintance, physician James Ramsay wrote that he “might have retained the 
smiles and approbation of more friends…by voting the democratic ticket, but if I had done so, 
with my convictions of duty, I would have been bought, by public opinion, and could not have 
retained my self-respect.”103 When William Pearson later wrote a novel about reconstructed 
southerners like himself, he made masculine pride the driving force behind his protagonist’s 
decisions. After giving a patriotic Fourth of July speech, his Democratic neighbors vilify him. 
When he later gets into legal trouble, Republicans help him out. Threats from the Ku Klux Klan 
cement his emotional commitment to the party of his new friends.104  
Without a doubt, personal idiosyncrasies played a role in determining party affiliation, 
and men on both sides used the same scripts for defining manliness against each other. 
Democratic elites also acted out of pride and alternately rooted their manliness in violence or 
restraint. However, the key point is that the social and economic background of reconstructed 
rebels manifested itself when they defended their political choices. Responding to those who said 
that submitting to northern conquerors was unmanly, they framed their embrace of defeat as an 
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assertion of their political agency as elite white men. In doing so, they paved the way for a 
redemption of southern elite power more broadly.   
 
Embracing Defeat 
Andrew Johnson’s plan to let traditional southern elites rule at home was a failure. Many 
of Johnson’s supporters continued their opposition to Republican Reconstruction through the 
Democratic Party. Not all ex-Confederates, however, were done with “self-reconstruction.” A 
substantial minority of them decided that they could continue to manage Reconstruction by 
working with the Republicans.  
 In contrast to other types of southern Republicans, reconstructed rebels were more likely 
to be members of the prewar elite. These elites believed that by embracing defeat, they could 
open a path to economic prosperity, peace, and political power. For some, remembering the 
experience of internal conflict in the Confederacy helped them to accept and embrace defeat. In 
other cases, Johnson’s weakness and the destabilizing rhetoric of Democrats convinced them that 
the Republican Party was the best vehicle for realizing their goals.   
Even when they had been active in the South’s first period of “self-reconstruction,” these 
southerners continued to reconstruct their political identities and play a role reconstructing their 
states. Though they were a minority among those who fought for Confederate independence, 
their actions had important consequences for regional and national history. Their association 
with the Republican Party guaranteed that even when African Americans were enfranchised, 
traditional southern elites would still be able to shape the direction of Reconstruction. Their story 










TO THE DEFEATED GO THE SPOILS: 
CONGRESSIONAL AMNESTY AND PATRONAGE 
 
 Less than three years after Confederate defeat, Massachusetts Congressman Henry 
Dawes urged his colleagues that “such men as Gantt, of Arkansas, and Governor Holden, of 
North Carolina, and Governor Patton, of Alabama must be drawn by the strongest possible cords 
into support of this Government.” Gantt was a former Confederate colonel. Holden had signed 
his state’s secession ordinance. Patton was a plantation owner who served in Alabama’s wartime 
legislature. “Longstreet!” Dawes continued. “Who would not rather to-day trust General 
Longstreet than any man who sneaked through four years and saved his neck by acting neither 
for the rebellion nor for the Union.” The men that Dawes named were disqualified from holding 
office by either the Fourteenth Amendment’s officeholding ban or the federal loyalty oath. And 
yet, unlike the majority of former Confederates, they had joined the Republican Party. They were 
reconstructed rebels, and Dawes believed the government need them. He asked that Congress 
pass a bill to remove their “political disabilities.”1   
 Many historians have described the North’s eventual “retreat from Reconstruction,” but 
this paradigm risks obscuring how reconstructionist and reconciliationist imperatives sometimes 
merged.2 Such was the case when Congress offered amnesty to reconstructed rebels. From the 
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very beginning of Congressional Reconstruction, Republican policy combined intervention in 
southern politics with North-South reconciliation and a gradual restoration of prewar elites to 
power. To their credit, Congress did not merely take former rebels at their word, as President 
Andrew Johnson did in his own amnesty policy. Rather, as several Congressional Republicans 
put it, they only wanted to help ex-Confederates who had performed “works meet for 
repentance.”3 By this phrase, they meant former rebels who spoke in support of Congressional 
Reconstruction, defended the political rights of Blacks, and voted for Republican candidates. 
Congress was careful—they required endorsements from known Republicans to prove these 
men’s allegiances. Even so, white Unionists and Black southerners were more reliable allies, and 
arguably more deserving of support. National leaders sought to empower these previously 
marginalized groups, but as Dawes’s words indicate, they simultaneously worked to put a subset 
of the South’s traditional elite back in power. 
 For their part, reconstructed rebels saw Congressional amnesty as a way to build the 
Republican Party’s capacity to govern in their states and local communities. Historians have 
usually characterized white southern Republicans as advocates of general amnesty.4 There is 
some truth to this, but it has escaped scholarly attention that southern Republicans also benefited 
from the officeholding ban. While they received individual amnesty based on their new loyalties, 
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their opponents were still left out in the cold, giving the reconstructed rebels a temporary 
advantage. Southern Republicans did urge a more general, or even universal, amnesty bill to 
conciliate and win greater white support, but in the short-term they used the officeholding ban to 
preserve state and local offices for Republicans.5 
 A growing body of scholarship on late nineteenth century citizenship explores the role 
that allegiance played in southern claims to belonging and officials’ evaluation of those claims.6 
Political disabilities were a key part within the postwar redefinition of citizenship. The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s first section extended citizenship to include African Americans by 
basing it on native birth, while the third section limited officeholding rights for former 
Confederates and enabled Congress to remove the same restriction by a two-thirds vote. Prior to 
the Amnesty Act of 1872, Congress removed political disabilities on an individual basis, in the 
process equating party loyalty with national loyalty. Public support for the Republican definition 
of nonracial citizenship became the standard for measuring whether white southerners were 
“reconstructed.” Ironically, that same principle of uniform citizenship later undermined the 
rationale for maintaining officeholding restrictions, leading to the separation of reconstructed 
citizenship policy from partisan identity as both parties moved toward general amnesty.  
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 The Fourteenth Amendment was the centerpiece of Republican nation-building. Passed 
by Congress in 1866 and ratified in 1868, its first section granted citizenship to “all persons born 
or naturalized in the United States” and guaranteed the “privileges or immunities of citizens” and 
“equal protection of the laws.” Additional sections tinkered with the South’s congressional 
representation, banned former Confederates from holding office, and guaranteed the national 
debt.  
Historian Eric Foner has argued that the officeholding ban in the third section “aimed to 
promote a sweeping transformation of Southern public life” by making “virtually the entire 
political leadership in the South ineligible for office.”7 Not all ex-Confederates were excluded; 
since the ban was limited to prewar officeholders only, it affected perhaps 20,000 former 
Confederates. These men would not be able to hold future office at any level. The Amendment 
did not go into effect until its ratification in 1868, but the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 included 
provisions temporarily disqualifying and disfranchising the same group during the state 
constitution-writing process. A federal test oath from 1862 also prevented a larger section of 
white southern society—any who had aided the Confederacy, regardless of whether or not they 
held prewar office—from holding a federal job, from congressman down to postmaster.8 
However, the Fourteenth Amendment stated that Congress could remove the 
officeholding disability by a two-thirds majority. From June 1868 until the Amnesty Act of 1872, 
Congress bestowed individual amnesty on 4,616 former Confederates who had been subject to 
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exclusions based on the Fourteenth Amendment, Reconstruction Acts, or federal test oath. These 
recipients of congressional amnesty were listed by name in statute books. 
It is important to note how this policy differed from President Johnson’s earlier program 
of presidential amnesty. Johnson had been far more lenient, promising to restore the civil rights 
and political privileges of ex-Confederates so long as they renewed their allegiance to the United 
States. The Fourteenth Amendment overrode this presidential amnesty as Congressional 
Republicans decided to create their own policy that would help only ex-Confederates who had 
proven their support for Congressional Reconstruction. The officeholding ban was both more 
and less radical than Foner suggested—it transformed public life not only by taking old political 
leaders out of it, but also by encouraging a segment of them to support the Republican Party. On 
the other hand, congressional amnesty returned a portion of the prewar elite to positions of 
power. 
The recipients of congressional amnesty were only a subset of the total number of 
reconstructed rebels. Historians have estimated that some 20 percent of white southerners voted 
with the Republican Party during Reconstruction. In Upper South states like Tennessee, many of 
these white Republicans were former Unionists, but in the Deep South, most were former 
Confederates. Despite the small number of reconstructed rebels compared to overall population, 
Congressional Republicans saw cultivating them as a necessity. Only in South Carolina, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana could Republicans afford to ignore the white vote. Elsewhere, 
statewide majorities required southern whites.9   
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Moreover, despite their interest in creating a new kind of nation, Congressional 
Republicans feared that a failure to win some degree of southern white consent would make 
Reconstruction illegitimate by Republicans’ own sense of democratic norms. Ohio Senator John 
Sherman, for example, argued that the Military Reconstruction Acts should protect African 
Americans in their life and property, and that they should benefit from universal suffrage, but he 
said he would not deprive former rebels of the ability to vote on the new constitutions. To do so 
he worried would “violate the republican doctrine that all governments be founded on the 
consent of the governed” and “supersede one form of oligarchy in which the blacks were slaves 
by another in which the whites are disenfranchised outcasts.”10  Confederate leaders could be 
banned temporarily from holding office, but only as a means of giving Reconstruction a head 
start and buying time to cultivate white support.  
 
Northern Friends 
 Since the end of the war, white southerners had been traveling to Washington, D.C. in an 
effort to influence policy or get personal favors. Many of them contributed to President 
Johnson’s lenient plan of restoration. After Congress took control of Reconstruction in 1867 with 
the Reconstruction Acts, some of the same southerners offered their support despite the fact that 
Congress had just imposed new officeholding disabilities on them. In doing so, they hoped to 
earn special exemptions and privileges for themselves and their network of allies back home.  
 Robert M. Patton of Alabama was the only governor elected under the presidential phase 
of Reconstruction to endorse the Fourteenth Amendment. He represented the possibility that men 
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who had supported Andrew Johnson’s policies could be converted to the congressional plan, and 
thus lend it legitimacy among moderate southern whites. Patton was born in 1809 to a family of 
merchants in northern Alabama. Though he acquired a plantation and over one hundred slaves, 
Patton also had family ties to early southern textile operations and he saw manufacturing as 
essential to the region’s economic development. He was a reluctant secessionist in 1861, and 
after serving in the state senate for the first year of the war, retired to his home in Union-
occupied northern Alabama. Three sons continued to fight in the Confederate army, and he lost 
two of them. In 1865, he returned to public life, serving in the first postwar constitutional 
convention ordered by Johnson, and then became the state’s first postwar elected governor. 
Though his inaugural address promised to maintain white political control, events proved that he 
was not inclined to fight against the tide of racial or constitutional change. Concerned for the 
reputation and economic future of his state, he vetoed provisions of his legislature’s “black 
code.” Patton’s primary goal was the economic development and financial stability of his state, 
which would ultimately lead to his decision to cooperate with the Republican Party.11   
 Trips to New York City and Washington, D.C. convinced Patton that completing 
Congressional Reconstruction was essential to Alabama’s economic recovery. After returning, he 
urged the legislature to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment—they did not—and he continued to 
urge cooperation with Congress when it passed the Reconstruction Acts. Financial considerations 
likely moderated Patton’s opinion on congressional policies, including the exclusion of himself 
and others from officeholding rights. In one speech, he downplayed the significance of the 
officeholding ban, estimating the number in Alabama who would be affected at only 3,000. He 
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said that such a small group should not “stand in the way of peace, prosperity and reunion.” The 
Reconstruction Acts added temporary disfranchisement, but Patton argued that “those who are 
disfranchised should use their influence for the accomplishment of all possible good.”12  
 In making his stand for Congressional Reconstruction, Patton also believed that 
Republicans would lift his political disqualifications and that he would be reelected governor. 
Patton had strong allies in Congress, financial circles, and the military. On May 10, 1867, he sent 
a telegraph to Ohio Senator John Sherman stating his opinion that Alabama would conform to 
the Reconstruction Acts.13 Five days later, Sherman introduced a resolution to relieve Patton of 
his “political disabilities.” The Ohio Senator believed that the support of moderate southern 
whites was necessary for Reconstruction to succeed, and he was dismayed radicals had pushed to 
go beyond the officeholding ban and disfranchise rebels. Sherman sent a pamphlet of his senate 
speech opposing this measure to numerous southern contacts. Likely, he intended his resolution 
on Patton’s behalf as another show of sympathy.14 Senators Sherman soon met with James A. 
Raynor, a New Yorker who headed the New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga Railroad, and 
Oakes Ames, a representative from Massachusetts and leading promoter of the Union Pacific 
Railroad. Likely they talked about the Patton resolution; the next day, Raynor wrote Sherman to 
press it.15  
 Though Sherman was unsuccessful, the Senate debated a similar bill in January 1868. 
Senator William Stewart mentioned having received numerous letters on Patton’s behalf from 
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the chief of the Alabama Freedmen’s Bureau. Stewart also read a letter from the commander of 
the Third Military District, who endorsed Patton as “an open and active supporter of the 
reconstruction measures” and credited his “firm and consistent support of the military 
authorities.”16 Patton’s lobbying was representative of efforts by reconstructed rebels to 
influence congressional policy, though he ultimately failed to have his disqualification removed. 
Joseph Brown and James Longstreet would be more successful.  
By the end of the war, Joseph Emerson Brown was only forty-three, but he had already 
served four two-year terms as governor of Georgia. In 1867, Brown went to Washington to 
gather information. He was introduced to James Garfield, an Ohio congressman and future 
president, as well as William Darrah Kelley, a Pennsylvania congressman whose support for 
manufacturing and protective tariffs would earn him the sobriquet “Pig-Iron Kelley.”17 Kelley 
kept up a correspondence with several prominent reconstructed rebels, one of whom referred to 
Kelley as “my only hope.”18 Kelley and Brown would become particularly close allies.  
From his conversations with Kelley, Brown learned that northern Republicans were not 
going to back down on Black suffrage. Since passing the Fourteenth Amendment the previous 
year, Republicans had actually gained strength, and there was enough popular and political will 
for them to require southern states to write Black suffrage into their constitutions. Brown saw 
that the only question was whether greater penalties like disfranchisement and confiscation 
would be mandated if white southerners refused to acquiesce.19  
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When Brown returned from Washington, he published a letter urging white Georgians to 
cooperate with Congress. “It is no longer a question of whether the freedmen will vote,” he 
explained. “That is already decreed in his favor; but the question is whether the white men who 
aided in the war against the United States shall vote.” On this point he contrasted Sherman’s 
Senate version of the reconstruction bill with the final House version that added temporary 
disfranchisement. He feared the possibility of greater penalties and a period of political limbo 
that prevented northern investment. It would be unwise for Georgians to cling to disfranchised 
leaders, Brown argued, “till by doing so they have made beggars of their wives and children, and 
plunged themselves into irretrievable ruin, when their fidelity to us can do no good.” True 
statesmanship required that leaders like Brown discourage such a course; he advised that white 
Georgians “agree with thine adversary quickly” and thereby ensure “peace, quiet, and returning 
prosperity.”20   
Throughout the spring of 1867, Brown canvassed the state in support of Reconstruction, 
and in early May, William Kelley joined him. Determined to reconcile ex-rebels to 
Reconstruction, Kelley made a speaking tour that began in Memphis, moved south and then east 
through Deep South cities, and then turned north along the east coast. In Montgomery, he shared 
a platform with Robert Patton, and in Atlanta, he stood side-by-side with Brown. Kelley 
bolstered the position of Brown and other reconstructed rebels by asserting that the 
Reconstruction Acts would be Congress’s final requirement unless met with continued 
resistance. He admonished white southerners to accept Black freedom and equality rather than 
having it forced on them: “accept the inevitable and find in it a good providence.” Moreover, 
Kelley mixed political arguments for individual liberty and national union with his economic 
	




vision. He told southerners that “contempt for man as man” was the only thing that kept the 
South behind the North and that regional differences could be eliminated by uplifting the status 
of labor.21 When Kelley returned home from his trip, he told his Pennsylvania constituents, “the 
South must be regenerated, and we of the North must do it.” He explained that it was in the 
interest of northern capitalists to provide the South with capital, and that laboring men go south 
and carry with them their northern habits. Such efforts would “develop a population as loyal as 
was that of any Northern State during the war” and “make the South bloom like a garden.”22  
Brown and Kelley worked in tandem to convince white southerners to participate in 
Congressional Reconstruction and to persuade white northerners that they would benefit from 
such efforts. Brown stood to benefit politically if Georgia were reconstructed and his political 
disabilities removed, while Kelley and the Congressional Republicans would profit from 
Brown’s popularity.  
However, Brown also understood that if he benefited directly through the relief of his 
officeholding disqualification, it would open him to the charge of opportunism. In his “agree 
with thine adversary quickly” letter, Brown wrote that being disqualified made him a selfless 
counselor. Unable to run for office, he could write “without regard to the effect which the 
communication of truth may have on my present or future popularity.” Brown mentioned the 
willingness of Congress to relieve worthy men of their disabilities and that “compliance with the 
terms on our part will so far soften the feelings of the people of the North, that our judges and 
other officers will very soon be relieved.” 23 Still, he asked Senator Sherman not to press a 
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resolution for his amnesty.24 Brown feared that the resolution would create conflict between the 
House and Senate, while also opening him to abuse at home. Brown told Kelley, “I of course 
make no objection to the relief of Gov. Patton, but I do not wish my name to be used in that 
connection at present.”25  
By March 1868, however, the situation looked different. Georgia Republicans needed to 
put forward candidates for election under a new state constitution. In some cases, reconstructed 
rebels looked like attractive candidates, with their past experience and political capital, but they 
nevertheless found themselves benched by the officeholding ban. Kelley told Brown that the 
position of the House against removing disqualifications had softened; Brown should put 
together a list of men who should be relieved.26 The convention itself forwarded such a list, 
probably at Brown’s suggestion, though added in a letter to Kelley, “I am not a suppliant for 
relief. I can live without it and without office.”27  
Nevertheless, Brown emphasized the work he had done for Reconstruction and said that 
he resented the insult when some members of Congress opposed his relief in open debate. Brown 
warned against humiliating men like him “who have sacrificed position and all that is most dear 
to aid reconstruction” by “still calling for fruit of repentance after the terrible struggle through 
which they have passed to sustain the Congressional plan.” If reconstructed rebels were not 
given their due, Brown prophesied, “it will soon make our white people a unit in opposition to 
Congress.” Wrapping up his letter, Brown insisted, “it is impossible to build up and maintain a 
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party here on the reconstruction line without the aid of leading Southern men who know our 
people and sympathize with them.”28 
Brown leveraged his popularity in Georgia in order to reap concessions from Congress—
the relief of political disabilities for reconstructed rebels and the promise not to impose 
additional requirements on the southern states. Brown knew the symbolic value of the part he 
could play for the party, as he did at the Republican National Convention in May 1868. Called 
upon to speak, he began by affirming, “I came here, as has been well remarked, a reconstructed 
rebel.” From this platform, Brown asked Republicans to support Georgia’s new leadership.29    
 Like William Kelley, Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson made a speaking tour through 
the South during the summer of 1867, moving in the opposite direction, from east to west. Thus, 
by the time he reached New Orleans, he had already conferred with Joseph Brown and Robert 
Patton. Wilson’s southern tour had a significant impact on former Confederate General James 
Longstreet. When Longstreet publicly explained his conversion to the Republican Party, he 
directly cited the impression that Wilson had made on him.    
Henry Wilson was a more committed supporter of African American rights than John 
Sherman, but he agreed with the moderate Republicans on the need to win over the support of 
southern whites. The New Orleans Republican reported Wilson’s words for the disfranchised: 
“Those who cannot vote or hold office can speak and act with us, and give us their influence. Let 
them do so and the country will never forget those who are true to it in the dark and troubled 
night through which we are passing.”30 The Raleigh Standard’s report of Wilson’s speech three 
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weeks earlier gave a better indication of what Wilson meant. “When proof is furnished that the 
disfranchised have acted properly and mean to do right hereafter,” Wilson promised, “then the 
disability will be once more removed by the hand of love itself.” However, for “those who favor 
the lost cause, who await reactionary measures,” he continued, “the government breathes 
defiance.”31 Wilson would later take the same position in the Senate, pronouncing his preference 
for universal amnesty in the abstract, while admitting that such rights must be withheld from 
former rebels until they respected the rights of Black southerners.32  
Longstreet was part of the committee that welcomed Wilson to New Orleans, and he was 
a vice-president of the meeting that the senator addressed. In a public letter on June 3rd, 
Longstreet reported that he was “pleased to have the opportunity to hear Senator Wilson and was 
agreeably surprised to meet such fairness and frankness in a politician whom I had been taught to 
believe uncompromisingly opposed to the white people of the South.” He went on to describe the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Military Reconstruction Acts as “peace offerings.” Then he 
turned explicitly to partisan politics. He declared himself “willing to work in any harness that 
promises relief to our distressed people and harmony to the nation.” Henceforth he would 
affiliate with the Republicans.33  
The idea that Wilson offered a quid-pro-quo to Longstreet during their meeting seems 
possible, since Longstreet later wrote to a mutual friend that the senator had “intimated when I 
saw him in N.O. that these political disabilities would be removed.”34 The former general spent 
the next two years traveling between various locations in the South, the national capital, and 
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New England, before returning to Louisiana in April 1869 with the federal patronage 
appointment of surveyor for the port of New Orleans.  
Patton, Brown, and Longstreet each became convinced that it was in their best interest to 
support the Fourteenth Amendment. They were behaving opportunistically, but from their 
perspective, self-interest aligned with the good of their communities. The South needed its best 
men. From Congress’s perspective, what mattered was that white southern support for their plan 
was growing. Even if congressional Republicans did not originally expect that the 
disqualification would cause some former rebels to change their party allegiance, Congress 
quickly sought to take advantage of such a welcome turn of events.   
 
Works Meet for Repentance 
 While the southern states were rewriting their constitutions in the spring of 1868, 
Congressional Republicans were confronted with the possibility that their most experienced 
allies in the South might not be able to hold office in the new governments. Nevada Senator 
William Stewart tested the waters by offering a bill to remove Robert Patton’s disabilities. 
Immediately, questions were raised about the Alabama governor’s wartime loyalty. Stewart 
evaded, claiming, “I did know the particulars of that, but they have escaped my memory.” 
Actually, Stewart considered wartime loyalty unimportant. “I have rather been investigating 
what he did since the rebellion,” Stewart continued. Another senator agreed, “It does not make so 
much difference what a man did in the past; if he is willing now to come forward and unite with 




and agree to reconstruct upon the basis we have laid down, why should we not relieve 
disabilities?”35  
Support among Senate Republicans was assured when Jacob Howard offered a formula 
for proceeding. Howard announced, “I understand that Mr. Patton has shown his faith by his 
works.” He would support Patton’s relief and act similarly on any “case of this kind,” while also 
insisting on “proof to the Senate that the party has really shown his faith by his works; in short, 
that he has done works meet for repentance.” Howard’s choice of language was biblical, evoking 
the Second Letter of James: “What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man say he hath faith, 
and have not works? Can faith save him?” Any duplicitous rebel might claim to love the Union, 
as many had done in their letters to Andrew Johnson. The only ones who could be trusted with 
office were those whose postwar behavior gave proof to their confessions of faith.36 
Though Thaddeus Stevens buried the bill for Patton’s relief in the House, another 
congressman brought up a bill to relieve James Longstreet, Joe Brown, and sixteen others. 
Objections emerged from the more radical faction of House Republicans represented by Stevens. 
John Logan thought that Longstreet’s letter “accepting the situation” was insufficient. Logan 
protested that if that were enough, “every rebel general would write one to be relieved from 
disability under the law.” The Illinois congressman made his case even more plainly by attacking 
Joe Brown. “Governor Brown is a politician,” Logan said bluntly. “He saw the handwriting on 
the wall, and the war having ceased he has taken advantage of it.” Building to a more general 
position, Logan continued, “No people ever lived on earth who loved political power as these 
leaders at the South do, and, in my judgment, there are no people who will change their opinions 
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faster and oftener than will these people for the purpose of obtaining power.” Logan was 
skeptical of rebel motivations, especially after so many of them had taken advantage of President 
Johnson’s lenient amnesty only to turn around and use their public power to oppress Black and 
white Unionists.37 
William Kelley was one of the first to respond. He had corresponded with half of the men 
in the bill, including his friend Brown. Kelley insisted that Brown had done more than any man 
to convince white Georgians to accept Congressional Reconstruction. He also vouched for the 
group as a whole and said that they had done “works meet for repentance.” James Garfield took 
up Kelley’s religious language. “It belongs not to us but to the Searcher of all hearts,” Garfield 
avowed, “to decide whether a man sincerely loves the Union. All we can fairly ask is that he will 
do what is required, and as soon as we are assured of that we should be willing to remove the 
disabilities now imposed upon him by our laws.” Amazingly, even John Farnsworth, who had 
lost a son in an ill-fated cavalry charge against Longstreet’s corps at Gettysburg, defended the 
former general. Farnsworth told the House that “without probing very deeply into the recesses of 
Longstreet’s heart, I would only inquire, is he acting heartily with the loyal people of the 
country?” In response to another representative who objected that Longstreet only accepted the 
situation “under duress,” Farnsworth replied, “I do not care whether it is under duress or not. 
One man like Longstreet can do the loyal cause in the South more good than a thousand ordinary 
men.” Southern elites were particularly valuable to Republicans for their fame and influence.38 
Farnsworth further voiced another layer of concern. The Reconstruction Acts, by 
combining Black suffrage with temporary white disfranchisement and disqualification for office, 
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might lead to “a white man’s party and a black man’s party.” Though sympathetic to the rights of 
freedpeople, Farnsworth feared that if parties in the South divided on racial lines, “the black 
man’s party will go to the dust.” There was certainly condescension regarding the capabilities of 
Black people in Farnsworth’s remark, but also a realistic fear of white counterrevolution. If 
former Confederates were excluded from participation in the new governments, they might argue 
that they had no stake in their success. Without white southern consent, Farnsworth reasoned, it 
would take military force to prevent the constitutions from being overturned. Farnsworth 
believed that rewarding loyalty and allowing rebels back into some positions of power would 
prevent the racialization of party politics.39   
Congressional Republicans also alluded to the need for experienced leadership in the 
South. Henry Dawes would later gain notoriety for Indian policies that aimed at racial 
assimilation; in 1868, he was more focused on assimilating white rebels. Listing the most 
prominent prewar leaders in the amnesty bill, Dawes argued that “the mind and character and the 
influence which those men must necessarily exert in those States are absolutely essential and 
necessary to a healthy reconstruction of those States.” The implication was that white 
southerners, once reconstructed, would provide better leadership than Black southerners. The 
former, after all, had experience in leadership and administration. Moreover, while northern 
Republicans believed former slaves were worthy of citizenship, they also associated political 
virtue with education and wealth, which fell along racial lines.40  
Some of the supporters of congressional amnesty, such as Dawes in the House and 
Sherman in the Senate, were moderates on Black civil rights. It is not too surprising that they 
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would advocate a policy that empowered white men. However, Garfield and Farnsworth were 
early supporters of Black suffrage and still supported congressional amnesty for whites. William 
Kelley and Henry Wilson consistently advocated for both Black civil rights and reconciliation 
with reconstructed rebels. Even Thaddeus Stevens frequently consulted the leader of North 
Carolina’s Republican apparatus, William W. Holden, and asked him for a list of reliable names 
for relief. Radical and moderate proponents of African American rights alike agreed that they 
should reward white southerners for joining the party, give them a stake in the success of 
Reconstruction, and even allow them to hold power.41 
In June 1868, both houses of Congress agreed to a bill with over a thousand names. 
Before it passed, however, Democrats seized the opportunity to object to its partisan nature. A 
Democratic congressman complained that the bill “selects men of one particular school of 
politics for pardon and omits all others.” Farnsworth retorted that his party could not help it if all 
southern Democrats were diehard rebels. Asked whether loyalty meant support of the 
Reconstruction Acts, which Democrats also saw as partisan, Farnsworth explained that it was 
“necessary that a man who acted with the rebels during the war shall give some evidence of 
repentance,” and that it was “very good evidence of repentance when he gives the reconstruction 
measures of Congress his cordial support. If he cooperates with the loyal people of his State, 
black and white, and helps in good faith and heartily to reconstruct and restore this State upon 
the basis of liberty and equality, he gives evidence of returning loyalty and repentance.” Another 
Democrat asked whether opposition to Black suffrage therefore made a man a rebel. Farnsworth 
denied this formula as an absolute rule, but admitted that he considered it evidence against a 
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man’s reconstruction: “if we find that all rebels oppose negro suffrage, it casts a little suspicion 
upon men who oppose it, whether you call them rebels or not.” Party loyalty proved national 
loyalty, and works that furthered Reconstruction proved both.42  
Only a few of the names in this first bill were avowed Democrats, and a conference 
between the two houses struck them out. Nearly all of the names came from lists provided by 
state constitutional conventions, which were dominated by southern Republicans. The House 
Select Committee on Reconstruction and the Senate Judiciary Committee also used their own 
contacts to vet the names. Patton’s name was left out, possibly because he objected to the 
Alabama constitution, which included additional disfranchisement measures. However, both 
Brown and Longstreet made the cut. Neither man had run for office, but others on the list had, 
even before they knew for sure that they would be relieved from their disabilities. For example, 
Holden was the Republican candidate for governor in North Carolina, and it was only because of 
the amnesty bill that he and numerous other reconstructed rebels were able to take their seats. 
Ultimately the Fortieth Congress provided relief to 1,431 former rebels. The Forty-First 
Congress acted on another 3,185, including some moderate Democrats who accepted the legality 
of Reconstruction and Black suffrage.  
 
Republican Patronage Networks 
 In 1860, southern secessionists had feared the extension of Republican patronage 
networks into the South.43 In 1868, those fears were validated. Once relieved of their 
disqualifications, the initial recipients of amnesty recommended others, who in turn wrote 
	
42 Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2414-15, 3301.  




applications for relief. Freed from their political disabilities, many went on to serve in federal, 
state, and local offices. Senator Jacob Howard had been right to expect that congress’s policy 
would “multiply, vastly multiply, the number of our friends and supporters in those States.”44  
 Joseph Brown endorsed a number of petitions, activating networks that he had 
established years earlier. For example, Charles E. Broyles came from the same corner of the state 
as Brown. In the late 1850s, he served on Brown’s staff and in the state legislature. On the 
reverse side of his application to Congress, Brown wrote that Broyles was “as true a republican 
as any in Georgia” and that “the party has use for him soon.” Though Broyles declined a 
nomination for Congress, his relief allowed him to serve as solicitor general for his circuit.45 
Another Brown devotee, James J. Findley, was a prewar legislator and rose to the rank of major 
in the Confederate service. He and Brown shared an interest in their region’s mineral wealth as 
well. Findley spoke for himself in his application, claiming he “supported Gen. Grant for 
President and do belong to the Republican Party and shall continue to give my support to that 
party whether pardoned or not.” Perhaps Brown’s decision to join the Republican had influenced 
Findley’s new allegiance. Freed of his disabilities, Findley made an unsuccessful bid for 
Congress and was subsequently appointed deputy U.S. marshal.46  
 One of the earliest Mississippians to receive amnesty was James Lusk Alcorn. He would 
go on to serve as a Republican governor and U.S. senator, and, like Brown, he brokered 
congressional amnesty in his state. Alcorn described a man from Bolivar county as “sincere, 
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hates the democrats; wept when the state seceded, but afterwards became a genuine rebel, now 
inclined to the Republican party.” He called another former rebel from Coahoma “a good 
republican” as well as an “honest and trustworthy man.” Alcorn added, “we wish to make use of 
him for some office.”47 On a longer list of names that he sent to Congress, Alcorn scratched 
various notes such as “Republican. Elected to state senate on my ticket,” “Unionist, old line 
Whig, held some small office, good man, will be with us,” “Secesh Dem, C.S. M. C. [Member of 
Congress], Republican, all right.”48  
 North Carolina provides the best setting to illustrate how reconstructed rebels made use 
of amnesty and patronage networks. States in the Upper South typically had more former 
Unionists in the Republican Party than former Confederates, but North Carolina had an 
exceptionally high number of reconstructed rebels. James Baggett’s research on 82 of North 
Carolina’s native white Republican leaders found that 73 percent of them had served or held 
office in the Confederacy.49  
 Governor William W. Holden had overseen amnesty under Johnson, and now that he was 
a Republican, he did so again for Congress. This time, his definition of loyalty had shifted. 
“Well, we all experienced in 1865 a kind of penticostal [sic] repentance among rebels,” he 
recalled. Rebels had given “lip service” to the Union loyalty back then. In 1868, however, “bona 
fide repentance and good works” would be necessary. To receive amnesty, Holden announced, 
former rebels “must vote, talk, write, travel, labor, and spend their money for the Republican 
party, the nation, and government, as other loyal men do.”50   
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 Leading Republicans sought to tap into local networks and used amnesty to do so. A 
North Carolina congressman recommended two men because “they will make us friends in their 
neighborhoods.”51 The use of amnesty to proselytize from the top down can also be seen in the 
activities of William Blount Rodman. Though a former Confederate colonel and a wealthy 
planter, Rodman was an early convert to the Republican Party. After defending his choice to join 
the Republican Party, he said that “there are thousands of men in North Carolina whose 
antecedents were like my own—who have pursued independently the same course of reasoning 
which has led me to the support of the Republican party…. I receive letters from them.” 
According to Rodman, they would accept Black suffrage and risk making violent enemies. 
However, they could not serve the party without the relief of their disabilities, nor would they 
support the party if the new state constitution added its own disfranchising measures. “We 
cannot afford,” Rodman insisted, “no party can afford, to shut its doors against men like these.”52  
 Rodman did what he could to woo friends to the party, though not always successfully. In 
early 1868, he wrote to David M. Carter, a fellow coastal planter, trying to cajole him to rejoin 
the Republicans. Carter had worked alongside Holden and Rodman to found the party the 
previous year. After a party convention refused to unequivocally renounce confiscation or 
disfranchisement, he defected. Rodman told Carter that the constitution they were working on 
would be moderate on such issues and avoid the radicalism that Carter dreaded. When Carter 
asked Rodman about his disqualification under the Fourteenth Amendment, Rodman told him 
that his break with the Republican Party would make amnesty unlikely. Rodman ultimately 
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failed to bring Carter back, and when Rodman raised Carter’s name with the party’s executive 
committee anyway, “objection was made.” As he told Carter, “You were convicted of political 
heresy & your name stricken off.”53  
 Rodman had more success with William J. Clarke. Clarke was also Confederate colonel, 
though from a more modest background. In early 1868, Clarke moved from Raleigh to New Bern 
to hunt for legal or literary work. While there, he also attended and spoke at conservative 
political rallies. He was not opposed to listening to Republican speakers, but he made his 
antipathy to them clear in his diary. Of one Republican meeting, he wrote, “miserable puerile & 
vile speeches to an audience composed principally of negroes.” Clarke joined the opposition to 
the new constitution, but when his side lost at the polls, he began to reconsider the company he 
kept. One spring night, he spent the evening discussing politics with Rodman.54  
 Clarke continued to meet with Rodman and other Republicans throughout the summer. In 
July, he was appointed attorney for the state-owned North Carolina Railroad. “The Republicans 
seem to be rallying to me,” he wrote. “God knows I need help and encouragement.” Clarke’s 
new friends made him aware of a judgeship that might come his way if he joined the party. In 
late August, Clarke gave his first Republican speech, and that fall, he stumped the eastern half of 
the state for Grant. Then on December 24, he received a Christmas present: a letter from North 
Carolina Congressman David Heaton informing him that his Fourteenth Amendment disabilities 
had been removed. That same day he was sworn in as a judge. Though the self-interest in 
Clarke’s conversion appears obvious, Clarke did not see it that way. Reflecting on his decision, 
he wrote in his diary, “I know not whether I have acted wisely, but God knows that none but 
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patriotic just and humane motives influenced me.” Clarke convinced himself that he was doing 
right for his country. Ultimately though, what is most apparent from Clarke’s meticulous diary is 
the increasing influence that Rodman and other Republicans had over him.55  
 In contrast to Rodman’s top-down efforts to win party converts, local contests for power 
also made amnesty necessary and pushed applications for relief from the bottom-up. In late July 
1868, a Republican leader in Fayetteville called Holden’s attention to the unfortunate 
circumstance that two of the town’s commissioners could not qualify for office under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This was a major problem because the other local officers who could 
qualify would not be qualified, since it was the job of town commissioners to certify them. The 
writer emphasized the urgency of the matter by mentioning that the district court circuit would 
begin in two weeks. The new legal order of Reconstruction, which now protected the rights of 
both Blacks and whites, required that Holden quickly appoint interim commissioners free from 
the officeholding ban.56  
 At the local level, reconstructed rebels needed amnesty because without it, anti-
reconstruction whites could use the Fourteenth Amendment against them. The application of 
James Monroe Pugh illustrates this point. Pugh was a Raleigh merchant who anticipated being 
appointed postmaster, a federal position that required an individual to swear that they had never 
aided the Confederacy in any way. A false statement would constitute a federal crime. Pugh 
believed he could take the oath, but in his official petition to Congress, he declared himself “very 
desirous to have my disabilities removed…for the reason that certain persons cannot after 
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removal cast the matter in my teeth.”57 Given the difficulty of avoiding complicity in the 
rebellion, it was better to be pardoned than face the accusation of perjury.  
 Disqualification from local office also meant that someone else would get the job, 
perhaps even a diehard rebel, since the Fourteenth Amendment had only banned rebels who held 
prewar office. If reconstructed rebels remained under the ban, unreconstructed rebels not under 
the ban had a greater chance of taking power. For example, Starkey S. Harrell was a Republican 
superior court clerk in Hertford County. In addition to his petition for amnesty, he wrote a 
pointed letter to his congressman. “I do not crave the office I hold, but am unwilling to yield an 
inch until subjection of Rebel sympathizers is plain,” Harrell fulminated. “If I am unable to hold 
the office, the whole county will be in possession of secessionists.”58 A couple of months earlier, 
Governor Holden asked the chairman of the House Select Committee on Reconstruction to stop a 
general amnesty bill—one without regard to partisan loyalty or works—because “we have not 
yet held our township elections. It is important that no general relief should be granted until these 
offices are filled.” Likely it was cases like Harrell’s that Holden had in mind. Reconstructed 
rebels needed amnesty to get in, but unreconstructed rebels needed to be kept out.59  
 Multiple levels of Republican officials handled pleas for relief before they reached the 
House Select Committee on Reconstruction. When North Carolina’s constitutional convention 
met in the spring of 1868, delegates produced the names of men from their counties whom they 
wanted relieved. Sometimes the delegates relied on information from even more local sources to 
determine who needed and deserved amnesty. A delegate from Robeson County closed a lengthy 
petition on behalf of another Republican, “All the loyal men of my county unite with me in this 
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petition.” The constitutional convention added the man’s name to the list they sent to Congress, 
and the House Committee included him in the first amnesty bill. After this initial list by the 
constitutional convention, later applications generally moved from individual towns to the 
Republican State Committee, then to the state’s congressional representation, and finally to the 
House Committee, all the while picking up signatures of endorsement.60  
The contents of the petitions reveal what it meant to be “thoroughly reconstructed,” as 
one North Carolinian put it.61 Applicants typically began their letters by describing the reason for 
their disqualification—any offices they held before the war; whether they were affected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the federal test oath; and their subsequent involvement with the 
Confederacy. Applicants sometimes sought to excuse their involvement in the rebellion. In North 
Carolina, many petitioners argued that in their hearts they had never been rebels at all. However, 
being “reconstructed” meant something different than claiming wartime Unionism.62 Successful 
petitioners universally expressed their support for the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Reconstruction Acts. A typical petition stated that the author was “in favor of supporting the 
Reconstruction measures of Congress & the state governments established thereunder.”63 
 Some petitioners were more specific. A soon-to-be internal revenue assessor wrote that 
“he has been active & persistent in supporting the reconstruction measures of Congress & in 
public speeches & newspapers of his state, he has advocated, on all occasions, the principles of 
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the Radical Republican party.”64 A future Republican mayor of Charlotte mentioned voting for 
Grant in the 1868 presidential election, editing a newspaper “in favor of universal suffrage,” and 
supporting all party nominees, even “to his great pecuniary loss and the alienation of his friends 
and business.”65 Another supplicant described himself as “a pioneer in the land of equal rights 
and manhood suffrage.”66 By contrast, one petitioner who wrote that he would comply with the 
acts of Congress “until they may be legally altered or amended” was not relieved.67 Together the 
petitions suggest that reconstructed rebels and Congress adopted an understanding of loyalty 
based on postwar party works, such as voting, canvassing, writing, speaking, advocating for the 
freedpeople, and bringing in more converts.  
 The public nature of these actions made it difficult for applicants to get away with lying. 
Multiple gatekeepers stood between the applicants and amnesty. Holden told the chairman of the 
House Committee that North Carolina’s “rule in regard to relief from disabilities in this state is, 
that the Republican State Committee investigate each case in which relief is asked, and that none 
but those recommended by the Committee be proper cases to be relieved.”68 The secretary of the 
state committee wrote to his congressional counterpart, “We desire to prevent any man from 
being relieved from political disabilities unless sanctioned by the members of Congress from this 
state or recommended by the Republican State Executive Committee.”69 North Carolina’s 
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congressional delegation also asked that no more names be added to relief bills until it could 
review them first.70  
The petitions that ended up in the hands of the House Committee reflected this vetting 
process. Almost all of the North Carolinians who were successful had been endorsed by the state 
Republican committee or by a Republican congressman. Petitions that lacked endorsements were 
not acted upon, and neither were those that included the signatures of numerous citizens but 
failed to go through the party officials. North Carolina’s lieutenant governor successfully 
blocked one petition by writing, “there is not a more stiff necked rebel in this county, Burke… 
He is the rebel candidate for Superior Court Clerk in this County.”71 
 
Restoration 
 Amnesty was a key party-building and nation-building tool that allowed southern 
Republicans to create networks linking individuals to centers of state power. Moreover, it gave a 
powerful cohort of reconstructed rebels a stake in biracial democracy. Yet, in doing so, it also 
channeled greater power to a subset of the prewar elite.   
Congressional amnesty, both in effect and by intention, empowered white southerners. 
Williams C. Wickham told a meeting of Republicans, “Without a large infusion of the native 
white element into the party, its existence here will come to a speedy end.”72 One of Holden’s 
advisors wrote, “It is to the interest of the Republican party to conciliate and win over the white 
men of the country. Indeed I think the very existence of the party at the South will depend on our 
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success in such an effort.”73 Amnesty was part of that effort. The way to recruit the mass of 
southern whites, it seemed to some Republicans, was to recruit their “natural” leaders.  
The class dimension of amnesty often showed through, as when one North Carolinian 
endorsed an application by writing, “We need such Republicans as he is to fill offices where 
business capacity is required.”74 Reconstructed rebels exploited the fact that certain jobs required 
a skill set that they had been fortunate enough to obtain because of their wealth and education.  
Even though the Reconstruction Acts gave poor whites and former slaves unprecedented access 
to government power, Reconstruction’s northern architects wanted the state governments to be 
managed at the top by experienced prewar elites who embraced the new order.  
Once relieved of their disabilities, reconstructed rebels ran for office, took government 
jobs, and became patronage brokers in their own right. The president of the North Carolina 
Railroad, for instance, gloated that if there was anyone working for the road who had opposed 
the Republicans at the last election, “he was some clever business man who has long since 
repented of his sins and is now for the Governor and the great National Conservative Republican 
Party.”75 African Americans benefited from railroad jobs, but a thorough study of North Carolina 
railroads in this period found that none were give a position of responsibility like director or 
conductor.76 Joseph Brown estimated that Republican control of Georgia’s Western and Atlantic 
Railroad would net between 1000 and 1500 votes because its Democratic employees would be 
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replaced with Republican ones.77 One may reasonably doubt that Brown was hoping to pick up 
additional votes among African Americans, who had no better alternative than the Republican 
Party. Some jobs might go to Black Georgians, but a careful use of patronage to win votes meant 
mostly giving the jobs to whites. The same pattern held for other kinds of patronage. 
Endorsements for registers in bankruptcy included known Republicans. However, out of the 
North Carolina applicants, there was only one African American, who wrote a poorly spelled 
letter and was not appointed.78  
Republican political organization was ballasted by public jobs for whites, who were then 
charged with redistributing goods and services to Blacks. Georgia Methodist John H. Caldwell 
and his wife opened day, night, and Sunday schools for African Americans with funds from the 
American Missionary Association. Finding the salaries for himself and other teachers 
insufficient, he sought additional resources from the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Bureau appointed 
him district superintendent in January 1867. With the government’s help he was able to open 
additional schools, hiring his wife, son, niece, and nephew as teachers. Caldwell pointed out to 
Bureau leaders that his brother, also a Methodist minister, owned a building that could be used as 
a school, and yet another relative was Bureau superintendent in a different district.79 Attorney 
General Amos Akerman—another reconstructed rebel from Georgia—claimed that on a recent 
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visit to York County, South Carolina he found that nearly all of the schools “were taught by men 
who had been in the Confederate armies,” until intimidation by the Klan caused them to stop. 
Like political offices, teaching provided reconstructed rebels with employment, and as Akerman 
added sympathetically, “one or two were cripples.”80  
Black southerners had mixed feelings about empowering members of the prewar elite. 
The New Orleans Tribune, for example, was skeptical of James Longstreet’s conversion in 1867. 
A bilingual newspaper dedicated to serving the city’s Black and creole communities, The 
Tribune argued, “our only advisors should be ourselves. None of these so called wise men…has 
our interest or welfare at heart. They speak for their people, not us.”81  However, when Grant 
appointed Longstreet surveyor for the Port of New Orleans in 1869, the attitude of the Tribune 
changed dramatically. Its editorials called him “an enlightened man, a true patriot,” and used him 
as a foil to criticize unreconstructed rebels: “After having shown bravery on the battlefield, he 
demonstrated in political life a great moral courage and, if his example were followed by our 
fellow citizens of the South, all our dissensions would soon be appeased.”82  
African American leaders sometimes opposed restricting the rights of ex-Confederates 
because they feared that it would undermine their own claim to citizenship. As the New Orleans 
Tribune put it, “If we refuse the franchise to any class, it can as well be withheld from us.”83 
However, few supported universal amnesty from the officeholding ban. More often, they paired 
individual amnesty with support for Reconstruction, as the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment 
had done. Black leaders like James Rapier of Alabama and Hiram Revels of Mississippi offered 
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resolutions to help reconstructed white southerners regain the right to hold office.84 Twenty-eight 
members of the Alabama legislature signed a petition to grant amnesty to Samuel Rice, the 
former chief justice of the state supreme court, who had joined the Republican Party after 
Grant’s election. As evidence of Justice Rice’s trustworthiness, the signers testified that he had 
consistently advocated equal rights during the eighteen months after his conversion and that “he 
has ever shown his faith by his works.”85 Conflict between African American leaders and 
reconstructed rebels would come later, but for now they helped each other.  
Southern Unionists and northern settlers were sometimes quicker than African Americans 
to challenge reconstructed rebels’ leadership. One Georgia Unionist protested against a petition 
for amnesty, writing, “if the Fourteenth Amendment means anything…if the test oath means 
anything, they mean to exclude just such men.”86 In Arkansas, a recent northern arrival told 
Congress that “there is no disposition on the part of the Union men in Arkansas to confer office 
on those who have been in rebel service; we are willing to have them come into our church as 
converts, but are disposed to let them occupy back seats for some years to come.”87 The 
objections of white Unionists, however, did more to weed out unreconstructed rebels who sought 
amnesty deceptively than to stop Congress from rewarding verified converts to the party. 
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Congressional amnesty was at least partially based on the assumption that Reconstruction 
needed the support of native southerners to give it legitimacy. At the same time though, African 
Americans and unconditional Unionists were native southerners too. To them, their consent was 
enough to mean that Reconstruction was not being imposed from outside. Northern Republicans 
saw these groups as vital partners in reconstructing the South, and yet, they were insufficient in 
northern eyes. They saw that white southerners were necessary to secure Republican majorities 
in all but a few states. They also knew that conservative southerners would see any government 
by African Americans and lower-class whites as illegitimate. Perhaps most importantly, white 
northerners shared with southerners the basic assumption that elite white men were more capable 
leaders, even though for Republicans, it now came with the caveat that officials must uphold the 
rights of African Americans.   
 
Toward General Amnesty 
 The Enforcement Act of May 1870 authorized the federal government to prosecute 
individual violations of voting rights. It also required the Justice Department to prosecute 
southerners who held office in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s officeholding ban.88 
Attorney General Amos Akerman, himself a recipient of amnesty, instructed U.S. attorneys to 
vigorously enforce the law not only against the Klan, but also against ineligible officeholders.89 
However, Akerman’s men did not get far with these cases before the Amnesty Act of 1872. Most 
of the enforcement came directly from the Republican state governments themselves. 
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Enforcing the ban against unreconstructed rebels depended on Republicans holding the 
state legislature. In North Carolina, the presiding officers of the general assembly notified 
Holden of vacancies caused by ineligible candidates being elected.90  Holden then ordered new 
elections for the vacant seats.91 In one case, a vacancy due to ineligibility led to the election of 
John W. Stephens, a Republican Confederate veteran who was later murdered by the Klan.92 In 
contrast to North Carolina’s vigorous application of the officeholding ban, Georgia Republicans 
were either unable or unwilling to eject ineligible whites because of the partisan split in the 
legislature. Instead, a block of conservative Republicans combined forces with Democratic 
legislators, several of them ineligible for their seats, and expelled thirty-two Black legislators.93  
The Georgia imbroglio not only demonstrated the haphazard enforcement of the ban; it 
also highlighted the ambiguous and contested nature of postwar citizenship. Black Georgians 
could vote under the Reconstruction Acts and the new state constitution. Anti-Reconstruction 
conservatives, though, argued that officeholding was not one of the “privileges or immunities of 
citizenship” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the state constitution said nothing 
about officeholding.94 African Americans and their allies disagreed. A meeting of African 
Americans in Savannah petitioned Congress, condemning the expulsion of the Black legislators 
as “an unjust deprivation of our most sacred rights as citizens.”95 Joseph Brown had campaigned 
for the state constitution by telling reluctant whites that since there was no explicit provision for 
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Black officeholding, such a right did not exist. After receiving amnesty, he was appointed Chief 
Justice of Georgia’s Supreme Court and found himself in a position to rule on a test case. 
Contradicting what he said on the campaign trail, though, he wrote a majority opinion that since 
prewar statutes had recognized all citizens as eligible to hold office, African Americans had that 
right under the new constitution as well. Even more decisively, Congress remanded Georgia to 
military oversight, reinstated the Black legislators, and removed the ineligible whites from the 
legislature.96  
If officeholding was a right of citizenship, though, what did this say about the citizenship 
of ex-Confederates who were prevented from holding office? Reconstructed rebels who 
petitioned for congressional amnesty saw officeholding as a right of citizenship, just as African 
Americans did. One supplicant asked “that he may be relieved of his disabilities, and be 
permitted to spend the remnant of his days in the full enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of 
an American citizen.”97  Similar language can be found in almost every petition. Reconstructed 
rebels acknowledged that they had lost full citizenship rights by constitutional authority, while 
also arguing that they merited an exception because of their support for Reconstruction. 
Petitioners from Georgia also mentioned their opposition to the expulsion of the Black legislators 
as evidence that they were fully reconstructed.98  
Reconstructed rebels used the combination of exclusion and amnesty to their advantage, 
but after gaining political control in their states, they began to call for general or universal 
amnesty. Such magnanimity, they hoped, might pacify discontented whites or at least undercut 
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the argument that Republicans were giving Blacks more rights than whites. Holden used his 
message to the legislature at the end of 1869 to suggest the time for general amnesty had 
arrived.99 James Lusk Alcorn of Mississippi, campaigning for governor in late 1869, paired 
universal amnesty and universal suffrage as his platform.100 A Virginia Republican, who only a 
few months earlier had opposed general amnesty because “these people are not and cannot now 
be loyal,” argued following the state’s first election that the masses only needed “nursing.” He 
believed generosity would win their gratitude and “turn their hate into friendship.”101 
 Meanwhile, Democrats and “liberal” Republicans who favored reconciliation with former 
Confederates condemned selective amnesty as an example of political corruption. The frequent 
accusation was that Republicans were “peddling out pardons.”102 One petition, though satirical, 
reflected this view of amnesty as a corrupt business. The front of the application read, “James B. 
Kennedy of Emanuel NC, recommended by Eggs, chicken, fish, and venison,” and inside, “Dear 
Jake, Do please remove my disabilities & eggs chicken & fish as well as venison… will be yours 
etc, James B. Kennedy.”103 Even the Republican New York Times assailed the “bitterly 
proscriptive” policy of “retailing pardon as a recompense for partisanship.” Piecemeal amnesty, 
it said, “suggests a system of bargain and sale, of subserviency on one side and patronage on the 
other, of rewards doled out to partisan adherents and punishment inflicted on all who dare to be 
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opponents.” The Times instead called for “a measure removing all disabilities as a means of 
promoting reconciliation, local and national.”104  
 In 1872, Republicans would pass a general amnesty bill to remove political disabilities 
from all but the highest-ranking Confederate leaders. White northerners increasingly came to see 
white southerners as having been sufficiently reconstructed. The moment had not yet arrived, but 
in time, it would appear to some northerners that identity as a Republican was no longer a 
prerequisite for loyalty like it once was.   
 
If the Fourteenth Amendment Means Anything 
 The Fourteenth Amendment repudiated the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision and 
wrote birthright citizenship into the Constitution. The Amendment’s authors hoped that a 
uniform standard of citizenship would result in homogenous institutions across the land, in 
contrast to the prewar South’s “peculiar institution.” By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, uniform citizenship was eroded by judicial interpretation, Jim Crow’s badges of 
inferiority, and other discriminatory legislation like the Chinese Exclusion Act.105 Even in the 
1860s, Congressional Republicans admitted that there were limits to inclusion when asked about 
the rights of women or Native Americans.106  
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 The exclusion of ex-Confederates from officeholding was written into the Amendment 
itself. Though the ban was always meant to be temporary, the exclusion and Congressional 
amnesty should inform how historians understand the postwar redefinition of citizenship. 
Congress intended the ban to exclude Confederates first, then transform them and return them to 
power through selective amnesty. Reconstructed rebels, for their part, did perform works 
supporting Black freedom, verifying their faith in non-racial citizenship. At the same time, their 
active use of the amnesty process reflected a desire to reestablish the authority of white elites. 
Their efforts to regain not only citizenship, but also control, foreshadowed their enemies’ 










MAKING THE SOUTH SAFE FOR INVESTMENT: 
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY 
 
In the fall of 1867, Rufus Bullock was in New York City, hunting for capitalists to invest 
in Georgia railroads. Though he had lived in Augusta, Georgia since 1859, he was no stranger to 
this capitalist mecca. In fact, he was born near Albany, New York, where he got his start in the 
telegraph industry before the Adams Express Company sent him south. During the war, he 
offered his expertise to the Confederacy and helped manage Confederate telegraph and railroad 
operations. Some southerners would later say he was a northern spy, though Bullock always 
boasted of his southern and Confederate bonafides, even after becoming a Republican. Closer to 
the truth, Bullock had an emotional attachment both to New York and Georgia, but little loyalty 
to larger regions like North and South. He seized opportunity wherever he found it.1  
In 1867, he found it in the Republican Party and railroads. In July, Bullock attended 
Georgia’s first Republican convention. If he lost friends because of politics, he gained others, 
and in November, the board of directors for the Macon and Augusta Railroad elected him 
president of their operation. And so, Bullock briefly returned to his home state looking for others 
like himself who appreciated a good opportunity. However, to his dismay, the nation’s leading 
financiers turned him down. “If you want to run a railroad in the Indian territory or anywhere 
else we will be glad to hear of the project,” they said. “But under a military government, it means 
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that one man can dictate policy in a way that is not conducive to the best interests of speculation 
and investment. Go back and establish a civil government and then come back.”2  
The comparison to “the Indian territory” was apt. In the decades after the Civil War, 
northern finance capital increasingly turned its sights west, not south. Investors were able to get 
advantageous terms for capital while the West was in a territorial stage, and then shape the new 
state constitutions through local agents. The status of the postwar South was much more 
uncertain. Under the Reconstruction Acts, multiple states were consolidated into military 
districts until their component states wrote new constitutions that provided for Black suffrage. 
The provisional civil governments might invest in railroads and issue bonds for investor to 
purchase, but there was the real possibility that any action could be annulled through military 
oversight. Completing the reconstruction process that Congress had set up became essential to 
attracting northern capital.3  
Bullock followed New York’s advice. As the state’s first Republican governor, he 
liberally pledged the state’s credit to railroads in order to make outside investors more confident 
that they would succeed. Most Republican governments in the South did the same.4 Many 
southern states would later cancel their Reconstruction-era debt and pass laws against further 
pledging the state’s credit to private businesses. Democrats were not unanimous on debt 
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repudiation, however, and they shared with Republicans a desire to make the South look 
attractive to outside capital.5  
By aggressively courting northern capital, reconstructed rebels set the trajectory that 
many of their opponents would follow. Ultimately, neither the reconstructed rebels, nor their 
successors, challenged the South’s distinct character as a low-wage economy in a high-wage 
nation. Unable to attract workers from outside the region, the South failed to develop a 
diversified economy as in some parts of the West and instead took on all the appearances of a 
“colonial economy.”6   
 
Southern Underdevelopment and the Need for Outside Investment 
Reconstructed rebels were ready to start over. Even those who had invested heavily in 
slavery began to see that the institution had held back southern economic development. It had 
made slaveholders like themselves rich but left the land itself undeveloped. Perhaps now they 
could start over by building factories, mines, railroads, and schools. As one reconstructed rebel 
told a meeting to promote a railroad through western Georgia, “Some of you in this country own 
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land worth $25 an acre, that if it were in the state of Ohio would be worth $200 an acre.” The 
legacy of slavery was strong, but maybe by choosing their investments wisely, southerners could 
catch up with the North.7   
 Though recent historians have argued that southern slavery made the Industrial 
Revolution possible, a more careful look at the prewar southern economy makes it clear that the 
reconstructed rebels were right in their assessment that slavery had held the South back.8 Human 
chattel represented two-third of the wealth of the average slaveowner. The value of this 
investment was independent of local development like villages, factories, schools, and roads, so 
planters had little incentive to put their money in such projects. Though railroads needed stock 
subscriptions to build, one prominent North Carolinian urged his neighbors not to buy stock until 
a road was complete. Instead, railroads sometimes rented slaves from planters to do their 
construction labor, since planters were most interested in maximizing their investment in slavery. 
Southern railroad building accelerated in the 1850s, but it had to be paid for by the government. 
Planters also showed little interest in mining the region’s mineral wealth and seldom bothered to 
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look for such opportunities. They focused on cotton agriculture, which quickly wore out the soil, 
and they reinvested their gains in slavery because it promised surer profits.9  
  After emancipation, however, that investment was wiped out. As historical economist 
Gavin Wright convincingly argues, planters stopped thinking of themselves as “laborlords” and 
began thinking of themselves as “landlords.” Southern elites increased their investments in 
railroads, factories, and mining.10 The reconstructed rebel who earlier compared land values in 
Ohio and Georgia explained the logic: “a railroad is the very best investment you can make, 
because it increases the value of the land,” he told listeners. “Formerly if a man had $1200, he 
would send to Virginia and buy a negro. Virginia got the money, and Georgia got the negro. 
Georgia now gets the negro, but it don’t cost her anything. Every new man that comes to Georgia 
now is worth just as much now as when we used to send money to buy a negro. Every country 
increases in wealth in proportion to the number of people in it.” Black farm labor was cheap, and 
rather than invest in human chattel, Georgians could invest in internal improvements that would 
boost the value of the land. Georgia could become like the Midwest, if only it committed to the 
northern model of development.11  
 Southern elites saw the way forward, but many of them lacked the means. The 
destruction of slavery had wiped out their primary source of capital. Moreover, southern wealth 
exclusive of slaves fell by forty-three percent by the end of the war. Due to low land values, 
planters would find trouble securing credit on generous prewar terms. Repudiation of 
Confederate bonds depleted banking capital from $61 million to $17 million over the 1860s, and 
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circulating currency fell from $51 million in the region to $15 million during the same period.12 
This situation posed a problem for southerners wanting to try out new opportunities. For 
example, a reconstructed rebel from Mississippi opened a textile mill in 1867, but he failed to 
raise enough money to keep it going. He despaired because “raising money in this country” was 
“out of the question,” and his attempts to get loans from St. Louis and New Orleans were 
rebuffed. He concisely summed up the South’s biggest economic problem: “It is evident we must 
have working capital.”13  
 Outside investment was the most obvious solution. As one advocate of this remedy put it, 
the South needed “Yankees and Yankee notions.” The former captain of a North Carolina 
regiment imagined a kind of postwar economic imperialism that would help, not hurt the South: 
“We want [northern] capital to build factories, and work shops, and railroads, and develop our 
magnificent water powers,” he explained. “We want their intelligence, their energy and 
enterprise to operate these factories, and to teach us how to do it… We want some of those same 
Yankee tricks played down here that have covered the north with rail roads and canals.”14 As this 
Republican convert made clear, the South could become like the North, but it would take 
northern investment and immigration to do it. 
 Northerners initially demonstrated considerable excitement over the prospect of going 
south. Many of them believed that free wage labor was superior to slave labor and that they 
could make handsome profits by running southern plantations with the newly emancipated 
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freedpeople. If they did not go south themselves, they could offer credit. In 1867, however, 
cotton prices came crashing down due to overproduction. Hard times, combined with the threat 
of Congressional Reconstruction, ended a brief period of goodwill between native-born planters 
and northern settlers. Growing violence toward Blacks as well as northern settlers convinced 
many of the latter to either leave or join the Republican Party.15  
 Moreover, as Rufus Bullock observed firsthand, northern capitalists were not going to 
invest in a place under military rule. Some white southerners, as well as northern capitalists, 
placed their faith in President Johnson and hoped that Republicans would be defeated at the 
polls.16 An influential segment of the southern elite, however, decided that the best way to attract 
northern capital was to comply with Congressional Reconstruction and resolve their states’ 
ambiguous political status.  
 
Republican Home Rule 
Though Democrats would later use the phrase “home rule” to refer to the overthrow of 
Republican state governments in the 1870s and the end of federal intervention in 1877, 
compliance with Congressional Reconstruction also signified a kind of home rule. In fact, many 
reconstructed rebels would later remember their part in Reconstruction as a success, arguing that 
by joining the Republican Party, they had helped to restore civil government and congressional 
representation to their states. By this definition, Republicans achieved home rule in the South 
between 1868 and 1870. However, unlike the Redeemers, who defined home rule as federal non-
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intervention, reconstructed rebels like Rufus Bullock primarily associated their earlier 
accomplishment of statehood with access to outside investment and a growing economy.  
The dangers of military rule were illustrated in the railroad partnership between Williams 
C. Wickham and Collis P. Huntington. Wickham was a former Confederate Brigadier General 
from Virginia, and perhaps as early as 1865, a member of the Republican Party. Huntington was 
a New York industrialist who built the western portion of America’s first transcontinental 
railroad. In October 1868, Virginia’s military commander, George Stoneman, told the secretary 
of war that he had uncovered a plot by Huntington to take over the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway. Huntington’s plan was to convince the state to vote its shares to elect Wickham as 
president, who would then contract with Huntington to finance the road, before the railroad 
tycoon finally took control himself. General Stoneman wanted to know if he should intervene. 
Fortunately for Huntington and Wickham, the secretary of war favored private ownership of the 
railroads over the South’s antebellum pattern of state ownership. Huntington and Wickham were 
allowed to go forward. With the former as president and the later as vice-president, they 
completed the road by 1873. Had Stoneman intervened, Virginia’s ports might not have had 
access to the coal mines of West Virginia.17  
To avoid such dangers and attract outside capital, it was wise to finish Reconstruction.  
Atlanta’s commercial elite certainly felt that way. Though most of the town had been razed in 
1864, its leaders were too busy to hate Congressional Republicans. In the first two years after the 
war, they had already taken advantage of Atlanta’s position at the nexus of railroad trunk lines to 
start an economic revival. With the demise of the factorage system, which had directed cotton 
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through seaboard ports, inland cities like Atlanta used the rails to channel cotton north. Atlanta 
also benefited from the South’s first national bank in December 1865, as well as from an influx 
of northern entrepreneurs. City founder and railroad builder Richard Peters wanted to dispense 
with the Congress’s requirements as quickly as possible, so he called a meeting of local citizens 
“to take into consideration the duty of Georgia in the pending crisis.”18   
Peters himself had already considered and decided. As chair of the meeting, he appointed 
Henry Farrow to head a resolutions committee. Farrow was a former Confederate colonel and an 
early convert to the Republican Party. Farrow’s committee resolved that Georgians should meet 
the Congressional requirements “promptly and without the least hesitation.” As explanation, 
Farrow told the audience that Congress had “provided a way to escape from onerous military 
governments,” and that they “owed it to the impoverished widows and orphans of our brave and 
noble dead to improve the opportunity thus offered us for inaugurating loyal State governments 
in conformity to the provisions of the bill just passed.” Obtaining the floor, another ex-
Confederate offered counter-resolutions advocating inaction, which would “thereby preserve at 
least, their self-respect, their manhood and honor.” Peters outmaneuvered the opposition, 
prevented them from voting, and ensured that Farrow’s resolutions passed unanimously.19  
Haste is not a term usually associated with the supporters of Congressional 
Reconstruction. After all, President Johnson’s plan had been quick and relatively painless for 
white southerners; the congressional plan meant a period of military oversight, a new round of 
constitution writing, and Black suffrage. Yet the minority of former rebels who embraced 
Congressional Reconstruction did so to end military government and to return to civilian rule and 
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congressional representation as quickly as possible. Businessmen were divided on the issue, and 
most probably sat quietly on the fence; even Peters was never an avowed Republican. 
Nevertheless, after Peters corralled Atlanta’s leaders in favor of acquiescence, some of them 
continued to support Reconstruction. The Republican leadership relocated the state’s capital to 
the commercial entrepôt, and 45 percent of registered whites voted for Grant in 1868.20 
From nearby Augusta, Rufus Bullock observed a “very general disposition among our 
business men” in March 1867 “to cut loose from old wartime political leaders & act at once for a 
full & final settlement of our political troubles by hearty acquiescence” in the Reconstruction 
Acts. Further resistance, he believed, would cause the “prostration of all business & 
enterprise.”21 In July, he became active in Republican politics, and his trip in November on 
behalf of the Macon and Augusta Railroad convinced him of the necessity of statehood. At the 
end of the year, he attended Georgia’s constitutional convention, and Republicans nominated 
him as their candidate for governor. Ex-Governor Joe Brown, who supported Congressional 
Reconstruction for the same reasons, described Bullock as “a gentleman of ability, of 
unimpeachable character, of industry and energy, of first-rate business habits, and strong 
common sense.”22 The party chairman, also a reconstructed rebel, argued that “Col. Bullock 
possesses the business capacity and practical ability necessary for such an emergency and that 
every financial and commercial interest of the State could be safely confided to his care.” 
Curiously, the Republican chairman added that Bullock played no part in the war—a blatant 
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falsehood—all the while prefacing his name with his Confederate military title. Akin to “General 
Longstreet,” he was still “Col. Bullock.”  
Georgia was readmitted to the Union in the middle of 1868, and Bullock went to Atlanta 
to begin his term as governor. Home rule, however, would not last for long. In September, the 
state legislature voted to expel its African American members. Black Georgians, a majority of 
white representative felt, did not have the right to hold office because the state constitution did 
not explicitly recognize such a right. Governor Bullock fully embraced the Republican Party’s 
position on political rights for African Americans. He had been eager to restore Georgia to the 
Union, so he now began lobbying Congress to intervene.23  
Bullock’s request for a return to Congressional oversight opened a rift in the state’s 
Republican Party—on the surface over whether Blacks had the right to hold office, but more 
deeply over whether Georgia was a fully reconstructed state. Bullock and his wing of the party 
wanted Congress to toss out legislators who were banned under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
reinstate the African American members. Brown led the more conservative wing of the party. 
Brown advised the governor against asking for congressional intervention because it would 
alienate white voters. However, the issue was less one of Black political rights, than it was a 
question of the state’s political status. Bullock had appointed Brown chief justice of the Georgia 
Supreme Court, and even though Brown had finessed the issue of Black officeholding to win 
ratification for the constitution, once on the court, he ruled that Blacks did in fact have the right 
to hold office.24 Brown was never as supportive of African American rights as Bullock, but he 
did not see those rights as a threat as long as whites were in control. Brown’s goal was to see 
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Georgia restored as a state, which would help both the state’s credit and his own business 
interests.  
Despite appearances, Bullock and Brown were not actually that far apart. Brown was not 
adamantly opposed to Black suffrage, and Bullock never claimed to desire military rule. In a 
letter to The New York Times, Bullock wrote that Georgia Republicans were not asking for 
“harsh terms imposed on our opponents, nor do we desire military government…. All we ask or 
desire is that Congress shall provide for the enforcement of its laws heretofore enacted.”25 
Bullock believed that Congress could enforce the terms of the Reconstruction Acts without 
military intervention. Brown and Bullock disagreed over the uncertain status of federal-state 
relations in the postwar era, but both hoped to restore Georgia to the Union and create a 
competitive Republican Party. Both goals were tied to encouraging northern investment and 
promoting economic reconstruction.   
At the end of 1869, Congress sided with Bullock, but decided that it would have to 
reimpose military rule to do what Bullock wanted. Including the period after Union victory and 
then again during Congressional Reconstruction, Georgia was now under military rule for a third 
time. Georgia’s third reconstruction worried property owners. Democratic leaders told them that 
Congress’s action invalidated the acts of the state legislature from September 1868 to January 
1870. This fear was aggravated when Bullock asked Congress not to seat the U.S. senators 
chosen by the illegal legislature. Bullock offered reassurance in his message to the new 
legislature: “the impression which is sought to be created that contracts are invalidated, that State 
bonds are repudiated, and that corporations organized upon the basis of the late legislation, are 
without legal foundation, is entirely groundless.” He pointed out that state bonds were selling 
	




higher than those of any other state.26 Nevertheless, Democrats correctly identified the alarming 
relationship between political uncertainty and economic uncertainty.  
Georgia’s military administrator restored Black legislators to their seats and appointed a 
commission of three officers to investigate the officeholding qualifications of white Democrats 
who were ineligible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fourteen state representatives and five 
senators were expelled, giving Republicans firm control of the legislature. Congress also 
required Georgia to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, which pushed the amendment over the 
threshold and into fundamental law. Georgia became a state once more in July 1870, and at least 
for a short time, Bullock was back at the helm.27   
To reconstructed rebels like Bullock, statehood was a necessary prerequisite for outside 
investment. However, there were opportunities all over the country, and especially in the West. 
To entice northern capital, southern leaders would have to do a lot more.   
 
The Political Economy of Law and Order 
First and foremost, Republicans needed to show that they were in control of their states. 
If most New York investors initially opposed Congressional Reconstruction, they also opposed 
the attempts of southern Democrats and Klansmen to overthrow it with violence after it was in 
place.28 Most historians who have written about the efforts of white Republicans to enforce the 
law have emphasized either their commitment to Black rights or their personal concern for 
survival.29 White terrorists intimidated, assaulted, raped, and murdered African Americans who 
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exercised social and political autonomy. Victims of the Klan also included white Republicans, 
such as ex-Confederate John W. Stephens of North Carolina.30 Moreover, by threatening to 
reduce voter turnout among Republicans of both races, the Klan endangered the longevity of 
Republican governance. Reconstructed rebels had an incentive to protect the lives of African 
Americans—whom they especially valued as voters—and to make sure that terrorism did not 
lead to a wider insurgency against the state government. Historians have, however, been less 
attuned to white Republicans’ perception that law and order was essential to attracting outside 
investment. By fighting the Klan, they would make the South safe for northern capital.   
Governor Bullock of Georgia hit on this theme at a meeting of railroad boosters. Setting 
aside the discussion of government support for the railroads, he decided to define his political 
position in a different way: “It is this: I am opposed to the next war.” Maybe Bullock was 
thinking of two years earlier, when the Democratic vice-presidential candidate Frank Blair had 
advocated using the military to overthrow the reconstructed state governments. Or, perhaps he 
wanted listeners to think about the impact the Klan was having on the state. “When we 
remember the improvement that has been made in our State during the last two or three years,” 
Bullock continued, “I am sure no one will wish to have them destroyed; and therefore I think you 
will all agree with me in the political sentiment I have expressed. We will say nothing about the 
last war.”31 Bullock crafted his words wisely, intending them not only for home consumption, 
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but also for northern capitalists who worried over whether southern railroads were a safe 
investment.  
Among the officials who had the power to do something about the Klan, the most ardent 
supporter of national law enforcement was Amos Akerman. A former Confederate from Georgia, 
Akerman took a legalistic perspective on Reconstruction, siding with the liberal authority of 
national law over the illiberal authority of local custom. The Reconstruction amendments 
transformed the legal landscape as Akerman saw it. However, he hardly would have considered 
himself a radical; he believed he was helping to restore order and prosperity.  
Akerman was not a native southerner, but his pursuit of a legal career brought him to the 
South, and his respect for legal authority influenced his political evolution through the 1860s. 
Akerman left his native New Hampshire in 1842, eventually settling in the northwestern Georgia 
hill-country, where he both practiced law and farmed corn with slave labor. During the Civil 
War, Akerman was loyal to the Confederacy, serving in the Georgia home guard and then as 
supply officer during General William T. Sherman’s advance into the state. His decision to 
support the Confederacy, however, grew not out of unquestioning state loyalty, but as he later 
recalled, from disdain for the weakness of the federal government.32  
Akerman took a soldierly view of defeat, one that was similar in a way to that of James 
Longstreet, but ultimately more ideological. Akerman believed that “a surrender in good faith 
really signifies a surrender of the substance as well as the forms of the Confederate cause.” 
Losing meant acceding to the result and marching forward together in the new direction. 
Moreover, he believed the Republican Party’s ideas about nationality and equality were both 
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“expedient and right.”33 He had once “recoiled from the horrors that we anticipated as the effect 
of emancipation,” but admitted in August 1865, he “had no conception that slavery could be 
abolished as easily and safely as was actually done.”34 Convinced that his fears of disorder from 
emancipation were wrong, he saw more disorder coming from unreconstructed rebels. 
For Akerman, Black suffrage became a way to guarantee the success of the new legal 
regime, as well as economic prosperity. As with emancipation, he had initial concerns. He 
worried that freedpeople’s lack of education might make them unsuited to the ballot. But after 
reflecting that poor whites voted as well, he thought it equitable to extend male suffrage. 
Moreover, he thought that Union victory was a sign that the northern political economy held the 
best recipe for economic growth. Speaking for himself and other reconstructed rebels, he 
explained to a friend, “we saw that it was idle for the South to seek prosperity now by the old 
means of involuntary labor or any thing akin to it.” Prosperity could only be found the same way 
that “other parts of the country prosper,” that is, “by the industry of those who broke the soil and 
those who voluntarily labor for others, encouraged by fair wages, by the protection of the law, by 
the hope of advancement, by the respect of the community, and by the ennobling presence of an 
equal voice in public affairs.”35  
Akerman quickly gained the confidence of party leaders. In the 1868 presidential 
campaign, he published a letter in the New York Times endorsing Grant.36 Akerman also 
increased his political profile by lobbying Congress to reject Georgia’s electoral votes—which 
went for Seymour, the Democratic candidate—on account of the expulsion of the Black 
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legislators and election violence.37 Grant likely appreciated Akerman’s opposition to state debt 
repudiation as well, which put him in line with the increasingly pro-creditor position of the party. 
In 1869, Akerman received an appointment as U.S. district attorney for Georgia, and a year later, 
President Grant elevated him to U.S. attorney general. In a letter to Charles Sumner, Akerman 
expressed some of the sentiments that would motivate his vigorous prosecution of the Klan. He 
believed that the people must “become used to the exercise of these powers now, while the 
national spirit is still warm with the glow of the late war,” or else “there will be an indisposition 
to exercise them hereafter, and the ‘state rights’ spirit may grow troublesome again.” Akerman 
thought that “a greater assimilation of the states to one another ought to be one of the results of 
the late conflict,” and he wanted legislation that would do so by enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment. “I desire that the people should get the habit of looking more to the general 
government,” Akerman wrote imperiously.38 
In late May 1870, Congress passed the first of three “Enforcement Acts,” so named 
because they would enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In response to the 
expanding legal needs of the nation stemming from this legislation, Congress also created the 
Department of Justice in July. Though the office of Attorney General had existed since the 
Washington administration, Akerman was the first to head an independent department. The first 
Enforcement Act made it a felony to bribe or intimidate voters, or to deprive anyone of a right or 
privilege of citizenship. However, throughout 1870, the government made no attempt to enforce 
it, hoping instead that it would serve as a deterrent. As a result, Akerman spent 1870 focusing on 
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railroad matters, examining whether companies had met the necessary requirements to receive 
federal aid.39 
 In 1871, Akerman became convinced that the Klan “combinations amount to war” and 
that they “cannot be effectively crushed on any other theory.”40 In February, the Second 
Enforcement Act tightened federal oversight of elections, and in April 1871, a third act 
empowered the president to use the military to suppress conspiracies against civil and political 
rights.41 Akerman personally supervised the trials of Klansman in North Carolina, which 
produced 49 convictions in the fall. Next, with the help of the military, Akerman’s Justice 
Department turned to South Carolina. Over 200 were arrested, and many more voluntarily 
surrendered, were deposed, and released. The courts could not keep up with the cases, and so 
only 58 of the South Carolinians were brought to trial, of which 53 pled guilty and 5 more were 
convicted.42 
Despite the success of the Klan trials, the use of the U.S. military divided native white 
Republicans. Georgia Governor Rufus Bullock and Atlanta’s Republican paper, The New Era, 
both opposed the third enforcement act, naively arguing that the state’s legal system could 
handle the Klan.43 Mississippi Governor James Lusk Alcorn, also a reconstructed rebel, 
minimized the extent of Klan activity in his state and insisted that state laws were working. 
Perhaps he worried about the potential backlash against federal enforcement, or the interference 
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of his leading rival, Mississippi’s Republican Senator Adelbert Ames.44 Republican governors 
needed to put down the Klan, but they also needed to make it look like they already had things 
under control for appearances’ sake.  
Other reconstructed rebels, however, agreed with Akerman that federal counterterrorism 
measures would create a good environment for economic growth. One Arkansas congressman, 
engaging in some wishful thinking, insisted “the true Southron and brave confederate soldier” 
does not belong to the Klan, and “having an interest in the repose of society and the prosperity of 
the country, they will cooperate with the Government.” With a united front against the Klan, he 
believed, “general contentment and prosperity will prevail for all time to come, immigration will 
then flow to our State even more rapidly than now, our industries will spring into life, our 
railroads will be but vast avenues for the ingress of millions of wealth.”45 Samuel F. Phillips of 
North Carolina told an audience that “all quiet men who wish to establish a foundation upon 
which the fabric of private fortune, for themselves and their children, may be erected” would join 
the Republican Party. “Industry cannot flourish but with an assured peace. Labor cannot prosper 
with one eye averted from work and fixed apprehensively upon public affairs.”46  
These sentiments were echoed in the majority report on Congress’s inquiry into what it 
called the Klan “outrages.” It conceded that ex-Confederates were “brave men, however 
mistaken,” credited their sincerity, and acknowledged that the government could not expect more 
than “a reluctant obedience,” but simultaneously insisted that Congress should not accept any 
less. It would not tolerate those “who permit the remnants of rebellious feeling, the antagonisms 
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of race, or the bitterness of political partisanships to degrade the soldiers of Lee and Johnston 
into the cowardly midnight prowlers and assassins who scourge and kill the poor and 
defenseless.” Moreover, “If the resuscitation of the State is desired by [the Black man’s] labor, 
neither will be secured by a persecution which depopulates townships and prevents the 
introduction of new law and capital.”47 Political and financial security went hand-in-hand, the 
Republican congressmen implied.  
Akerman couched his goals in economic terms less frequently than other reconstructed 
southerners. His primary motivation seems to have been his conviction that the war had created a 
revolution in federal relations and that the law should triumph over social custom. He aimed to 
create a consistent legal regime that protected life and property uniformly. Nevertheless, 
Akerman was keenly aware of the relationship between stability and prosperity. In late 1871, a 
Wall Street investor wrote to Akerman not for a legal opinion, but a financial one. Akerman had 
worked on cases involving government subsidies to railroads, in addition to prosecuting the 
Klan. This concerned capitalist wanted to know whether Akerman would recommend investing 
in a Texas railroad from Galveston to Houston and San Antonio. The attorney general responded 
that he did not know the particulars of the company, but went on to boast that the resources of 
the South were such that there would soon be a rising demand for its products. Against the land’s 
natural endowments, Akerman counted the continued “disturbances” since the war. He 
optimistically wrote, though, that such violence was subsiding and the results of the 1870 
elections “must have a powerful influence upon the malcontent portion of the people, by 
convincing them that further resistance to the established order of things is hopeless.” Akerman 
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concluded with encouragement: “Among the consequences of the political quiet which I thus 
anticipate, will be an increased attention to the business interests of the south, greater security 
both to capital and labor, extensive immigration and investments of capital from 
abroad.”48 Countering domestic terrorism was about creating stability, and creating stability 
meant attracting investment. 
As recent scholars have emphasized, the Reconstruction amendments and enforcement 
legislation created a liberal framework of rights, but it remained subject to the power of illiberal 
local customs, courts, and illegal violence.49 Akerman hoped that the nation-state might reach 
deeper, that the laws might be enforced. He longed for order, stability, and security, which 
incidentally, financiers commonly saw as necessary mediators of risk. If, however, Akerman 
believed that national homogeneity was necessary to promote industrial growth, he was wrong. 
Later in the century, northern capital would be happy to invest in a Jim Crow South. Segregation 
and disfranchisement created a different kind of stability, and investors found in the South a lack 
of regulation, tax incentives, and low wage labor. Later generations would be loath to admit it, 
but those economic conditions owed much to another set of actions that reconstructed rebels took 
to encourage outside investment.  
 
Railroad Bonds and Cheap Labor 
A year after Richard Peters appointed Henry Farrow to outline Atlanta’s support for 
Congressional Reconstruction, Farrow went on a trip to St. Paul, Minnesota. The contrast with 
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Georgia left him depressed. Writing home to his wife, he lamented, “There is too much Western 
Country for the exhausted South ever to become very prosperous. I can’t imagine why any one 
would turn from this rich west and go south—they won’t do it.”50  
This was a private confession of the reality that most southern boosters recognized. It was 
unfair to expect the South to quickly overcome a laggard economy. The region’s success in large 
part remained tied to the fortunes of the global market for cotton. The local merchants who 
provided credit to both planters and sharecroppers forced the region into greater dependence on 
cotton, which was still the most profitable crop, even when overproduction caused prices to fall. 
On top of this, the Republican Party’s commitment to the gold standard caused deflation that hurt 
farmers in both the South and West. At least the West was free from the legacy of slavery and 
cotton dependency. Men like Farrow, however, were determined to do all they could to make the 
South attractive to outside capital.51  
Much of their effort centered on railroad finance and cheap labor. Railroads were a risky 
investment, but there were ways to reduce that risk that were proven by history. The South’s 
Republican governments endorsed railroad bonds with state credit, making them look like a safer 
investment for northern and European investors. They also leaned into the region’s pool of cheap 
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Black labor and leased convicts to private corporations. Outside investment allowed the South to 
grow at an equal pace with the North and more outside investment looked like the only way to 
ever catch up.52 However, outside investment also funneled profits out of the region, making it 
difficult for the South to develop a diversified economy like the Midwest and parts of the Far 
West. Places like Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming also received outside aid, but crafted laws to 
retain some of the profits and protect workers.53 Cheap labor left little incentive for immigrating 
to the South. The North sent its capital, but not its people, yet again a heavy contrast to patterns 
in the West. Ultimately the South’s problem was not so much the colonial nature of outside 
investment, but the incentive that planters had to keep labor inexpensive. There were 
alternatives, but they would have gone against the personal interests of reconstructed rebels.54  
To take railroad finance first, southern Republican administrations like Rufus Bullock’s 
in Georgia drew on prewar methods to attract investment. Starting the 1850s, southern states had 
begun buying up railroad stock with state bonds. Northern investors were wary of railroad 
startups and they did not sell well in Europe. On the other hand, outside investors trusted state 
bonds because states rarely went bankrupt. Out of the states that repudiated their public debt 
before the war, few were in the South, and their administrations were Democratic. The 
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Republican party stood firmly for the interests of creditors. So, through a process known as 
hypothecation, railroad companies exchanged their stocks for state bonds and then sold those in 
national and international markets. Southern states gained a controlling interest in the roads, and 
the companies could generate the capital they needed to begin construction.55  
During Reconstruction, southern Republican government continued the pattern, financing 
railroads with state credit even as northern railroads were increasing falling into private hands. 
Every reconstructed state constitution except Mississippi’s allowed the state to pledge its credit. 
North Carolina’s constitution actually preempted the work of the legislature by granting $2 
million in bonds to five roads. By the end of 1869, the legislature issued an addition $28 million 
in bonds and stock subscriptions to 18 companies.56 In Georgia, Bullock approved $8 million in 
bonds during the course of his administration.57 In all reconstructed states that pledged their 
credit, the constitutions created limitations, such as requirements that a certain number of miles 
had to be built and a given amount of private stock had to be subscribed before the state would 
release its bonds. Not to be deterred, North Carolina’s William Holden and Georgia’s Rufus 
Bullock each found reasons to release the bonds early.58  
To reconstructed rebels, railroad aid held advantages besides attracting investment. 
Railroads, once constructed, would raise property values. Purchasing additional slaves had once 
been a better investment than anything else, but with slavery gone, landowners looked to 
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increase the value of their real estate through other investments. Moreover, southern states found 
that with emancipation they also lost a substantial tax base and had to fund new social programs 
like public schools—though these were never adequately funded—by increasing the taxes on 
land. If land values went up, it would both appease landowners who faced higher taxes and raise 
extra revenue for the state. As Governor Bullock explained at a local meeting of railroad 
boosters, “The advantage to the state is in the increased value of taxable property by 
development and increase of population.”59 He pointed to the Midwest as a vindication of state 
aid in promoting railroads: there, “the value of taxable property is enhanced, the resources of the 
State are increased, and the products of the mine, the factory and the farm find ready sale.”60  
Bullock was confident that railroad aid would also benefit African Americans. The 
governor told Black Georgians that “the enhanced price of land brings up with it the value of 
labor.” Though Bullock sought to dignify labor, he also assumed that labor and capital 
corresponded to Black and white. Despite their conversion to free labor ideology, reconstructed 
rebels seldom imagined it would offer much social mobility for Blacks. “You, colored men have 
muscle,” Bullock told Black Georgians, “your white friends have money. Let the two be united, 
and the road will be promptly built.”61 In this formulation, Bullock may have anticipated Booker 
T. Washington, with whom Bullock would share a stage at the Atlanta Exposition of 1895.62 
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Bullock was right about the potential benefits to property owners, but less so about what 
railroads would mean for African American workers. Railroad jobs did pay good wages, and 
they provided some African Americans much-needed resources and a degree of power that drew 
the ire of white Democrats and the violence of Klansmen.63 However, these jobs were temporary, 
and wages in all sectors remained low. Southern wages in both farming and cotton textile 
production—the latter off-limits to African Americans—fell drastically during the late nineteenth 
century compared to those in the North.64  
Certainly, wages remained low for many reasons, including overproduction, low cotton 
prices, and the credit trap of the crop-lien system. Government policies like convict leasing only 
exacerbated the downward pressure on wages. Though the Redeemers often take the blame for 
convict leasing, the policy was innovated by southern Republicans like Bullock, who themselves 
built on prewar precedents. As boosters for business, southern Republicans saw convict labor as 
a strong incentive for outside investment. Convicts helped to build the initial mileage a road 
needed in order to receive state aid and investors saw that the project had a sure source of labor. 
According to Alex Lichtenstein, who has made a meticulous study of convict labor in Georgia, 
“state aid in the form of financial security went hand in glove with state provision of forced 
labor.”65  
There were key differences between convict leasing and antebellum slavery, but 
fundamentally, it was a new form of highly racialized, forced labor. In 1870, Georgia’s convict 
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population was eighty-three percent Black. A year earlier, Bullock leased the entire state 
penitentiary to Grant, Alexander and Company, which in turn provided labor to individual roads. 
With this forced labor, the company graded 469 miles of road from 1869 to 1871.66 Likewise, in 
Virginia, Huntington and his reconstructed partner Wickham used Black convict labor to blast 
tunnels through the mountains so the state would have a railroad to the coal mines of West 
Virginia.67 Opposition to these policies from Black Republicans was muted at times, but at least 
one such leader cried the practice as “A New System of Chain Gang Slavery.”68  
Convict labor was not the sole reason why wages in the South remained low. Even in 
1890, there were only 27,000 convict laborers in the South, compared to more than half a million 
total workers in the region’s mining and manufacturing industries, and a figure several times 
higher for agriculture.69 Convict labor was one part of a low-wage regional economy. Low wages 
were also a response to the cotton market, and the regional elite had a stake in keeping them low. 
As a result, the South was able to draw outside investment, but failed to draw much immigration 
from outside the region, which in turn limited economic growth.  
Reconstructed rebels used railroad aid and convict labor to draw outside investment and 
make the South more like the section of the country that had defeated them. The New York 
stock, bond, and commodity brokerage firm of Henry Clews purchased $3 million in Georgia 
and Alabama securities.70 Even more came from Europe.71 Their actions drew capital from the 
North, and even more so from Europe. Over the 1870s, southern states such as Virginia, North 
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Carolina, and Georgia divested themselves from the railroad game, selling their shares into 
private hands. For example, by the end of the decade, the main artery through the southeast was 
owned by Pennsylvanian Tom Scott.72  
Outside investment, however, also meant outside control, and though the reconstructed 
states benefited from rising land values and access to markets, they lost much of the profits from 
the corporations themselves. Tax-breaks for railroads and other industrial property were yet 
another mechanism in the Republican arsenal for spurring development. Perhaps by taxing the 
railroads more heavily, they could have retained more of the profits. That potential revenue could 
have been spent within the state or used to reduce the tax burden on landowners.73 A couple 
decades later, Western states would use taxation and various regulations to limit the power of 
outside ownership, leading to more balanced economies.74 For Reconstruction-era southerners, 
however, the primary fixation was getting the railroads built, one way or another. One 
comprehensive study of western North Carolina in this period finds that “mountain leaders were 
warm to outside interests and never saw their presence in the state as an intrusion or a tragedy.”75 
In Virginia, one newspaper noted some popular dissatisfaction over the “Huntington contract,” 
but concluded “it was a question of 'to be, or not to be,' as to the completion of the road to the 
Ohio river.”76 There was an understandable haste everywhere in the South to get resources.  
Most essentially, the policies of reconstructed rebels were shaped by their interests as 
landlords. Though historians have debated the relative influence of planters versus industrialists 
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in the postwar South, both shared a fundamental interest in raising property values and keeping 
wages down. If this class perspective had not existed, they might have redistributed land by 
lending African Americans money on easy terms or taxing idle land until landowners put it on 
the market.77 Reconstructed rebels generally did not favor such a course. The president of South 
Carolina’s 1868 constitutional convention, a reconstructed rebel, declared on the second day, “I 
am opposed to all confiscations of property, because the confiscation of all the lands of rebel 
owners in the State can have no effect in promoting the welfare of the state.”78  
Instead, most reconstructed states created “stay laws,” which delayed the collections of 
debts and kept landholding intact. Georgia went even farther, canceling its pre-1865 debt 
entirely, though the provision was ruled unconstitutional. Additionally, homestead exemptions 
guaranteed that a certain amount of property could not be seized in debt proceedings. Though 
studies of Reconstruction governance have sometimes counted the stay laws and homestead 
legislation as indices of economic radicalism, they did much more to benefit white southerners 
than African Americans, since it was the former who had property to lose. Radicals tended to 
urge no exemption, which would force land onto the market. Moderates argued that the debtors 
were small farmers, not elite planters, but some of the exemptions were quite high, ranging from 
$1,500 in North Carolina to $7000 in Arkansas.79 
Reconstructed rebels also sought to avoid heavy property taxes. Some, drawing on 
antebellum precedent, proposed linking the rate of taxation on property to the poll tax, which 
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would discourage anyone from raising the former. Ultimately, only North Carolina did so, 
through the agency of William B. Rodman. A reconstructed rebel, Rodman convinced his 
colleagues in the constitutional convention to require that the poll tax be equal to the tax on $300 
of property.80 Moreover, even though North Carolina was the most reckless of the reconstructed 
states in pledging its credit to railroad companies, the legislature repeatedly failed to raise the tax 
revenue necessary to pay interest on its bonds, ultimately to the ruin of the state’s credit.81  
Reconstructed rebels like Williams C. Wickham and Rufus Bullock at times seemed like 
lackeys for foreign corporations, but their ultimate goal was the restoration of personal and 
regional prosperity. Southern Republicans in Congress often supported protectionist tariffs to 
support coal and iron industries, but they did so to support their own region’s resources, not out 
of fealty to the North. On monetary policy, moreover, southern Republican Congressmen 
actually broke with the party, siding with southern Democrats to support monetary expansion 
that would combat the deflation that was hurting their constituents.82 Some revision of the 
Republican political economy, which benefited the northeast over all other regions, might have 
helped the southern economy catch up, but reconstructed rebels were not able to exert much 
influence in that direction. Though reconstructed rebels were able to capture the Republican 
Party locally and make its racial policies more conservative, they were not able to exert a similar 
influence in the national party when it came to political economy.83  
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There were alternatives to the policies pushed forward by reconstructed rebels. They 
might have anticipated the tactics of Western states at the end of the century, or they might have 
given more support to Black freedpeople. However, they did not foresee the pitfalls of outside 
investment, and they were not going to endanger their own class interests. In some areas like 
monetary policy, they did try to challenge northeastern power, but they were Republicans and the 
Northeast shaped the party. Reconstructed rebels, in some sense, were in the wrong party to 
challenge the unequal benefits that different regions of the country received from 
industrialization.  
 
Party Recrimination and Debt Repudiation 
The Republicans’ aid policies, together with convict leasing, succeeded in drawing 
investment. However, several factors undermined the impact of such achievements. The faith 
that investors put in a state’s credit was misplaced. States promised more than they could support 
in revenue. The Panic of 1873 also hit the South particularly hard. For instance, New York 
investor Henry Clews lost $2 million out of a $3 million investment in the South because of the 
crash.84 During hard times, southern Democrats also attacked railroad aid as evidence of 
Republican corruption. In fact, Democrats were equally involved in railroad ventures and 
received help from Republican administrations. Railroad-building was bipartisan, and 
Republicans hoped that success would happen on their watch and draw more white southerners 
into the party. However, when roads failed, the Republican Party likewise took the blame.85  
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For example, George Swepson, a banker and entrepreneur from the North Carolina 
piedmont, used phony construction contracts to obtain state bonds from Governor William 
Holden. Rather than selling the bonds to fund construction, Swepson invested them in Florida 
railroads. No one might have noticed had the state’s credit remained good, but a gold panic on 
September 24, 1869 brought the value of state bonds crashing down, forcing Swepson to sell off 
all of his railroad investments. Democrats pressed for an investigation. No one could figure out 
for sure if Swepson was a Democrat or a Republican, which mattered for pinning the blame on 
one party or the other. Swepson received congressional amnesty for aiding the Confederacy and 
probably voted for Grant in 1868. He certainly benefited from Governor Holden’s trust, but he 
also brought many Democrats into his scheme. One former railroad president in the state mused 
of Swepson, “I do not think he has any politics; I do not think he wastes his time on politics.”86  
However, the question of responsibility could not stop with the politics of railroad 
presidents like Swepson. Railroads were built with state funds. “Whether Swepson calls himself 
a Democrat or Republican matters little,” retorted a Democratic paper. “But who is responsible 
for his official conduct? Who made him President of a great railroad? Who placed seven millions 
of bonds in his possession?... What party is responsible for our extravagant system of 
government? What party endorses the corrupt administration of Governor Holden?”87 There was 
no denying that the Republicans were responsible for the program of railroad aid. They had 
hoped to win more political support for the party through successful infrastructure, but they 
wound up saddled with a reputation for self-interest, fraud, and failure.   
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While Democrats accused the Republicans of corruption in railroad building, they 
developed a related attack centered on Republicans’ law enforcement policy. When Holden 
requested the North Carolina legislature pass a stronger militia law, one Democratic 
representative said that “the whole thing was gotten up to create political capital.” Republicans 
had exaggerated Klan activities and distorted the motive behind them, according to Democrats. 
North Carolinians “have ever been a law-loving and a law abiding people,” and the militia bill 
was “a miserable party measure to intimidate the people in the next election.”88 
The counterterrorism efforts of reconstructed rebels opened them to charges of 
opportunism just as much as railroading schemes had. In Congress, Democrats tried to show that 
Klan violence was either made up, or that it was the justifiable result of Republican corruption. 
The anti-Reconstruction Raleigh Sentinel said the Enforcement Acts would enable Grant to 
“declare the State in insurrection and, by military terror, carry the [1872] election.”89 When 
Attorney General Akerman brought the power of the U.S. government to bear on the South 
Carolina Klan, another editor commented, “These men have been taken from their homes by an 
arbitrary edict of a central despotism and incarcerated at the instigation of partisan conspirators 
for the sole purpose of making political capital and maintaining the ascendancy of the party in 
power.”90  
In fact, shining light on Klan activities in the South was a good strategy for Republicans. 
Akerman wrote to a fellow Republican, “such atrocities as Ku Klux fire up Congress and the 
North.”91 He told a Georgia ally that the congressional investigations would “horrify the North” 
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and that “all that is necessary to hold the majority of the northern voters to the Republican cause, 
is to show them how active and cruel the Confederate temper still is in the South.”92 Evidence of 
Klan terrorism is well documented. Nevertheless, its partisan significance made it easy for anti-
Reconstructionists to accuse Republicans of opportunism and exaggerating. 
Even Northern Republicans started to express skepticism as their constituencies grew 
tired of supporting military intervention in the South. Grant’s Secretary of State wrote about 
Akerman in his diary: “He tells a number of stories, one of a fellow being castrated, with terribly 
minute and tedious details in each case. It has got to be a bore to listen twice a week to the same 
thing.”93 Akerman was forced out of the administration at the end of 1871. By his own 
admission, he was “garrulous on the Klan,” and he also made enemies with powerful railroad 
interests by denying them federal assistance unless they met all the legal requirements.94 Matters 
of national political economy were coming to dominate the identity of the Republican Party, 
even though for Southern Republicans, security and prosperity were intimately linked.  
After leaving Washington, Akerman noted that northerners were increasingly 
scapegoating Southern Republicans and interpreting their requests for military intervention as 
attempts to “cloak [Southern Republicans’] own corruption by an affection of party zeal, and to 
maintain themselves here [in the South] by Northern support in places which they ought not to 
hold.”95 Northerners were becoming more accepting of the Democratic Party ruling the South, a 
solution that finance capital also did not mind, so long as there was cheap labor and the anti-debt 
repudiation, pro-creditor wing stayed on top.  
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When Democrats came into power, however, they turned their critique of Republican 
corruption toward the state debts. Republicans had amassed these debts by pledging the state’s 
credit to support railroads. Democrats had been part of the railroad bonanza, but now many of 
them argued that the state bonds were fraudulent and that instead of paying the purchasers with 
tax revenue, the debt should be adjusted down or even repudiated. Not all Democrats agreed with 
this solution, especially the “New South” Democrats who supported industrial growth. Some of 
the Democrats who opposed repudiation had even been Republicans at one time, such as 
Confederate Governor Joseph Brown whose stay in the Republican Party ended in 1872.96 The 
opposition of Brown and other industrialists prevented repudiators from cancelling as much debt 
as they wanted. Nevertheless, the post-Reconstruction South repudiated $116.3 million and 
avoiding paying much more in interest payments. The Redeemers also rewrote the state 
constitutions to prevent their states from pledging the state’s credit to private corporations in the 
future.97 
Williams C. Wickham was one of the strongest opponents of debt repudiation. The 
movement to adjust down the debt was unique in Virginia for several reasons. First, most of the 
debt was contracted before the war, not during Reconstruction, so it was easier for “funders” like 
Wickham to argue convincingly that it was legitimate. Unlike other reconstructed states, Virginia 
never had a period of Republican government because in the first election under the new state 
constitution, Republicans were defeated by a coalition of conservative Republicans and 
Democrats. In 1871, this coalition of conservatives passed a bill to fund the debt, exchange old 
bonds for new ones that could be used to pay taxes, and raise taxes on land. These measures 
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proved insufficient to pay down the debt, and by the late 1870s, Virginia was in the middle of a 
fiscal crisis. The crisis was compounded by the fact that the Democrats who succeeded the 
conservative coalition government diverted revenue from the public school system toward 
paying down the debt. Rather than repudiate like most other southern states, Virginia’s leaders 
were determined to honor their obligations even if it meant slashing social services.98 
Wickham had supported the Republicans against the conservative coalition of 1869, and 
he remained a Republican through the 1870s and 1880s, even though he agreed with Democrats 
that the state debt should be funded. In this stance, he was in line with the pro-creditor positions 
of the national Republican Party, but increasingly out of step with Virginia’s Republican 
organization. In the late 1870s, an independent movement called the “Readjusters” brought 
together men of both parties who supported measures to repudiate part of the debt, invest in 
public schools, and protect the voting rights of African Americans. In 1879, they won a majority 
in the legislature, and two years later they elected their candidate for governor and put their 
leader, ex-Confederate General William Mahone, in the Senate.99  
Mahone had not been a Republican during Reconstruction, nor was he able to attract the 
support of all the former rebels who had. Williams C. Wickham was also a former Confederate 
general, but in contrast to Mahone, he led a faction of Republicans that in the late 1870s chose to 
fuse with Democrats instead of independent movements like the Greenback Party or the 
Readjusters. In 1878, Wickham urged Republicans to vote for the Democratic candidate for 
congress over an independent who favored the circulation of paper money unbacked by gold 
coin. Though the idea was to curb deflation and help farmers, Wickham argued against it 
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because inflationary paper money would “inflict injury upon both the national and State credit.” 
The great principle of the Republican party, he said, “is the preservation of the credit of the 
nation.”100 One funder newspaper published a letter from Philadelphia arguing that the election 
of a Republican Governor who stands with the party on financial principles—“such a man as 
Gen. Wickham for instance”—would bring a flood of northern investment.101 
Wickham’s role as vice-president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, in which he 
played second to Collis Huntington, undoubtedly shaped his staunch support for the gold 
standard and other pro-creditor positions like funding the state debt. In 1880, the editor of the 
Richmond Whig insinuated that Huntington had influenced legislation to fund Virginia’s debt, to 
which Wickham offered a strong rebuttal.102 Virginians were increasingly concerned about the 
role of outside money, and Readjuster Senator William Mahone was a champion of locally 
owned railroads, yet another reason for Mahone and Wickham to find themselves at odds.103   
During the presidency of Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, Wickham had been allowed to 
control federal patronage in Virginia, but the Readjuster victories convinced later presidents 
James Garfield and Chester Arthur to shift that privilege to Mahone. In order to crack the 
Democratic “Solid South,” the Republicans in Washington were willing to overlook the 
Readjusters’ heresy on financial principles. While most Virginia Republicans probably supported 
the Readjusters, Wickham declined a straight-out Republican nomination for governor in 1881 in 
order to keep the race between two parties and gave his support to the Democratic candidate. 
Two years later, he ran for a seat in the state senate. Though still a Republican, he declared 
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himself “in full accord with the Democratic party of this State.” Adopting the language that 
Democrats used when they opposed Republican Reconstruction, he expressed a desire to see 
Virginia “redeemed from misrule.”104  
The election gave Wickham a chance to redeem not only Virginia politics, but also his 
own reputation. In Wickham’s native Hanover county, just north of Richmond, court day 
provided the opportunity for both a Confederate reunion and a campaign event, with Wickham 
starring in both.105 The Democratic anti-Readjuster organ, the Richmond Dispatch, was a good 
friend to him throughout the 1880s, absolving him of blame for his party label. “Reputable 
Republicans of the State such as General Wickham and men like him…give to the Republican 
party in Virginia all the character it has,” the Dispatch commented.106 Wickham won election to 
the state senate in 1883 and again in 1887.  
The political career of William Mahone has drawn more scholarly interest than that of 
Wickham. Mahone was a former Confederate general, and though not an opponent of white 
supremacy, he was nevertheless willing to support Black voting rights and education over 
conservative economic interests. However, the path of Williams C. Wickham was more typical 
of reconstructed rebels. Unlike Mahone, who had fought against the Republican Party in 1869, 
Wickham was an early adherent because he believed that Republican economy policies were 
necessary to make the state attractive to northern capitalists like Collis Huntington. Rather than 
support policies that might help alleviate the suffering of farmers and educate a skilled work 
force, Wickham held to the northeastern, pro-creditor Republican Party line.  
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Debt repudiation was a risky move. After Georgia repeatedly repudiated portions of its 
Reconstruction debt, New York banks became skeptical of requests for new loans. New York 
and Connecticut both prohibited banks from investing in Georgia bonds.107 On the other hand, 
Virginia’s fiscal crisis, the product of conservative funding policies in the 1870s, showed that 
repudiation may have been the best policy if the goal was to direct revenue toward one’s own 
citizens instead of letting it flow out of the state.  
Some reconstructed rebels did take a stand against northern creditors and non-resident 
corporations. For instance, Daniel Lindsay Russell was one of the last reconstructed rebels to 
serve in office. By drawing on a coalition of Republicans and Populists, he was elected governor 
of North Carolina in 1896. In his inaugural address, he attacked the Democrats’ economic record 
and promised he would “not encourage, sanction or countenance financial repudiation in any 
form.” At the same time, however, he opposed leasing. In his inaugural address, Russell 
condemned leasing the North Carolina Railroad to J.P. Morgan’s Southern Railway Company or 
any other “foreign or non-resident corporation.” He tasked legislators with using all possible 
measures “looking toward the recovery of this property for the benefit of the people and the 
taxpayers of the state.” He also predicted public ownership of railroads at a future date and 
advocated a reduction of freight rates.108 Russell was an exception. To ex-Confederates, support 
for Reconstruction did not neatly transfer into support for the Populist party, and those ex-
Confederates who did support the Populists usually did not have good things to say about 
Reconstruction. Economic populism had been growing in the South since the 1880s, and perhaps 
if racial division did not impede its success, or if such attitudes had been more common earlier, 
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the South could have retained more of the profits of industrialization.109 Economic radicalism, 
however, was not the legacy of reconstructed rebels. 
The Redeemer Democrats rejected some of their predecessors’ tactics, like pledging the 
state’s credit to private corporations, and they even repudiated some of the Reconstruction-era 
state debt. Their reactionary behavior, however, gave little indication of how much their own 
policies owed to the reconstruction rebels. Democrats aided railroads by expanding on the 
generous tax breaks that Republicans had given them. They continued the policy of convict 
leasing and did little to challenge the region’s low-wage economy. The “New South” movement 
of the 1880s employed much of the same rhetoric that reconstructed rebels had used, 
emphasizing sectional reconciliation and southern opportunities for investment and industrial 
growth. It is little wonder that many of the reconstructed rebels found a place of honor in the 
post-Reconstruction South, whether they abandoned the party like Joseph Brown, or stayed in it 
like Bullock and Wickham.   
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BOTTOM RAIL ON THE BOTTOM: 
THE RACIAL CONSERVATISM OF RECONSTRUCTED REBELS 
 
 James Lusk Alcorn went to Washington almost immediately after the war, hoping to 
divine the South’s future. Far from his Delta plantation in Coahoma, Mississippi, Alcorn sent the 
political forecast to his wife, Amelia. Almost two years before the Reconstruction Acts, Alcorn 
predicted that Congress would not readmit the southern states to the Union without Black 
suffrage, though perhaps they would accept one limited by literacy requirements. Jumping in 
front of the coming revolution, he told Amelia, “it would be politic for the Southern States to 
meet this issue with an acceptance at once. We must make the negro our friend. We can do this if 
we will.” Black suffrage did not provoke his indignation, as it did for so many other white 
southerners, because “to let the negro approach the witness stand & the ballot box by no means 
implies his social equality.” American political tradition had long reconciled popular 
participation and inequality. As Alcorn noted, “we don't recognize the social equality of the low 
and base of our own color who enjoy these prerogatives to an extent equal to the proudest.” 
Moreover, if white Mississippians resisted Black suffrage, it would make freedpeople “our 
enemy under the promptings of the Yankee, whose aim is to force us to recognize an equality,” 
and the result would be bloody. “Will the southern people secure the friendship of the negro?” 
Alcorn asked rhetorically. “I fear they will not.”1 
	




When Congress required the South to adopt Black suffrage, bitter ex-Confederates spoke 
about the “bottom rail on top.” The phrase implied that the political, as well as social, hierarchy 
had been reversed. Reconstructed rebels like Alcorn, however, were confident that this would not 
be the case. Many were antebellum elites. They had plenty of experience asking poor whites and 
yeomen farmers for their votes, at times complying with their preferences in a way that a true 
aristocracy would not have tolerated. Still, elites did not see yeomen as their equals, and they 
knew that wealth, education, and political office gave them more power than the average voter. 
As experts in unequal patron-client relationships, reconstructed rebels looked upon Black 
political rights as something familiar—as something still compatible with white supremacy and 
class power. 
Reconstructed rebels were rationalizing their actions, however, and they were doing so in 
the face of the pervasive fear of “social equality” between Blacks and whites. As historian 
Hannah Rosen has argued, “‘social equality’ referred broadly to forms of association between 
white and black people that did not convey a hierarchical meaning for race and that did not serve 
to mark racial difference.”2 It included such scenes as Black and white men “sitting down 
together at a table or on a train, sharing a smoke at a club, or belonging to the same organization 
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on a footing of equality,” as historian Nell Irvin Painter has explained. “When a servant sat with 
an employer, that was not ‘social equality.’’’3 An underlying fear was that social equality would 
lead to Black men entering, wanted or unwanted, into spaces that included white women, thus 
violating white men’s ability to protect white women from the sexual advances of social 
inferiors. The most dreaded symbol of social equality was interracial sex and marriage. 
Homosocial mingling did not pose as great a threat, but some saw a slippery slope. Even on its 
own, interracial politicking carried the implication that white men were surrendering their power 
and dignity.  
Black southerners insisted that they wanted only political and civic equality, not social 
equality, but they also expected their white “friends” to treat them with dignity and respect. 
African Americans allied with antebellum southern elites in the Republican Party because these 
men used their social capital to support Black voting rights and economic uplift. In return, Black 
southerners supported reconstructed rebels’ applications for congressional amnesty, as well as 
their pursuit of high office. However, freedpeople also kept their own counsels, put their own 
interests first, and bristled when their “friends” treated them with condescension. When African 
Americans expressed their desire for a greater share of political offices, more economic 
opportunity, and equal access to public spaces, interracial political friendship tended to break 
down. Reconstructed rebels told their Black constituents that legal equality was the law of the 
land and that Blacks were needlessly stoking the politics of racial division.  
Historians of Reconstruction at the beginning of the twentieth century frequently claimed 
that white Republicans supported Black suffrage purely for political power. In particular, the 
“Dunning School” was wholly unsympathetic to Reconstruction and argued that the project was 
	




driven by corrupt white officeholders.4 A more sympathetic view of the time, however, would 
root white Republicanism in political realism, rather than corruption. Nothing could protect 
Black freedom so much as a strong Republican Party supported by Black as well as white votes.5 
A careful analysis of the reconstructed rebels shows that political realism and the desire for 
power both played a role. Men like Reverend John Caldwell and Edward Gantt seem to have 
truly sympathized with the freedpeople, but at the same time, they still expected to lead and for 
Blacks to follow.  
Recognizing the reconstructed rebels’ desire for racial control, however, does not have to 
lead to the cynical conclusion that African Americans were manipulated and that Reconstruction 
was at its core an attempt by some whites to gain power over others. The freedpeople were not so 
easily fooled. Reconstruction was the expression of their personal and collective aspirations for 
freedom, safety, and opportunity. They were willing to criticize white leaders in the party, and if 
their political friends proved false, they would find others or rely on their own agency.6 
During Reconstruction, white southerners disagreed fiercely about how to preserve white 
supremacy. A significant minority of former Confederates thought that joining the Republican 
Party would be the best way to preserve the maximum amount of white control. Democrats saw 
these reconstructed rebels as race traitors, but then Democrats in the late 1870s and 1880s came 
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to agree with them that Black suffrage was not a fundamental threat to white supremacy so long 
as white elites remained on top. Through fraud, intimidation, and violence, Democrats 
suppressed enough Black votes to keep themselves in power, but legal disfranchisement awaited 
the last decade of the nineteenth century. The confidence that reconstructed rebels and their 
Redeemer successors maintained in the resiliency of white supremacy ultimately helps explain 
why Black disfranchisement did not happen sooner.  
 
“Friendship” and “Social Equality” 
Eli Jackson and his brother were freedmen who owned a blacksmith shop in New Bern, 
on the North Carolina coast. A trade such as theirs, likely learned under slavery, helped to 
elevate similar men to positions of community leadership during Reconstruction. In 1870, Eli 
Jackson’s neighbors chose him to represent them at the state Republican convention in Raleigh. 
While in the city, he went to the National Hotel for a drink, “the House being kept by a Northern 
man and a Republican.” Jackson later wrote that he had “expected to be treated like a friend and 
brother; but I was refused a drink.” Jackson first complained to Judge Charles R. Thomas, a 
reconstructed rebel, and asked his advice. According to Jackson, “The Judge told me to consult 
my friends.” Jackson was taken aback. “I told him I thought I was consulting my friend then,” 
Jackson wrote. The Black Republican found a better friend in another reconstructed rebel, 
William J. Clarke, husband to author Mary Bayard Clarke. The former Confederate colonel 
attempted to order drinks for a half dozen African Americans at the bar, but he too was refused.7  
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After embracing the Republican Party, reconstructed rebels had to renegotiate their 
relationship with Black southerners. Frequently, they did so by deploying the language of 
“friendship,” a metaphor for patron-client relationships that went back to the eighteenth century. 
Political friendship presented a façade of equality, but also depended on a reality of inequality—
the patron’s superior access to resources, which the patron could distribute to clients in return for 
political fealty. But what if a patron couldn’t, or wouldn’t, deliver? What about when Black 
southerners’ expectation to be treated with dignity and respect exposed the contradictions of 
political friendship?  
 Reconstructed rebels understood what African Americans expected from them, even if 
they often failed to live up to Black expectations. James Alcorn, in a letter to other white 
Mississippians, boldly rejected slaveholder delusions about Black fidelity. “The Loyal League is 
upon you,” he said, referring to the Black grassroots political organizations, also called Union 
Leagues, which were springing up throughout the South. “Even a brief experience of the 
workings of that voting machine would satisfy you, as it has me, that all which our people claim 
for the influence of the old master is nonsense.” The freedman was “free, erect, enfranchised, 
with all the rights of American citizenship attaching to him.” Alcorn proposed “to vote with him; 
to discuss political affairs with him; to sit, if need be, in political counsel with him.”8 
By saying this, however, he hoped to gain some of the same influence that other former 
slaveholders thought the freedpeople would automatically accord them based on their prior 
relationships. By adopting a Republican platform “guaranteeing to the freedman all his rights as 
a citizen, providing generously for the education of his children, securing to him, by its 
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exemption from seizure for debt, the endowment of a generous homestead, an influential and 
respectable mass of white people of Mississippi may maintain their position as advisors of the 
old and devoted servants of the South—the colored people.” With such an alliance of Black and 
white, they could then negotiate with northern Republicans to abolish the wartime tax on cotton, 
obtain money for levee construction, and relieve ex-Confederates from their political 
disabilities.9 
 Men like Alcorn were willing to collaborate with African Americans in the Republican 
Party, which meant defending their new political rights and actually talking and listening to 
them. As men who thought of themselves as refined gentlemen, many former elites believed they 
knew how to do this. William Rodman, ex-Confederate and Republican patronage broker, wrote 
home to his wife during the 1868 constitutional convention: “I am on easy terms with all our 
delegates—Yankees & niggers,—I treat the last with civility & they amply return it. A little 
courtesy—which to them is particularly valuable from a Reb.—goes a great way.”10  
Rodman’s private condescension toward Black allies suggests how little his racial 
attitudes had actually changed. It also mirrored the condescension that prewar elites had privately 
expressed when they found that they had to pander to poor whites and yeomen for their votes. 
For example, one planter in low country South Carolina complained that universal white suffrage 
gave “a class of people power which they are totally incompetent to exercise.” Nevertheless, 
such men continually feted voters before election time and provided important services 
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throughout the rest of the year like ginning their cotton, all the while expecting political fealty in 
return.11   
Reconstructed rebels did more than flatter and take political positions that would 
convince Blacks to vote for them. They also provided freedpeople with much needed resources, 
and on much better terms than Democratic employers. In Spartanburg, South Carolina, 
prominent upstate planter, physician, and Republican John Winsmith attracted Black tenant 
farmers by offering them average wages and providing them with a schoolteacher. When 
Winsmith’s plantation was assaulted by a party of Klansmen, neighboring men alleged that the 
raid was made because Winsmith had quite understandably armed his tenants and was using 
them to picket the area.12  
Dr. Winsmith’s assailants also charged him with being a proponent of “social equality” 
between the races, though he denied it when a congressional committee questioned him about the 
incident. “Far from it,” he responded.13 The white man who taught contract law to Winsmith’s 
tenants likewise denied ever teaching “social equality” to the freedpeople “because I knew this 
generation never could do that.” Nevertheless, the teacher admitted that he participated in Union 
League meetings with them. Was this not social equality? The man conceded that biracial 
politics “would bring social equality this far: that we would be obliged to associate with the 
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negro enough for his friendship; this is, we would neighbor with him and be friendly to him. We 
would be obliged to do that. Every public man would be compelled to do that.”14 
Certainly, reconstructed rebels like Winsmith did not support interracial sex or interracial 
marriage, and this is what they meant when they denied believing in “social equality.” Moreover, 
men like Alcorn and Rodman clearly retained many of their old attitudes concerning the 
capability of African Americans. At the same time, however, they were willing to engage with 
Black southerners on a footing of equality that other whites clearly found disturbing. In one case, 
a reconstructed rebel and his wife were ostracized because they frequently invited “negro 
visitors” into their home.15 To most whites, there was a fine line between Black and white men 
having political discussions in private spaces, where white women typically entertained guests, 
and interracial sex. In the antebellum South, male political candidates might be forced to mingle 
with the hoi polloi for votes, but women were supposed to represent and defend class privilege.16 
Even homosocial politicking could suggest sexual deviancy. Ex-Confederate General Wade 
Hampton was not a Republican by any means, but in early 1867, he told Black leaders that he 
would support Black suffrage if it were limited by a literacy or property requirement. The 
illustrated magazine Harper’s Weekly lampooned the anti-Reconstruction leader with a cartoon 
where Hampton asks a Black voter, “Of course you’ll Dine with me on Thursday?” and the 
Black man responds, “Not on Phursday, Massa HAMPTON. On Phursday, I’se promised to 
sleep with Massa PINCKNEY.” The cartoonist seemed to be saying that whites who solicited 
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Black votes were sacrificing their manliness. Black voters, the cartoon also suggest, held more 
power than whites because they had options of who to “sleep with.”17 
 
        Figure 2: “The New Era,” Harper’s Weekly (New York), 6 April 1867. 
 
Even when opponents of Black equality did not try to excite sexual anxiety, they might 
still interpret interracial “friendship” as “social equality.” For example, J.F.H. Claiborne, a 
prominent ex-congressman on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, became the subject of editorial 
ridicule simply for hosting the visiting John Roy Lynch, a former slave and Republican 
	




candidate for Congress. Claiborne felt compelled to respond, and he offered a defense that mixed 
antebellum paternalism with the postwar reality of biracial politics. First, he argued that he had 
“no prejudices to conquer,” having been “raised among colored people, nursed by them, waited 
on by them since through weary stages of illness, never deserted by them during the war, owning 
my fortune to their labor and my life to their fidelity and vigilance.” The trope of happy and 
loyal slaves would later become a mainstay of Lost Cause mythology and defense of southern 
race relations. Claiborne, however, used it to justify extending friendship toward African 
Americans in the postwar world, where they were legally the political equals of whites. 
Claiborne continued by pointing out the irony that Democrats were seeking to woo African 
Americans away from the Republicans, “yet it is a grave offence…if I call to see the Republican 
candidate for Congress, who in every respect is a representative man of his race and his era.” 
With both parties soliciting their votes, he concluded, “I cannot see how we are to count on their 
support and exclude them from our civilities.”18 
According to reconstructed rebels, “friendship” between Black and white men did not 
mean “social equality.” Universal suffrage for white men had not resulted in a breakdown of 
class power or social distinctions. Elites had to pander to the masses, but they still considered 
themselves superior and would have balked at yeomen holding office except only occasionally, 
here and there, and exclusively with the backing of wealthy patrons like themselves. Imagining 
their former slaves as voters was a gigantic intellectual leap, and for most white southerners, 
impossible. Opponents of Black political rights also saw the political hobnobbing between white 
and Black Republicans as clear evidence of “social equality.” Reconstructed rebels, nevertheless, 
were able to rationalize their political behavior by drawing on metaphors from antebellum 
	




society, such as the “friendship” between patrons and clients, and the imaginary fidelity of 
enslaved people toward their masters.  
 
White Patrons and Black Clients 
“Friendship” was a metaphor that helped reconstructed rebels to embrace Black political 
agency without conceding white supremacy. This is what historian Gregory Downs has 
accurately labeled patronalism: “a belief that services are distributed by big men on behalf of 
favored clients.”19 Eventually, confidence in the resilience of white supremacy and class 
privilege would throw reconstructed rebels into conflict with Black voters. From the start, 
however, their relationship was shaped by the freedpeople’s need for access to resources.  
Black southerners preferred to rely on each other when they could, rather than turning to 
former slaveholders for help.20 When a congressional joint committee asked one North Carolina 
freedman whether certain whites were part of the Union League, he replied that he could not say 
because he was “not interested in white people’s business, only colored people’s.” The man said 
that he belonged to a “Loyal League,” but not a “white folks League,” and that his organization 
only had 3-4 white people.21 A freeborn man from the same state confessed that if it were not for 
freedpeople in his county uniting their money to help him purchase six acres of land, he would 
not have been able to build his house, as well as a school for the community.22  
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However, capital-deprived and newly emancipated freedpeople did frequently turn to 
white Republicans for help furthering their individual or collective aims. John Winsmith’s 
plantation was not the only one that doubled both as a workplace for African Americans and a 
space for Union League meetings.23 North Carolina freedpeople lived on an Alamance planation 
owned by a white Republican who served as constable in a different county; no other whites 
lived there and their patron only visited once every other week. Freedpeople appear to have 
found greater autonomy working for Republican employers.24  
African Americans were supported in their efforts to protect themselves against the Klan 
by another landowner who gave them permission to use his gun to defend themselves. 
Eventually, a large group of Klansmen pulled the man from his house one night and whipped 
him in front of the freedpeople. The Klansmen told him to abandon his Republican principles 
and stop living with so many Black people on his land. Refusing to be intimidated, he responded 
that God knows how he would vote and that the freedmen needed a place to live. He told a 
congressional committee that he was widely reputed as a “white nigger” for voting Republican, 
and he fully expected his employees to vote Republican too.25 Democratic landowners 
sometimes forced their workers to vote against their own interests; working for a Republican 
landowner offered more freedom, even if it did not guarantee their safety from the Klan.  
Reconstructed rebels frequently expressed a desire to help in the moral and intellectual 
uplift of the freedpeople. James Ramsay, a North Carolina physician given to deep introspection, 
often reflected on the welfare of his Black neighbors and offered them free medical services. In 
his diary, Ramsay wrote, “the poor free-people—my former slaves have no homes and it makes 
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my heart bleed to see them thus.” Later in the year, the election of township officers gave him 
cause to examine his racial privilege: “The poor negro asked but little and I gave it to him. But 
he has done much for me, in past days[;] but for his labor I would not, in all probability, enjoy 
the benefits of an education, which is denied to him.” Reconstructed rebels like Ramsay were 
willing to imagine a more equitable racial order. However, he could not escape the desire to 
preserve his own status: “That God will bless and protect [the negro], without injury to the white 
man, is my prayer and belief. Let the races live together in peace, to do so, justice must be done 
each towards the other.”26 Justice, he believed, should not entail any loss on his part.   
Reconstructed rebels frequently lectured freedpeople on middle class virtues. In a draft of 
a speech to “my colored friends,” Ramsay planned to outline the duties of freedom: industry, 
honesty, temperance, manners, and honoring one’s contracts.27 Another reconstructed rebel 
advised Blacks that “honesty, industry, economy, sobriety, truth, virtue and intelligence” would 
secure their success.28 These values reflected what any respectable men were expected to 
embody, though in this context, their articulation could be racially condescending as well as 
blind to the particular disadvantages of the freedpeople.  
Moreover, anti-Reconstruction whites tended to give the same speeches about Black 
responsibility; the difference was that reconstructed rebels were optimistic and believed that 
Blacks would, as John H. Caldwell put it, “prove themselves worthy” of the political rights 
granted by Congress. Caldwell, the Methodist minister, started teaching freedmen’s schools in 
1866, and a year later he was a district superintendent for the Freedman’s Bureau. Writing to the 
state board of education, he praised African Americans for their progress in freedom: “When the 
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benign influences of education and religion have prevailed, the colored population have been 
marked for their morality and industry. No crime of any magnitude has been committed and they 
are every where rising above the dominion of their biases which were nurtured in them in the 
times of slavery.” Reconstructed rebels believed that given assistance in their moral and 
intellectual reformation, African Americans could be made into useful citizens.29   
Edward Gantt, Arkansas’s wartime turncoat, also became a superintendent for the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, distributing legal and educational services to African Americans. He was a 
particularly well-meaning patron, frequently proclaiming his belief that national laws could 
change conservative social traditions. On December 22, 1865, a crowd of anxious freedpeople 
gathered at his office. Another agent had threatened to “hire them out.” Hiring out was the 
practice of slaveholders leasing the labor of their slaves to other whites. The Freedmen’s Bureau 
had been tasked with regulating contracts, so it was not irrational for the formerly enslaved to see 
the Bureau as a white master contracting them to another white employer. Gantt gave an 
impromptu speech. “Why you have just as much right to hire me out,” he told them. “I don’t 
belong to you, nor do you belong to me or anybody else.” The Freedmen’s Bureau, Gantt 
explained, was not their new master. It would leave them alone unless they or their employers 
broke the law. The Bureau, as Gantt understood it, was a temporary safeguard of free labor until 
laws and public sentiment converged to guarantee equal protection. If the Bureau touched the 
bodies of Black people, it would not be as a personal master, but as the impersonal enforcer of 
laws that disciplined wrongdoers of any race.30  
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There is little reason to doubt Gantt’s claim to his supervisor that his Black audience 
went away satisfied. They may have believed Gantt that the law would protect them equally and 
that they would not be subject to another form of oppression. However, Gantt held many of the 
same blind spots as northern proponents of free labor. The Bureau “will not give you any land,” 
he told his Black neighbors. Ignoring federal support for white western settlers and railroads, he 
claimed that the government had never given land to white people. A former slaveowner, he also 
drew a false equivalency between himself and his audience: “There was a time when I did not 
have any land. But I worked and saved my money and bought some. Now I have a good deal.” 
Defending the equitability of the contract system, he told them that “in the North, where I have 
traveled, a large number of white people…make contracts and labor by the month or year just 
like you do. They work faithfully, and never leave home in business hours without permission. It 
is easy & proper for you to do the same. They are free & so are you.” Gantt assumed a degree of 
social mobility that was already disappearing in the North, that was inhibited by the legacy of 
slavery in the South, and that was contradicted nationally by federal policies that privileged 
white Americans. Gantt told the Black Arkansans in his charge that politeness and respectability, 
“honesty and industry,” would make them “a good name” and in turn would “always secure you 
a good place and good wages.” Gantt was wrong, but these were the blind spots of the national 
middle class and free-labor ideology, more so than the blind spots of slave-labor ideology.31 
Gantt’s idealization of the law as an impersonal arbiter was also faulty, but he was neither 
intentionally deceptive, nor completely naïve. As a white southerner, he understood that civil 
courts were run by prejudiced men who would not enforce the laws equally. When the state 
legislature passed laws allowing employers to “apprentice” the children of indigent parents, he 
	




warned privately that it “would touch 99% of the freedpeople and would send them into the 
control of their former masters.” The reason, he argued, was that white Arkansans “have not 
reached the time when they can do complete justice to all men.” Violations could be taken to 
court, “but where,” Gantt asked, “is the public sentiment to enforce it? Where is the Judge that 
would enforce it? ...And where would be found the orphan negro who could go to Court in 
person and make ‘complaint.’ And where that ‘any other person’ in all our community advanced 
enough—unshackled of prejudice enough—and having the moral courage to take the part of the 
oppressed, if that oppressed be a negro?” He still entertained a certain naiveté that prejudices 
would inevitably fade and that the law could become an impersonal arbiter in a legally 
homogeneous nation. But this naiveté was not the same as hoping, as other white southerners 
did, that the law could be used to reassert the old racial power dynamics. “My conviction,” Gantt 
wrote, “is that nothing assimilating [sic] slavery should be entrusted to our people until they are 
thoroughly weaned from this evil—until all hope of its future existence in any shape has been 
dispelled—until they have walked in the sunlight of the new order of things long enough to 
distinguish realities from dreams.”32 
 Gantt was more concerned with white attitudes toward the law than with Black attitudes 
toward labor. “Their prejudices give way slowly,” he told his supervisor. Nevertheless, he was 
hopeful that “by extending the existence of the Bureau, what education & strength failed to do, 
might be supplied by an influx of liberal-minded people.”33 Gantt waged a constant battle to 
break up apprenticeship, teach white employers that they could not use physical discipline, and 
prevent them from arresting self-employed freedpeople in the town. When whites asked him 
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what to do about disobedient employees, he told them they should first send their petition, then 
he would rescind the contract, and alluding to the high demand for labor, he threatened that he 
would find other employers who will hire them and treat them like other laborers. Gantt was not 
disturbed by the economic leverage Black Arkansans had during the labor shortage, and he 
insisted that white planters treat their employees equitably. In another case, a white man 
informed Gantt that a Black mechanic was living alone, with little food, and that the man should 
be forced to contract. “My dear sir,” Gantt replied, “if that be so, you had better force me to 
contract, for I have not two days rations on my place.”34 Even if Gantt continued to draw false 
equivalencies, he was determined to teach whites to see Blacks as their legal equals.  
Gantt’s position as a Bureau agent gave him government-sanctioned status as an arbiter 
of the law between Black wards and unreconstructed rebels. His personal reconstruction did not 
make him everything that the Black southerners needed or wanted in an ally. The Bureau did not 
provide land or other forms of capital needed to safeguard and give meaning to their freedom. 
Moreover, Gantt’s focus on abstract legal rights made it difficult to fully confront the unequal 
social and economic power embedded in southern race relations.  
Gantt was probably a more sincere advocate for African Americans than most 
reconstructed rebels. His blind spots were shared by northern proponents of free labor ideology. 
Other reconstructed rebels carried more of the slaveholder’s desire for control into the 
postbellum world. One Black landowner noted that some white Republicans called him a “very 
mean nigger,” “a mean son of a bitch,” and “a damned rascal.”35 It is nonetheless worth 
remembering why African Americans would be willing to trust reconstructed rebels with power. 
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Legal equality would be a significant accomplishment, and having local elites defending it 
mattered. African Americans, long excluded from politics, also valued that willingness of 
reconstructed rebels to act as patrons, providing them with access to the resources that gave 
freedom its substance. Soon, however, the inequality of these patron-client relationships would 
come into more obvious conflict with the democratic aspirations of the freedpeople.  
 
Under their Influence?  
While Virginia was moving through Congressional Reconstruction, Williams C. 
Wickham told an audience of Black Republicans, “It is your bounden duty so to conduct 
yourselves as to bring white men of influence to unite with you who will sustain you in the rights 
with which Congress has invested you.” A reporter summarized, “he didn't believe that they 
wanted to dominate over the white men.”36 In other cases, reconstructed rebels more subtly and 
unintentionally revealed their expectations that the bottom rail would stay on the bottom. Just 
prior to the organization of a Republican Party in Georgia, John Caldwell warned his superior in 
a letter in the Freeman’s Bureau that Democrats like Wade Hampton were trying to control the 
Black vote with bribes and “unscrupulous representations.” Reconstruction’s opponents were 
only wooing Black voters to get elected. “Very different,” he explained, “are the principles and 
measures set forth by the new party organized in conformity with the suggestions of Gov. Brown 
of Georgia.” What Caldwell said next, however, suggested not only his confidence in the 
righteousness of the Republican cause, but also his implicit assumption that reconstructed rebels 
like him would be at the head of the party: “All rebels reconstructed in spirit, converted by the 
	




logic of events from the error of their ways together with the great mass of freedmen combined 
under their influence should be fused into one great omnipotent Republican party.”37  
Moreover, Caldwell’s ideal statesman, Joseph Brown, at one point inadvertently 
disclosed his fear that Blacks might look elsewhere for leadership. It began when Black minister 
and political leader Henry McNeal Turner asked Brown whether land confiscation and 
redistribution was likely. Brown replied that if confiscation happened, northerners would 
probably use it to pay down the national debt or give pensions to Union veterans before they 
would help Blacks. “Your people could expect to gain very little,” Brown counseled, “by an 
exchange of the people with whom they have been raised for strangers who would become 
purchasers of the lands[,] who know little of their habits and would probably have little 
sympathy with them when settled among them.”38 This argument revealed more about what 
Brown feared than what a likely outcome of land redistribution might have been. Brown realized 
that if he could not influence Black Georgians through the Republican Party, the alternative was 
that they might rally around more radical northern men who had come south since the war. 
But how much influence did reconstructed rebels really have? Not much, Thomas Walton 
thought. Walton was a planter in the Mississippi Delta, a former military aide to General 
Longstreet, a law professor at the University of Mississippi, and a committed Republican. 
Speaking to a congressional committee, he said that African Americans had been very generous 
in their personal support of him, naming in particular Senator Blanche Bruce, Congressman John 
Roy Lynch, and Mississippi Secretary of State James Hill. However, he admitted that he did not 
feel welcome in the freedpeople’s grassroots political meetings. “I am quite certain that my 
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personal influence with the negroes is not a bit greater than that of any democrat in my county,” 
he told Congress. “I am quite certain that I was never able to influence a vote or influence a 
colored man on any single question of politics; which I confess with some mortification.” The 
reason, he believed, was “the enormous gulf between the races in all social relations—that 
confidence which springs from personal friendship and an unrestrained social intercourse being, 
in my judgment, an essential cement to a political party, and being absolutely out of the question 
between the white and Black races.”39 The “friendship” that people like Alcorn wrote about was 
a very specific, and limited, relationship indeed.  
Biracial cooperation was tempered by distrust growing out of Blacks’ unequal 
relationship with white patrons, and so African American leaders and their communities often 
insisted on more direct access to state power.40 In 1870, Henry McNeal Turner, now a member 
of the Georgia legislature, reminded his colleagues how few political offices Blacks had gained 
in the state. Only two years earlier, the white legislators had declared that Turner and other 
representatives of his race were not qualified to hold office, and Congress had to insist that they 
be reseated. “But for all, what have we got in Georgia,” Turner lamented, “simply the right to 
vote and sit in the General Assembly after being elected twice, once by the people and then by 
the United States Congress.” Beyond that, there was “not a colored juror or a colored police [sic] 
in all the State.” He counted “two colored magistrates, one colored clerk of court, and one or two 
	
39 "Mississippi in 1875. Report of Select Committee to Inquire into the Mississippi Election of 1875 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1876), 50 [hereafter referenced as Miss. 1875]. 
40 Hahn, An Nation Under Our Feet, 252-254; For analysis of a similar tension between white patrons and Black 
leaders in 1890s North Carolina, see Jeffrey J. Crow, "Fusion, Confusion, and Negroism": Schisms among Negro 
Republicans in the North Carolina Election of 1896, The North Carolina Historical Review 53, no. 4 (October 




colored bailiffs” for all of Georgia.41 Republicans lost control of Georgia in 1871, so Turner 
would not see an improvement, but in other states the first couple years of the decade saw an 
increase in Black officeholders. By the end of the decade, more than 2000 African Americans 
had held office in the South.42 As historian Steven Hahn explains, “The combination of black 
militance in the plantation districts and white retreat in many of the nonplantation districts turned 
the southern Republican party blacker and blacker over time.”43 Where they did not hold power 
themselves, Black southerners made their own influence felt by deciding between competing 
Republican factions that wanted their vote.44 
Black southerners and reconstructed rebels frequently found themselves at odds when 
Black aspirations to wield power on behalf of their communities conflicted with reconstructed 
rebels’ racial pride. In some cases, reconstructed rebels were quite willing to support Black 
officeholding, even paying the surety bonds necessary for them to hold office.45 They had done 
as much for the occasional white yeoman in the antebellum South.46 In such cases, however, they 
did so because it did not contradict their desires or what they perceived to be their interests. 
When Black leaders mounted a direct challenge to the authority of reconstructed rebels, the latter 
began to see their Black rivals as corrupt demagogues who invented imaginary racial issues to 
get power and, in doing so, threatened to bring about “negro supremacy.” 
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Still, reconstructed rebels’ indignation at Black challengers was complicated by their 
sense of themselves as the freedpeople’s friends. Moreover, they depended on African American 
voters to remain in office. The following cases serve to illustrate in greater personal depth the 
complicated and tenuous “friendship” between Black political leaders and reconstructed rebels, 
as well as how those relationships unraveled.  
 
Bill Holden and Jim Harris 
William Woods Holden had embraced Confederate defeat early on, and in the summer 
and fall of 1865, he tried to rally North Carolinians around an anti-Confederate narrative of their 
experience. Andrew Johnson had made him provisional governor, but he failed to be elected in 
his own right later that fall. Less than three years later, he succeeded in becoming governor as a 
Republican.  
Holden’s relationship with African Americans shifted dramatically in that time. In 
October 1866, he spoke at a Black educational convention. The convention was chaired by James 
H. Harris, a Black North Carolinian who was destined to prominence in the state, and who would 
soon be working very closely with Holden. The ex-provisional governor told his Black audience 
that they should focus on labor and education. “He urged the colored people to keep out of 
politics,” Holden’s own newspaper reported. “They had no time to waste at public gatherings,” 
he said, and “they should avoid all temptations to idleness and dissipation.” He advised them that 
“the true interest of the colored race was to cultivate the friendship of the whites; and the whites 




friendship.” Holden promised that “the colored people would always find him a friend and well-
wisher.”47  
Perhaps James Harris already saw Holden as a potential ally, despite Holden’s 
discouraging words about Black political activity. Others, however, were certainly skeptical. 
Black author Frances E. W. Harper shortly after told a North Carolina audience that she believed 
Holden should not be trusted.48 Regardless, when Holden spoke at the educational convention, 
his reconstruction was still incomplete. At the state Republican Party convention in September 
1867, he responded to a conservative pamphlet that laid out some of his old statements about 
African Americans. Holden was emphatic: those statements “are no longer my views; and my 
colored friends know that as far as I am concerned I heartily welcome them to the freedom which 
the Union arms have secured for them.” He told them he did not “pretend…to be either 
consistent or infallible,” but by January 1867, he had declared himself for Black suffrage and 
now went even further: “I can afford to say that as a man and a gentleman, when I take a colored 
friend by the right hand and call him, politically and civilly my equal.”49 At the same convention, 
James Harris quipped that the same individuals so worked up against social equality “have 
invited colored men into their parlors in secret—I don’t tell where I have been—but I tell you 
these very gentlemen…have tried mighty hard to pull black negroes into their parlors and 
endeavor to win them to the Conservative side.”50 
Holden’s star was finally rising, and so was James Harris’s. With typical wit and humor, 
Harris told an African American audience, “Well, when I go anywhere the people, white and 
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black, follow me around like a bear. I can scarcely get any rest.”51 The freedpeople loved his 
bold advocacy for their claims to justice and equality, while whites were attracted by his tone, 
“moderate, but firm and decided.” At one meeting of African Americans in Raleigh, he set out 
his position: “I am a radical. I hope the Republican Party is radical enough for anyone. But I do 
not wish to abuse the mass of the Southern people.”52 Harris understood that the Republican 
Party was the best vehicle for the freedpeople’s interests, but he was also determined to cultivate 
white allies.  
Harris was born in 1832 in Granville County, North Carolina and was free by at least 
1848, after which he worked as an artisan in Raleigh. Though Harris would become a strong 
supporter of Holden during Reconstruction, in the 1850s, Harris fled to Ohio largely because of 
the wave of racial hysteria that had been stimulated by Holden’s newspaper. Harris studied at 
Oberlin, and then during the early years of the Civil War, he traveled to Canada, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone. By 1863, he was back in the disunited states, encouraging Black enlistment in 
Indiana. After the war, he returned to North Carolina as a vice-president of the National Equal 
Rights League. During the following two decades, he organized and directed numerous 
organizations that increased the power of African Americans at the grassroots and linked them to 
sympathetic whites: the Freedmen’s Savings and Trust Company, the Wake County Co-operative 
Business Company, the Raleigh Co-operative Land and Building Association, and a school for 
handicapped Black children. He frequently found himself placed at the head of political meetings 
called by state’s freedpeople, served the people of Raleigh in a municipal capacity as justice of 
the peace, assessor, and alderman, attended the 1868 state constitutional convention, was elected 
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to multiple terms in both houses of the General Assembly, and attended several national 
Republican Party conventions.53  
Harris aimed to connect African Americans to biracial institutions while also serving 
their interests in the Republican Party. Doing so, however, meant that he needed to avoid 
alienating southern whites. In his speech at the September 1867 party convention, Harris said 
that “we the colored people, have not learned our political alphabet” and should “remain quiet, 
sir, and receive a little wholesome counsel from those who have been brought up with superior 
advantages.”54 In 1868, he also declined a nomination to Congress, and at other critical junctures 
told other Black leaders not to run for an office that might fire off racial tension.55 Nevertheless, 
Harris frequently held office himself, and his public image even drew the attention of 
Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, who dined with Harris in Wilmington. There in 
Wilmington, Harris gave a speech that drew the approval of Wilson as well as the Union men of 
the port city.56 Sometimes Conservative newspaper editors even got the wrong idea from his 
conciliatory overtures, thinking that they might be able to detach him from the Republicans and 
make him the Black poster-boy for the Conservative Party.57  
Harris’s moderation occasionally got him in trouble with the freedpeople and more 
militant grassroots activists. Some freedpeople interpreted his dismissal of land confiscation as 
“playing into the hands of the rebs.”58 Abraham Galloway, a former slave who escaped from 
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Wilmington by sea and spent much of the war helping enslaved families make their way from 
their plantations to the Union army, was considered by some to be Harris’s rival after the war. 
Both opposed outright confiscation, but Galloway thought higher taxes on land might be a good 
way to force planters to sell, while Harris advocated a temporary tax moratorium due to the 
difficult circumstances faced by all. Galloway cultivated an image of grassroots radicalism that 
starkly contrasted with the attitude of moderate statesmanship that Harris cut.59  
Freedpeople often felt uncertain whom they should trust during Reconstruction, but 
Harris was continually able to defend himself against charges of being bought by whites. To a 
crowd of freedpeople in Raleigh who had been alerted to Conservative newspapers that reported 
favorably on Harris’s more conciliatory speeches, Harris read, explained, and sometimes refuted 
the articles line by line. He respected the skepticism of his audience, while also defusing it with 
humor: “Now let me read a further extract from this Edgecombe speech. I will read it all, for if I 
do not you will say that I tried to conceal something. I know you,—that is what you will say. 
(Laughter, and cries of read, read!)” After responding to that one and a report of a speech he 
made in Halifax, Harris joked “if I reply to the reports of two of these speeches, then some of 
you will say, why don’t he reply to all. Why it would take five clerks to keep up with them. 
(Laughter.)”60 Yes, Harris admitted, he did not want to insult white southerners, but he also 
explained that he was dedicated to bringing them over to an acceptance of Black people’s rights.   
The image of white Republicans like William Woods Holden was built by the support of 
Black spokesmen. On July 8, 1867, Harris sent a petition to Washington on behalf of the Equal 
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Rights League, asking Congress to remove Holden’s disabilities under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Harris professed that Holden had been “especially conspicuous and indefatigable in 
his efforts in behalf of the Union, the cause of Liberty, humanity, and justice.” Harris considered 
Holden a “true and tried friend,” persecuted only by the disloyal, and necessary to the state’s 
reconstruction into the Union. Though Harris had not been in North Carolina during the war, he 
wrote that “all the nation knows that [Holden] alone struck blow after blow at the rebellion from 
within.”61 Three years later, when Governor Holden was being impeached and tried by a 
Conservative legislature for his use of martial law to fight the Klan, leading Blacks published a 
broadside comparing Holden, “our good friend,” to the biblical Mordecai who stood between the 
murderous Haman and genocide.62  
 
Figure 3: “Holden Being Pulled in the Back Window,” The Holden 
Record (Raleigh, NC), 9 Apr 1868. A Conservative Party paper 
mocked Holden’s relationship with African Americans by 
lampooning a wartime incident when Holden sought the 
Confederate governor’s protection from a mob.  
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Though African American leaders knew how to boost the reputation of native white allies 
among ordinary Black people, they also sought to shape white Republicans and retain as much 
leverage in biracial politics as they could. A Wilmington man wrote a letter to Governor Holden 
on behalf of “the Colard people of north carolina,” who “are very much dissatisfied with the laws 
we are working under.” He accused Holden of “doing Every thing” for their white employers, 
who “did not put you in the office,” and “not for us,” who did. This citizen hoped that his letter 
would make Holden “open your heart and be a companen to us and do every thing in your power 
for us and you will.”63 Jordan Chambers, “a colored man…who has tried to do his full duty to 
you and our noble party,” tried to leverage his grassroots activism in Iredell County by 
mentioning all the incentives he had not to be a Republican. “During the late election my 
influence was sought on both sides,” wrote Chambers, and though he ran as a Republican, he 
said “the Conservatives vainly endeavored to induce me, by the most tempting considerations, to 
take that name off, to come out and curse the party, and thus bring the colored men of Iredell and 
Rowan en masse to their standard, for these were all looking (and pardon the egotism) how I was 
going.” Since the contingency of Chambers’s activism was again up in the air because of a 
“general conspiracy among the landowners of this section, to starve me and my family out, and 
to kill or drive me from the country,” he asked for an appointment to office that would give him 
power and an independent subsistence.64  
It was of particular importance to Black leaders like James Harris that they demonstrate 
loyalty to the Republican Party while also insisting that that they were not blind adherents. 
Mixing dedication with conditionality, Harris promised, “Never, unless it falls short of its duty to 
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the great principles which it now advocates, will I leave its ranks.” More directly asserting the 
political independence of African Americans, he said, “I do not tie myself hand and foot merely 
to party, forever and forever. But I do bind myself to the principles of humanity, liberty, equality 
and justice, and will follow withersoever they lead into or out of parties as it may be.”65 Though 
statements like this one made some Conservatives think that Harris could be detached from the 
Republicans, it was more likely a reminder to African American listeners that Harris was not in 
the pocket of whites, and to white Republicans that he expected them to live up to their biracial 
commitments.  
Harris had observed that after emancipation, southern whites and Blacks became 
“unacquainted with each other,” such that “the white man does not know what disposition to 
make of the negro, or the negro of the white man, after they have lived together in the same 
country for so many years. I can tell you gentlemen it is because they have become strangers to 
each other. Let us get acquainted once more, gentlemen, and all the difficulties will be 
removed.”66 Harris and other Black leaders worked to create a new relationship with southern 
whites, and those whites who adopted a Republican identity had some incentive to do so. 
Moreover, Black Republicans sought to make this relationship one that worked for African 
Americans. In the shifting circumstances of the 1870s, however, it would become increasingly 
difficult to maintain political friendship across the color line while still mobilizing the power of 
white allies for racial justice.  
Patronage politics touched off factional disputes over the role of race in the Republican 
Party and who were the freedpeople’s real friends. For example, Union veteran George M. 
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Arnold worked for the Freedmen’s Savings and Trust Company in Wilmington after the war, but 
rather than developing connections to the local party leaders, he frequently accused them of not 
giving African Americans their fair share of offices. Instead, Arnold cultivated the friendship of 
Greensboro’s prominent white Republican, Thomas Settle, Jr. When Wilmington Republicans 
accused Arnold of turning traitor to the party in late 1872 and Arnold heard that Settle credited 
the charge, he wrote an anxious letter to Settle asking for confirmation whether Settle believed 
he had “sold you out.” Arnold added, “I only want to say this, that I never tried harder to secure 
anyone’s election than I did yours and am perfectly convinced to let time show you of the fact.” 
Apparently Settle believed Arnold, because a year later Arnold was again at work against what 
he considered the “Anti-Negro Ring” of Wilmington and urged that one of North Carolina’s U.S. 
senators be replaced with Settle. Meanwhile, another Black Republican wrote to Settle 
denouncing the patronage machine, while yet another Black Wilmingtonian asked for Settle’s 
help getting the appointment of postmaster. To add to the mess of patronage, Settle received a 
letter from a white Republican defending the current postmaster as “a loyal white Republican 
threatened with replacement by a colored Republican simply for color’s sake.” Several others 
accused George Arnold of maligning the Republican collector of the port in a movement to 
replace him with an African American collector.67   
William Woods Holden’s own patronage debacle demonstrated how the distribution of 
employment opportunities could test and even destroy biracial “friendship.” After being 
impeached and removed from office, Holden spent some time editing a Republican newspaper in 
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Washington D.C. Then, in 1873, he returned to North Carolina as regional postmaster, 
headquartered Raleigh. By 1876, Holden still retained his popularity among African Americans. 
Black political activist Charles N. Hunter wrote to Holden in March of that year that he had been 
reading Holden’s publications on temperance to other African Americans and found that Blacks 
still had great respect for Holden. “No man has ever gained as fully the heart of our colored 
people in the state as yourself,” Hunter wrote. “A very considerable proportion of them here, are 
under the impression that you are still their Governor, while not a few anxiously inquire if, and 
hope that, you will be a candidate on the Republican ticket for Governor in the next election. 
With the exception of the few local politicians hereabout, you and Gen. Grant are the only public 
men they know anything about.”68  
However, with Republicans no longer in control of any part of the state government after 
1876 and their influence waning, African Americans became even more openly skeptical of 
white Republicans, who had not always adequately supported African American bids for local 
office or federal patronage. In 1880, James Harris started his own Black newspaper that directed 
its fire toward Democrats as well as racist white Republicans. In particular, Harris called out his 
old political ally, Holden, for not appointing any African American clerks in the Raleigh post 
office. Harris had helped to build up Holden’s reputation in 1867, but he now asked “if Gov. 
Holden is inclined to pander to a perverted taste of caste entertained by the white citizens of 
Raleigh.”69 In early 1881, Harris began a campaign to convince President Garfield to put him in 
Holden’s place. Charles N. Hunter, who had five years before so highly praised Holden, now 
told a visiting Post Office official from Washington that Holden, “like the other white 
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Republican office holders, were opposed to the negro enjoying official patronage, and to that 
extent I was opposed to them.”70  
Holden remonstrated in a letter to the president that since the formation of the party he 
had “held and practiced the rule that colored men, adopted citizens, and native white Republicans 
should be placed on the same footing of merit in regard to office and honor.” He explained that 
when he entered the office of postmaster all the clerks were white Republicans of merit and only 
two African Americans had applied for positions since then, and neither qualified.71 Charles N. 
Hunter’s biographer and historians since have repeated the claim that after Holden was removed 
from office, his successor immediately appointed Hunter to a clerkship.72 However, newspaper 
evidence, as well as Holden’s statement to Garfield, indicates that Holden himself had appointed 
Hunter sometime in March before being removed, and that Hunter had been merely retained by 
Holden’s successor.73 It is even possible that Hunter wrote his letter regarding Holden’s failure 
to support Black patronage while holding a clerkship under him in the Raleigh post office.   
Despite Holden’s last attempt to profess the biracial southern Republican creed of 1867, 
personal disappointment and disillusionment about the direction of his region led him to 
renounce the Republican Party in 1883. He accused northerners of discriminating against the 
southern wing of the party and falsely claimed that Virginia Republicans wanted integrated 
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schools, which he denounced as “Negro equality.”74 Holden had come a long way from 1867. 
African Americans like Harris and Hunter had worked to build his reputation among the 
freedpeople, and Holden had embraced them as political equals. It would not be fair to say that 
Holden adopted a faith toward equal rights opportunistically, and that once he lost his job that 
faith disappeared. Self-interest is a partial explanation, but not all. When the Confederacy stood 
defeated and it looked like Republican ideology might create a new future for the region, 
reconstructed rebels made a realistic assessment. However, when racial conflict only increased 
from both within and outside the party, they started to believe that African Americans were 
asking too much and the “friendships” fell apart. 
 
Governor Alcorn and Sheriff Brown 
According to one estimate, James Alcorn paid nine-tenths of the taxes in Coahoma 
county. Alcorn owned 20,000 acres of fertile cotton land just 14 miles east of the Mississippi 
River. According to one visitor in the 1870s, the estate included two hundred fifty cottages, each 
with “two rooms, fourteen feet square and an open piazza along the whole, ten feet wide.” These 
provided habitation to over a thousand African Americans—Alcorn’s field workers and their 
families. “These houses,” the visitor wrote:  
are left open to trespassers and homeless, nomadict [sic] blacks are soon 
ensconced within. They must need have bread and bacon, and soon appear at the 
office of Mr. Jones, the Senator’s factotum. A contract is soon made, the negroes 
are paid for their labor in food or money, tree are ‘deadened,’ and the dense 
undergrowth is swept away, and within a brief period cotton and corn grow 
luxurianely [sic] about the congeries of white cottage not long before hidden in 
the foliage of the matted vines and among great towering oak and cypress trees. 
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This description of “Alcorn’s Acres” made its way into the columns of the New York World as a 
local color story about Black life on a Mississippi estate. It was 1876, and according to this 
witness, Black Coahomans had lost their old obsession with guns and schooling. It was an idyllic 
picture to demonstrate the senselessness of Reconstruction: “Fat, healthy and greasy as these 
negroes are, their oily, black faces glistening in the sunlight, and seeming blacker by contrast 
with the snowy cotton fields, I am not sure that they are thus blest because of radical 
legislation.”75 
Unmentioned in this picture was the way Reconstruction had brought James Alcorn and 
his employees into the same political party, and then put them at odds over what that would 
actually mean in terms of local power. In 1865, Alcorn had seen the inevitability of Black 
suffrage and the necessity of interracial “friendship.”76 Two years later, he wrote a pamphlet 
encouraging white Mississippians to not only accept Congressional terms, but also join African 
Americans in the Republican Party. He said he would sit with African Americans, discuss 
politics with them, vote with them, and share with them a common political platform that 
guaranteed their rights and safety. His goal, however, was a conservative one. He wanted to 
check the revolution of Reconstruction like he would a runaway horse, that is, by running with it 
for a distance.77 Alcorn believed that Republican Reconstruction could still be managed by 
whites if they joined the party in power.78  
 Alcorn’s views were not shared by most white Mississippians at the time, and they 
probably never were. Still, on March 10, 1870, Alcorn gave his inaugural address as the first 
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governor of a Republican Mississippi. As might be expected, Alcorn’s speech was a political 
balancing act and it reflected the practical necessity of governance. More importantly, it stated 
his view that Black political rights did not represent a fundamental challenge to the racial order. 
Though promising equality in voting, jury selection, and distribution of offices, he added that, 
“wealth, intelligence, social position have always, as I trust they ever shall be, great power in the 
state.”79 In the distribution of offices, Alcorn was more concerned with winning political capital 
with white southerners. Of Alcorn’s 546 patronage appointments, historian Lillian Pereyra found 
that 247 went to Republicans and 217 to Democrats, but only a handful went to African 
Americans. These African Americans typically were placed on the board of county supervisors 
and were there outnumbered by white members. Black Mississippians attained more coveted 
positions like sheriff later when offices were opened to election; they owed their success to 
voters of their own race, not to Alcorn’s careful engineering.80   
 In addition to patronage, access to public accommodations and education were areas 
where Alcorn’s attempts to “make the negro our friend” fell short of how some African 
Americans understood equity within friendship. Though the Republican legislature passed an 
antidiscrimination law for railroads, Alcorn quibbled with particular provisions, and the law was 
ignored in practice. As to education, Alcorn expressed a preference for racially separate public 
schools. A Washington, D.C. paper edited by a former slave criticized Alcorn for not allowing 
his children to attend school with those of Hiram Revels, a Black minister whom the Mississippi 
legislature had recently chosen to fill the final year of Jefferson Davis’s vacated seat in the U.S. 
Senate. Anticipating the argument that Black people must adhere to “their white Republican 
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friends” to prevent Democrats from taking the state, the author answered, “In God's name let 
them come, for they can do no more than poison the fountain of our political existence, and 
GOVERNOR ALCORN has done his best to do that.”81 
 Alcorn responded publicly to the editorial by denying that his policy position was 
motivated by prejudice. He insisted that his childhood in a slave society had actually taught him 
less prejudice than could be found among white northerners. He had been “nursed by a woman 
of color” who followed his fortunes from one state to another and “lives, to-day, in the 
enjoyment of an old age of ease and plenty on my plantation, under but a poor requital of the 
life-long devotion which has tied me to her in love as a son to a mother.” Nevertheless, Alcorn 
feared that mixed schools would enflame the prejudices of whites which had formerly been 
aroused by political equality. Alcorn counted himself among “those of us who have risen 
superior to the very natural repugnance that struggled against” political equality, but his 
conversion was recent enough that he could sympathize with “thousands of good and true men of 
the South who wrestle today with their own prejudices towards an acceptance of the enlightened 
policy of equality before the law.” As evidence that African Americans did not want mixed 
schools and would not force them on unwilling whites, he pointed to the fact that the legislature 
of Black-majority Mississippi did not insist on integration.82      
Despite his paeans to the interracial harmony of the Old South, Alcorn won the friendship 
of leading Black Mississippians like Hiram Revels. Revels appeared an ideal surrogate for 
Alcorn. In the Senate, he was a vocal proponent of civil rights as well as a general amnesty bill 
for former Confederates. After Alcorn’s tussle with the Washington press, Revels published a 
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statement testifying that the governor’s efforts to ensure “that all persons, irrespective of race, 
color or former condition may prosper and do well if they desire and try to do so…have been a 
perfect success and have my approval and appreciation.”83 When Revels’s term expired, Alcorn 
appointed him as the first president of a new university for Black Mississippians.  
Nevertheless, after Alcorn left the governor’s mansion to succeed Revels in the Senate, 
Black Mississippians shifted their support to a more progressive ally, Adelbert Ames. A Union 
general from Massachusetts and now Mississippi’s other U.S. senator, Ames had publicly 
challenged Alcorn when the latter said that he had the Klan situation under control. When Ames 
announced that he would run for governor as the regular Republican nominee in 1873, Alcorn 
saw it as a personal affront, as well as a threat to his influence over Black Mississippians. In 
1865, Alcorn had supported befriending the freedpeople because if white Mississippians did not 
do it, then northern men like Ames would, and they would turn Blacks against them. Alcorn 
announced that he would run against Ames, and he did so with mostly Democratic backing, even 
though he still claimed to be a Republican. Alcorn blamed Black disloyalty to him on Ames, who 
he called “an enemy to the white people of the State.” In one campaign speech he alleged that 
Ames “cares nothing for the colored people except to use them as instruments in working the 
degradation of the Southern whites. His purpose is, I repeat, to antagonize the races; to exclude 
the Southern whites from all share in the administration of the State government.”84 Alcorn 
would support political equality, but not African Americans defying his friendly counsel.  
The battle against Ames in some ways was a proxy for Alcorn’s fight for control on his 
own plantation. Back in Coahoma, Alcorn’s workers had voted for him in 1869, but in the 
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following years they also chose local officials of their own race. In 1873, while Alcorn was again 
campaigning for governor, African American Sheriff John Brown made speeches against him. 
Brown was a schoolteacher who had been educated at Oberlin College in Ohio before moving to 
Coahoma County. As Alcorn recalled, Brown “denounced me as a hypocrite, a cheat, a 
democrat, and a jackass.” More galling, Alcorn felt straightjacketed, since if he responded, “this 
would have rendered me liable to the charge of fighting the negroes because they refused to vote 
for me.” Alcorn’s only recourse was to deflect responsibility to northern carpetbaggers: “I have 
taken more from Brown than I have ever submitted to from any man in all my life. I well knew 
he was set upon me by Ames and I sought to make him Ames [sic] responsible, but he shirked 
the issue.” Alcorn confessed that the majority of Black employees on his plantation voted against 
him, though he still believed he was the truer friend to Black Mississippians and that they only 
rejected him due to the cunning deception of northerners.85 
  The situation in Coahoma only got worse for Alcorn in the following years. In 1875, 
white Democrats across the state used violence to win local elections in what became known as 
“the Mississippi Plan.” Alcorn, who still considered himself a Republican, interpreted the 
violence as proof that “no state can be maintained under carpet-bag rule” and added that he could 
not support the state party with Ames in control.86 In fact, he would work with Democrats to 
overthrow the Republican organization in his county. Two years earlier he had refused to 
confront Sheriff Brown, but now that he was no longer running for office, he held an opposition 
meeting where he accused Brown and other officers of misappropriating public funds and 
inciting violence. Alcorn later supported an opposition ticket led by a white northerner who had 
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supported Ames in 1873, suggesting the cause of Alcorn’s ire was Black political power, not his 
feud with Ames. Alcorn explained later that he held this candidate in low regard, but thought he 
would not be as likely to incite the colored people to violence as Brown.87 
A couple days later, a local Black militia completed drills to show their determination to 
defend an upcoming rally for the Brown ticket. Rumors quickly circulated that the militia 
planned to burn Alcorn’s plantation at Friar’s Point. In response, Alcorn helped to raise a band of 
forty to fifty cavalry led by an ex-Confederate Democratic general who had supported Ames in 
1873 purely as the best way to set Republicanism on a course of self-destruction. A cavalry 
charge disbursed the Black militia without casualties, though later the murder of a white man led 
to the lynching of at least one African American and two more missing.88 Sheriff Brown fled 
across the Mississippi River, writing to Governor Ames, “J. L. Alcorn says that I shall not be 
sheriff any more.” Two days later, he wrote again, “I have attempted to go home three times to 
settle up my business, but I have met with an armed force to take my life each time.”89 Alcorn 
had redeemed Coahoma County from what he saw as perversion of Republicanism and 
Reconstruction.  
If the correspondent of the New York World is to be believed, things settled down on 
“Alcorn’s Acres” by 1876. Perhaps the author of the colorful vignette had intended to convey the 
failure of Reconstruction’s attempt to transform the South, and therefore the futility of Alcorn’s 
part in it as well. Or perhaps he simply meant to depict the benevolence of a Mississippi 
plantation owner, leaving aside his Republican politics. In truth, Alcorn did not expect 
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Reconstruction to dramatically transform social relations on his plantation; he saw racial and 
class power as resilient enough to withstand Black political participation. Alcorn was unable to 
make the Republican Party respectable in Mississippi in his view, but his vision of white 
patronalism would live on after Redemption.   
 
A Post-Racial Fantasy and The Facts of Reconstruction 
Reconstructed rebels supported Black political rights and relied on Black votes, but 
ironically, they often expressed a desire to avoid the politics of race. As they put it, by bringing 
about a consensus on Black equality, they hoped to make Black interests politically irrelevant. 
With both parties in agreement on racial issues, reconstructed rebels theorized, African 
Americans would divide politically on economic issues and exert less influence overall. As 
historian Steven Hahn has argued, Black southerners often practiced the politics of racial 
solidarity; anti-Reconstruction whites did the same, while also employing a divide-and-conquer 
strategy. They regularly stoked divisions between Black and white Republicans, and even 
between different factions of Blacks.90 In contrast to both groups, reconstructed rebels saw that 
whites would benefit if both races divided evenly between the two parties. African Americans 
would become a minority in each party, unable to exert influence in either, or at least not for 
collective racial gain. The power of white elites would remain intact.  
William Rodman expressed this view explicitly. Countering Conservatives’ arguments 
that Black suffrage would lead to “negro supremacy,” he argued that if the other side would 
conceded the right of Blacks to vote, then “the colored people will divide among the different 
	
90 Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 226-230; 387. See also Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 




parties, just as white men do, and while individually enjoying the advantage of suffrage, as a 
distinct political power they will cease to be either dangerous or important.”91 Rodman was 
honest in this belief. Privately, he predicted that African Americans would vote “in mass” for 
Grant in 1868, “but after that,” he anticipated “it will be difficult if not impossible to prevent the 
splitting up of the colored vote.” For this reason, he advised making up the difference by 
encouraging white voters, especially ex-Confederates.92 Rodman had made a controversial move 
by joining the southern Republican Party, but he did not think this institution would have a 
Black-majority for long.  
As Rodman’s characterization of Black political power indicated, reconstructed rebels 
saw their own base as a potential threat to society, even as they depended on them for votes. 
When one Alabama judge left the Republican Party, he wrote that “stupendous evils” had come 
“from congregating the entire mass of negro voters into one party, constituting seven-eighths of 
the whole.” Denying Black agency, he blamed northern settlers who had stirred up racial hatred. 
“I cannot see how any tolerable solution to this negro question is to be found,” he continued, 
“otherwise than by distributing them, as a minority, into two parties, in both of which the white 
element will preponderate.”93 This view was shared by Louisiana’s Republican “carpetbagger” 
governor who defended a Black Democrat by saying, “The more negroes becoming Democrats 
will bring more white men into the Republican Party and in that is the safety of the Republic and 
the prosperity of the people.”94  
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African Americans believed that political equality meant that they would be able to 
confront the issues that most impacted their lives, such as inequalities in public accommodations, 
livelihood, and legal justice. While reconstructed rebels wanted racial conflict to fade away, 
African Americans wanted a truly equal say over their lives and their society. When a Black 
spokesman criticized James Lusk Alcorn for his stance on integration, he responded, “It seems to 
me that some of the prominent men of your race are over-sensitive on the subject of social 
equality.”95 When a New Jersey man of color wrote to Attorney General Amos Akerman 
complaining about the miniscule numbers of African Americans employed by the federal 
government, Akerman responded that this result was not because of prejudice, but rather because 
of the difference in education. When his correspondent tried to make Black political power felt 
by threatening to abandon the Republican Party, Akerman wrote back, “It would be an instance 
of political ingratitude which would justify all that their enemies have said against [Blacks]…. I 
cannot believe that they are capable of such meanness!”96 
With their own power at stake, reconstructed rebels frequently saw the freedpeople’s 
preference for leaders from their own communities as reverse discrimination. Charles R. 
Thomas’s refusal to help Eli Jackson get a drink at the Raleigh National Hotel foreshadowed 
problems to come for the reconstructed judge. From 1871 to 1875, Thomas would represent 
North Carolina’s first Black-majority district.97 Up for reelection in 1874, his constituents 
pressed him to take a stand in favor of a new civil rights bill that guaranteed equal treatment in 
public accommodations. Thomas knew that some were talking about elevating African American 
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John Hyman to replace him. Thomas reiterated his belief in equality, but at the same time told 
Blacks to refrain from pressing the civil rights issue or discriminating against white Republicans 
for office. “Whenever you raise the question of color,” Thomas fumed, “I'll go out. I'll repudiate 
[the party].”98 Thomas blamed the problem of race on African Americans. Republicans in his 
own district voted to replace him with Hyman, who went on to win Thomas’s seat in Congress. 
When Thomas went over to the Democrats two years later, he claimed “no prejudice toward any 
man on account of their color, race or nativity” and reaffirmed his belief in equality before the 
law. However, he considered full justice to African Americans as having become embodied in 
constitutional amendments.99 Though the nation at large was abandoning its commitment to 
racial progress, Thomas saw Reconstruction as a success. If there was still any conflict over race, 
he blamed it on unnecessary agitation from African Americans. 
Williams C. Wickham stayed in the Republican Party long after Virginia was “redeemed” 
by Democrats, but when the Readjuster Party drew Black support, he accused Blacks of 
racializing party politics. “Whilst charging upon their opponents a desire to draw the color line,” 
Wickham said that Black leaders: 
are actually drawing it themselves in the worst and most dangerous way by 
forming club of the colored people in all communities where their votes will be of 
possible service to them in the next elections, inducing them to come together in 
the dead hours of the night by the unlimited distribution of free whiskey and a 
regular moneyed stipend, have them addressed by incendiary speaker, who 
endeavor to inflame and incite them against the white people amongst whom they 
live, thus endangering the peace, welfare, and good feeling of the community; 
whilst if they had one spark of the interest which they, for selfish ends, profess to 
have in the colored people, or one iota of patriotism, they would labor to bring 
about good feeling and friendship between the two races, whose interests here are 
so similar and so intimately connected, and between whom it is so important that 
the most kindly relations should exist. 
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Though Wickham claimed that he was “recognized as a friend of the colored people,” he was 
fundamentally opposed to the politics of Black solidarity and their spokesmen’s attempts to push 
back against white supremacy. Dismissing their just concerns, he insisted that “under the laws of 
Virginia, as well as under the laws of the United States, the whites have no rights that are not 
equally possessed by the colored people.” He promised to defend their rights if they elected him 
to the state legislature, but warned that if they did not, “it would confirm the claims of their 
opponents that they are blinded by race prejudice.”100 
African American spokesmen advocated the interests of their communities, but they also 
understood the need for white support. Few African American spokespersons were more 
respected by white southerners—Republican and Democrat—than John Roy Lynch. A former 
slave from Natchez, Mississippi, he served as the speaker of the Mississippi legislature and then 
in the U.S. House of Representatives. In his 1913 reminiscences, The Facts of Reconstruction, 
Lynch wrote that the relations between Blacks and “the aristocrats of former days…had been 
friendly, cordial and amicable even during the days of slavery.” According to Lynch, this led to 
the accession of numerous ex-rebels to the Republican Party: “in Mississippi they were led by 
such men as Alcorn, in Georgia by Longstreet, in Virginia by Moseby [sic], and also had as 
leaders such ex-governors as Orr, of South Carolina; Brown, of Georgia, and Parsons, of 
Alabama.” Lynch argued that “the administration of James L. Alcorn as Governor of the State of 
Mississippi is one of the best with which that unfortunate State has been blessed.” As historian 
Justin Behrend points out, Lynch was writing in response to the arguments of racist white 
historians that Reconstruction had been an era of misrule. He distorted the truth to suggest a 
moderate Reconstruction and ignored much of his own activism for civil rights and Black self-
	




governance. In an era of Jim Crow, Lynch sought to build a memory of positive collaboration 
across the color line.101  
Even in the 1870s, however, Lynch expressed ideas about racial politics that resonated 
with the assumptions of reconstructed rebels like Alcorn. In a speech on the House floor Lynch 
denied that the Civil Rights Bill of 1875 “would in any way affect the social status of anyone.” 
He pointed out that social class created distinctions between white people as well as between 
African Americans. In a quip that could be read both as reassurance to whites and an assertion of 
Black dignity, he told his white colleagues, “if at any time I should meet any one of you at a 
hotel and occupy a seat at the same table with you, or the same seat in a car with you, do not 
think that I have thereby accepted you as my social equal.” Moreover, Lynch argued that the 
school integration portion of the bill should be included because “the Negro question ought to be 
removed from the politics of the country. It has been a disturbing element in the country ever 
since the Declaration of Independence and it will continue to be so long as the colored man is 
denied any right or privilege that is enjoyed by the white man. Pass this bill as it passed the 
Senate, and there will be nothing more for the colored people to ask or expect in the way of civil 
rights.”102 Like Alcorn and other reconstructed rebels had done before, Lynch suggested that it 
was possible to put an end to racial issues in politics.  
Lynch had risen from the Black grassroots politics of the Natchez district, and at the same 
time knew how to gain an advantage by speaking to white assumptions and beliefs. Lynch would 
continue to do the same after Redemption, engaging in “fusion politics” that brought together 
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African Americans with Democrats like L.Q. C. Lamar. Reconstructed rebels, for their part, 
came to believe that they had fulfilled their duty to African Americans.  
Reconstructed rebels were more genuinely supportive of Black freedom than their 
opponents in the Democratic Party. It is transparently clear, however, they never intended to 
surrender white political control; at times, they even thought they might increase their own 
power by cultivating Blacks as clients and voters. They also imagined that by pursuing the 
course that they did, race would cease to be a source of political contention, and whites would 
remain the top rail. Three decades before Black disfranchisement, they concluded that joining the 
Republican Party would, in the words of James Longstreet, allow southerners to make 
Reconstruction “white instead of black.”103 Their actions failed to establish a lasting two-party 
system, but they help explain why disfranchisement was not whites’ immediate response after 
Redemption. 
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REDEEMERS AS RECONSTRUCTED REBELS: 
HOME RULE AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 Ten years after Confederate defeat, Thomas Settle, Jr. spoke at a soldiers’ home in 
Dayton, Ohio. Far from his native North Carolina, the first-time visitor introduced himself as “a 
thoroughly-whipped and reconstructed rebel.” Confederate veterans, he confessed, had followed 
“vain gods” and could have been hanged for treason. For this reason, he continued, they owed a 
greater obligation to protect their common country in the future than did his audience, who had 
been faithful to the country and now received pensions for it.1 His message hit the increasingly 
fashionable theme of North-South reconciliation, but his penitent attitude was unfashionable by 
1875. Other ex-Confederates combined reconciliationist rhetoric with bitterness about the 
northeastern bent of Republican economic policy, or they equated the morality of the Union and 
Confederate cause. Settle spoke of white southerners more as loyal subjects than as equal 
citizens. Not only did Southern Democrats condemn Settle’s words—northern newspapers now 
considered such submissiveness unnecessary and unmanly.2  
 Campaigning for governor of North Carolina a year later, Settle attacked the central 
tenets of pro-Confederate remembrance and defended the state’s Reconstruction constitution. 
Settle’s Democratic opponent, Zebulon Vance, had been the state’s Confederate governor. In 
1876, Vance still characterized the postwar amendments to the federal constitution, the 
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Reconstruction Acts, and the 1868 state constitution as fraudulent. Vance triumphed over Settle 
and Democrats subsequently amended the state constitution, making it harder to vote and giving 
the legislature control of county and township governments.3 Other historians have portrayed this 
event as the defeat of reconstructed southern identity by its unreconstructed alternative. Were 
Settle and other reconstructed rebels forgotten prophets of modernization and racial progress? 
Their words and actions suggest otherwise. Reconstructed rebels were important partners in 
abandoning Reconstruction.   
 According to the usual narrative, “Reconstruction” ended in southern “home rule.” The 
transition is called “Redemption” and its agents were “Redeemers.” More specifically, 
Redemption can mean either the moment Democrats won a legislative majority in a particular 
state between 1870 and 1876, the subsequent revision of state constitutions, or President Hayes’s 
southern policy of non-intervention starting in 1877. Historians have rightly reversed the moral 
implications of the term “Redemption,” pointing out that white Democrats won by fraud and 
violence. Home rule, historians have also made clear, meant not just a return of state sovereignty, 
but also white supremacy and elite rule. White southern elites were the ones who would rule at 
home. Another group of scholars have added to our understanding of Redemption by pointing 
out the role that white northerners played. Increasingly over the 1870s, white northerners 
sympathized with white southern property holders over propertyless African Americans, and few 
northern voters wanted to see the U.S. military permanently intervening in the South.4      
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While historians have correctly emphasized the racial dynamics of “home rule” and the 
complicity of white northerners, the prevailing view misses three crucial elements, all tied to the 
national conversation about what it meant for white southerners to be “reconstructed.” First, at 
the same time that white southerners used violence to overthrow Republican state governments, 
Democratic leaders redefined themselves to northern audiences, arguing that they were fully 
reconstructed, fully American. They claimed they were rooting out corruption from their states 
and insisted they should rule those states themselves. Some like Zebulon Vance still criticized 
the Reconstruction Amendments notwithstanding, but other Redeemers publicly accepted them 
as legitimate. Second, Northern Republicans, for a variety of reasons, accepted the sincerity of 
the Redeemers and removed the Fourteenth Amendment officeholding disqualification from all 
but a few hundred ex-Confederates. Third, reconstructed rebels—that is, ex-Confederates in the 
Republican Party—echoed the Redeemers’ claims about misrule and helped to rehabilitate the 
image of native white elites against that of northern “carpetbaggers” and southern Blacks. Taken 
together, Redeemers, northerners, and reconstructed rebels created a nation-state in which 
southern home rule did not look like an anomaly or a defeat. 
Most reconstructed rebels came to embrace Redemption and home rule. True, Thomas 
Settle and other Republicans continued to run against Democrats, but they simultaneously 
adopted their opponents’ criticism of Reconstruction. Rufus Barringer, North Carolina’s 
Republican candidate for lieutenant governor in 1880, was representative of this pattern. 
Barringer, a former general in Lee’s army, inveighed against Democrats for undemocratic 
practices, but also admitted that he was glad President Hayes removed federal troops from the 
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South. He criticized the Redeemer legislature for taking away county and township self-
government, but he also shared his opponents’ core assumptions about the proper racial order.5 
At the state constitutional convention of 1875, he opposed integrated schools and interracial 
marriage. “I frankly admit the abuse of power by the negro governments South,” Barringer told 
the press. “I go further and declare that it is a fearful blunder, not to say crime, for these people 
and their ignorant allies to assume to rule and govern.” He blamed this result on the intolerance 
of Democrats, not on Black themselves, but still concluded that if white North Carolinians would 
“deal with [Black men] as any other voter,” then “‘negro power’ is at an end.”6  
Despite Barringer’s criticism of Redeemer Democrats, the latter at times reached out to 
African American leaders and won a substantial share of Black votes in the 1880s.7 Though 
Redeemers worked to keep the South solidly Democrat by reducing Black political participation, 
they had come to agree with reconstructed rebels that Black suffrage was not a fundamental 
threat to white supremacy. Some reconstructed rebels even joined the Democratic Party, as 
Barringer would do in 1888.8 Looking back, they prided themselves that they had helped create a 
consensus based on accommodation to the North in exchange for home rule.  
More so than Redemption, Black disfranchisement at the turn of the century was a strong 
repudiation of the political views most associated with being “reconstructed” in the 1860s. The 
remaining reconstructed rebels, however, did not always see the contradiction. In the 1870s and 
1880s, the Supreme Court issued conservative interpretations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
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Amendments, undercutting federal protection for Black civil rights.9 Simultaneously, northern 
states circumscribed voting rights based on residence and literacy, factors that were ostensibly 
non-racial, but in fact discriminated against the poor and racial minorities.10 From this vantage 
point, reconstructed rebels who lived to the end of the century hardly saw the gap between 
Reconstruction nationalism and Jim Crow America. It was ironic. Reconstructed rebels became 
complicit in the late nineteenth century’s tragic outcome.  
 
General Amnesty  
 In 1868, Congressional Republicans had settled on a policy of offering relief from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s officeholding ban to individual Confederates who were known 
supporters of Reconstruction. The policy was made possible by the party’s supermajority in the 
40th and 41st Congress. Public opinion in the North, however, quickly turned against the policy, 
which newspaper editors argued was too partisan. Democrats also prepared to make universal 
amnesty a campaign issue in 1872. When the 42nd Congress met in the spring of 1871, 
Republicans no longer had a supermajority, and it appeared politically expedient to undercut 
Democrats by offering amnesty to most former Confederates affected by the officeholding ban.  
 Republicans naturally denied that they were acting out of expediency, and their defense 
of a general amnesty bill is revealing of the shifting conversation about reconstructing 
individuals. First, they argued that the ban was not reaching the perpetrators of Klan violence, 
and that it might even be fueling it. Second, they adopted the Democrats’ view that the ban 
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robbed the South of its most capable leaders. These arguments dovetailed with the Democratic 
refrain that Reconstruction was discriminatory against whites and that equality before the law 
required lifting the officeholding restriction. The Amnesty Act of 1872 removed disabilities from 
all but a few hundred ex-Confederates who held high political office or military commissions 
before the war. Passed with bipartisan support, it reflected not only a concession to expediency, 
but a consensus that the reconstruction of individuals was complete.  
In the debates on the general amnesty bill, Democrats simultaneously criticized 
Congressional Reconstruction and argued that amnesty would make equality before the law 
complete. In the congressional hearings on Klan violence, Representative Frank Blair of 
Missouri continually sought to show that the disturbances were not racially motivated and that 
white unrest was caused by the officeholding ban. Speaking in favor of the general amnesty bill, 
he again accused Black southerners of seeking “to degrade and humiliate the white people of this 
country.”11 James Beck of Kentucky revived the charge that Republicans were “peddling out” 
amnesty for party purposes. Beck argued, “we ought to put all men, white as well as black, upon 
terms of equality before the law.” If some adult white men could not hold office, he reasoned, 
they were not equal to the African Americans. Implicitly reminding his colleagues that 
Republican Reconstruction policy had been about both reforming whites and transforming 
institutions, he contended, “if this bill passes, then the work of reconstruction of individuals as 
well as States is at an end.”12  
 Congressional Republicans joined in the chorus that their own policy had become 
unworkable. Nevada Senator William Stewart reflected that such “special legislation” had led to 
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“embarrassment” because the beneficiaries of amnesty sometimes told their constituents that 
they had not asked for relief. Stewart considered it “impossible for Congress to investigate and 
pass upon the cases of individuals with any degree of fairness and impartiality.”13 Reconstructed 
rebels frequently benefited from selective amnesty, both through their own relief and through the 
exclusion of their rivals; however, they also frequently supported general or universal amnesty to 
conciliate white constituents. The waters became quite muddy when the political value of 
exclusion conflicted with the political value of amnesty. Illinois’s John Logan criticized 
Southern Republicans for first advocating universal amnesty and then delaying the bill when it 
looked like it would allow Zebulon Vance to be elevated to the Senate. Logan pointed out that 
some of the Senate’s current members—such as Alcorn of Mississippi—had done no less than 
Vance to support the Confederacy, and President Grant had brought an ex-Confederate—Amos 
Akerman—into his cabinet.14 Ironically, in a previous Congress, Logan had opposed even 
minimal selective amnesty because he did not believe rebel converts were sincere; now he 
suggested that if such men were amnestied, relief should not be withheld from ex-Confederates 
who remained with the Democratic Party. 
Another group of Republicans argued that, though former rebels might not be deserving 
of magnanimity, general amnesty would pacify them. Congressman John Farnsworth, an 
architect of the earlier policy, argued that disqualification from office had not reduced violence 
in the South. The Klan was the problem, he said, and the officeholding ban did not target 
nightriders. Instead, it created strife. Farnsworth pointed out that those who had only reluctantly 
gone into the Confederacy could not hold office, while their former slaves could.15 Luke Poland 
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struck the same chord, claiming that proscription made the banned into martyrs. It was not a 
matter of whether these men deserved amnesty, but a matter of fostering tranquility.16  
Robert Elliott, a Black congressman from South Carolina, responded to Farnsworth’s 
assertion that the ban targeted the wrong people. If the elites banned by the Fourteenth 
Amendment were not actually those doing the nightriding, Elliott said, they nevertheless 
encouraged and financed it.17 Other Republicans insisted that former rebels needed to prove they 
were reconstructed. According to Massachusetts Senator George Hoar’s reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, banned individuals could not hold political office until it was proven 
that they had changed their minds.18 Tennessee Unionist Horace Maynard agreed that the 
Republican Party’s embrace of amnesty had as its condition that the proscribed first become law-
abiding.19 James Nye of Nevada joined Charles Sumner in arguing that the amnesty bill should 
be linked to a supplemental bill for Black civil rights. Only by accepting the latter, he argued, 
could rebels show they were “in earnest about this thing.”20 This was the old gospel of James 
Garfield, that faith must be accompanied by works. Now, however, more Republicans were 
implying that amnesty should be freely distributed as an act of grace and that this peace offering 
would win former rebels to its side.  
The other common argument by Republicans revealed the extent to which they had come 
to see white proscription as illegitimate. As Pennsylvania Senator John Scott put it, local and 
state governments in the South lacked both “character” and “capacity.” Scott alleged that 
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disorder in the South was due to the disqualification of good men and the election of bad men. “I 
am satisfied,” he concluded, “that the character of many of the local administrations in the South 
can be very much improved by removing these disabilities.”21 White southerners in Congress, 
eager to win over more of their own race with conciliation, agreed with Scott. South Carolina’s 
northern-born Republican Senator Frederick Sawyer claimed that it was because a “large number 
of men in the southern States were shut out from the possibility of holding State and Federal 
offices that we have had so many abuses in the local government of those States.” Lack of proper 
leadership had made his state’s government “a disgrace to civilization.”22 Louisiana Senator 
William Kellogg, also of northern extraction, thought that amnesty would undercut the argument 
of hostile southern whites that they were taxed unjustly and their money put in the hands of 
“adventurers,” a label typically applied to men like himself.23 
 Ironically, southern Republicans helped to create the perception of misrule and 
illegitimacy in the South. By repudiating the wisdom of the officeholding ban, they implied that 
native white elites were the South’s natural leaders and that their own hold on power—even if 
they too were native southerners—was based on the rigging of institutions. Northern journalists 
who traveled in the South during the 1870 popularized this view of Reconstruction in accounts 
like James Pike’s The Prostrate State. That Southern Republicans echoed these charges could 
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L.Q.C. Lamar: Teaching the North a Lesson in Reconstruction 
 It would be misleading to conclude that white northerners gave up on changing the South 
altogether. Rather, they began to see Southern Democrats as reconstructed. This growing 
perception had as much to do with the limited expectations of white northerners as Southern 
Democrats’ efforts to craft a new image and then successfully sell it to the North. During 
Presidential Reconstruction, southern Democrats had argued that they accepted Confederate 
defeat and the end of slavery, and therefore they should be restored to full citizenship. 
Congressional Reconstruction changed the meaning of American citizenship, both by defining it 
on the nonracial basis of birth on U.S. soil and limiting the officeholding privileges of former 
rebels. Southern Democrats sought to “redeem” their states from the government that resulted, 
but by the 1870s, they simultaneously argued that they were reconstructed American citizens. 
Contradicting numerous reports of white violence, they argued that white southerners had 
changed and Democratic elites could be trusted to rule their states.  
In 1874, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, a Democratic congressman from 
Mississippi, used a eulogy of the recently deceased Charles Sumner to present himself as the 
latest embodiment of reconstructed citizenship. “Strange as, in looking back upon the past, the 
assertion may seem,” Lamar announced, Mississippi regretted the death of Charles Sumner “and 
sincerely unites in paying honors to his memory.” After some back-handed compliments about 
Sumner’s “high moral qualities,” Lamar built a defense of sectional reconciliation based on 
recognition of sincerity and bravery on both sides. The Mississippi Senator made Sumner a 
symbol of reconciliation, arguing that despite the latter’s egalitarian views, he held “no enduring 
personal animosity” toward white southerners. Lamar urged that northerners and southerners 




desire to be one…not merely in community of language and literature and traditions and country; 
but more, and better than all that, one also in feeling and in heart.” Lamar closed his eulogy by 
ventriloquizing for Sumner, imagining if that if the dead man could speak he would say, “My 
countrymen! Know one another, and you will love one another.”24   
As much as Lamar ascribed symbolic meaning to Sumner’s body, Lamar became a 
symbol himself, one of a reconstructed South. One Republican newspaper in the North called 
Lamar’s speech “the most significant and hopeful utterance that has been heard from the South 
since the war.” Another northern newspaper called it “evidence of the real restoration of the 
Union in the South.” A third wrote that Lamar “teaches us all a lesson in reconstruction,” that 
reconstruction should have been managed “by and through the ruling class in that section: the 
men of intelligence and character.” Lamar proved that “even Sumner was not wise in time.” As 
this last comment suggests, there was a contradiction between Lamar’s portrayal of Sumner as a 
conciliator and his self-presentation as a reconstructed rebel. If men like Lamar were the proper 
rulers of the South, Sumner had been wrong to exclude them from office, and he had been 
doubly wrong to link general amnesty with his supplemental civil rights bill.25 
Lamar drew mixed praise and condemnation from southern newspapers. Though several 
prominent ones congratulated Lamar, others saw a sacrifice of principle and honor. Some even 
classed him with James Longstreet, the Republican Party’s first symbol of reconstructed 
southern identity. Even more revealing, though, are the attempts of his supporters to refute the 
comparison. One Mississippi editor insisted, “There is not a single attribute in the nature of the 
Godhead that can take sides with Longstreet in his treason to the South, while everyone will 
	
24 Edward Mayes, Lucius Q.C. Lamar: His Life, Times, and Speeches, 1825-1893 (Nashville: Pub. House of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1895), 184-187.  




sustain Col. Lamar in his noble and manly eulogy of Charles Sumner.” Lamar himself lamented 
criticism from the southern press, but took consolation that his speech had won many northerners 
to the side of southern home rule.26 
Less than two months later, Lamar gave a floor speech in which he affirmed the 
completeness of Reconstruction. Defying the stories of racial terrorism in the South, he asserted 
that white southerners, “regard the new amendments to the constitution which secure to the black 
race freedom, citizenship, and suffrage, to be not less sacred and inviolable than the original 
charter as it came from the hands of the fathers.” Reconstruction was a success: “your policy of 
securing the results of the war, has reached its consummation,” Lamar told Republicans. 
According to this new paragon of reconstructed southern identity, Black southerners were free 
from even “the slightest restraints from the whites,” “equality before the law is without an 
exception,” and to go further would be to make Blacks “a privileged race.”27 
At the same time, Lamar pled the cause of white elites. “Is no regard to be had for the 
white population in these Southern States…?” he asked. It was they, he said, “in whose veins 
runs the blood of the races that uphold the Christianity and civilization of the world” and who 
alone represented “the intellectual culture, the moral strength, the material interests, the skilled 
labor, the useful capital of that entire section, as well as its political experience.” Military rule, 
according to Lamar, put into control incompetent Blacks and strangers in whom the white people 
had no confidence. These men received money from taxpayers who were inadequately 
represented. Moreover, the so-called civil governments in the South were in reality military 
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because of the force that backed them up. Their only constituency, Lamar argued, was the 
President of the United States.28  
Lamar’s self-presentation implied that if Democrats like him were reconstructed, there 
was no need to maintain a different group in power. The argument dovetailed with the 
Republican Party’s repudiation of the officeholding ban and the increasingly popular northern 
view that southern state governments needed their elites back in the saddle. Even against 
continued reports of racial violence in the South, white northerners came to accept Lamar’s 
professions that Reconstruction had won, southern whites were reformed, and that Black rights 
were secure under home rule and Democratic elites.   
 
Rutherford B. Hayes and David M. Key: The Lecturer and His Illustration 
 Even more so than Lamar, the story of Tennessee Democrat David M. Key’s rise to 
national prominence exemplifies the relationship between American nationalism, citizenship, 
and southern home rule. When Republican President Rutherford B. Hayes appointed Key as his 
postmaster-general in 1877, newspaper editors speculated that it was part of the “compromise” 
that secured Hayes’s inauguration while each side disputed the electoral count. Hayes’s 
“southern policy,” which pledged not to interfere in southern state elections, was also part of the 
alleged compromise. Historians have since disputed whether there was in fact a compromise—
Hayes had outlined his southern policy before the post-election controversy, and he had already 
been mulling the advantages of a Democratic cabinet member from the South. Historians have 
also been kinder to Hayes in their interpretation of the motive behind his southern policy. Hayes 
likely considered the South already lost, and therefore sought promises from the South’s 
	




Democratic governors to protect Black rights in exchange for recognizing their mandate—a very 
different kind of compromise, aimed at protecting African Americans in a much more 
constrained political environment.29  
 What end was served by the appointment of a Democratic cabinet member? The 
postmaster-general oversaw the appointment of thousands of postmasters and mail carriers 
throughout the country, a system of political “spoils” that rewarded party members and gave 
them an income while they, in addition to organizing the mail, engaged in local political 
organizing. Post office patronage had been crucial to the organization of the Republican Party in 
the South, and it was even more important in helping the party survive electoral defeat in the 
southern states. Hayes’s choice of a Southern Democrat to head this apparatus in part reflected 
the movement of civil service reform, an attempt to make the national bureaucracy less partisan. 
However, the effect was to abandon Southern Republicanism. Key removed controversial 
northern-born postmasters in Lynchburg and Petersburg, as well as a female ex-spy who had 
been Richmond’s postmistress. One newspaper estimated that one-third of the new postmaster 
appointments in the South were Democrats.30 The Official Register did not list where postal 
appointees were born, as it did for other federal jobs, but even the Treasury Department, which 
was run by Ohioan John Sherman, showed a significant shift in southern customs appointments 
from northern-born agents to ones native to their state or the South.31 Democratic control of the 
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state governments in South Carolina and Louisiana may have been unavoidable by 1877, but 
surrendering the federal patronage seems hardly necessary.  
 
 
Figure 4: Customs Patronage in 1869 and 1877. Based on the The Official 
Register for 1869 and 1877.  
 
 Key functioned not only as an agent and a symbol of Southern Democratic home rule, but 
also for Hayes as a symbol of reconstructed American nationalism. In an article titled “The 
Lecturer and His Illustration,” a southern newspaper gave a sardonic description to Hayes 





















New England. Mr. Hayes is the deviser and exponent of the Southern policy; Mr. Key is the 
living proof of its efficiency.”32 Key, who was an avid consumer of public opinion, meticulously 
cataloguing newspaper mentions in scrapbooks, was conscious of his symbolic role. The 
president’s embrace of Key, and Key’s embrace of the Hayes administration, illustrated the 
reconstruction of southern state sovereignty within the context of sectional reunion.  
 Key was born in 1824 in eastern Tennessee and settled in Chattanooga, where he married 
into a planter family, practiced law, and became active in the Democratic Party. He supported 
secession in 1861 and served as lieutenant colonel of the 43rd Tennessee infantry. Twice 
wounded, he spent the last two years of the war a refugee before returning to Chattanooga in 
1866. He supported Andrew Johnson’s conservative plan for Reconstruction and in 1870 helped 
to “redeem” Tennessee with a new state constitution that eliminated restrictions on white 
suffrage. In 1872, he was defeated in a congressional race, but when ex-President and U.S. 
Senator Andrew Johnson died holding that latter office in 1875, the governor named Key as an 
interim replacement.33  
 Despite this honor, Key was out of step with the dominant faction of Tennessee 
Democrats. His support for a return to the gold standard and opposition to repudiating 
Tennessee’s state debt aligned him with the Republicans nationally and New South boosters at 
the state level.34 Moreover, after the violent redemption of Mississippi in the local elections of 
1875, Key was the sole Democrat to join Republicans in voting for an investigation. Though he 
cast doubt on northern accusations that the election was fraudulent, he supported an inquiry to 
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prove that white southerners favored law and order. In a letter to the Memphis Avalanche—
edited by Key’s ally, ex-Confederate Colonel Andrew J. Kellar—Key wrote: 
I have had my fight and want peace. I, for one, shall treat the war as over. I 
concede that I am whipped. I concede that the negroes are free and entitled to 
citizenship—that they shall not be enslaved again. That a state cannot secede I 
agree; and furthermore, I agree that a man may have opposed the South and yet be 
an honest man—misguided, if you please, but still honest. I believe that the South 
was right in the war, but the war decided that it was in the wrong, and I abide by 
the result. If the press of Tennessee can convince the North that I have 
misrepresented the temper and feeling of my people it will be unfortunate for that 
people.35  
 
The faction of Tennessee Democrats led by Isham Harris, Tennessee’s Confederate governor, 
thought Key had gone too far. Harris’s men prevented Key from being elected to the Senate in 
his own right, and even the governor repudiated his appointee. Still, Key framed himself as the 
representative face of the reconstructed South, and this, through the intercession of allies like 
Kellar, drew President Hayes’s attention in 1877.  
 Though Key never officially adopted the Republican label when Hayes appointed him 
postmaster-general, his acceptance of the offer prompted comparisons to Longstreet and other 
reconstructed rebels. In an article titled, “Longstreet, Mosby, Key & co,” the Memphis Daily 
Appeal classed Key with other respectable whites who had “deserted the tax-paying people and 
taken shelter with the thieves who were robbing and plundering them.” The “apostacy” of 
Longstreet, the editor said, could not be considered “patriotic” when performed by Key. “He 
becomes the willing instrument and agent of the most villainous band of freebooters that ever 
blighted a free government or stole the liberties of the people.”36 Other southern commentators 
rejected the comparison, and at least one correspondent of Kellar’s Memphis Avalanche who 
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signed himself “ex-Confederate”—likely Kellar himself—turned the comparison into a defense 
of both men. By the late 1870s, more white southerners were beginning to credit Longstreet for 
racially conservative motives in joining the Republicans, and New South Democrats like the 
writer juxtaposed Longstreet and Key favorably to the “stay-at-home politicians” and the 
“Bourbon press.” The latter types criticized Confederate General Albert Sydney Johnson for 
retreating too much during the war; then, they attacked Longstreet for working with the north 
afterward; now they turned their sights on Key. These much-maligned Confederates, though, had 
all proven their devotion to the Confederacy, and the writer posited that other veterans agreed 
with him that the presence of southerners in the federal government was a sign of 
reconciliation.37  
 Other New South writers saw Key as the herald of a revived federalism. When Key made 
the first of two trips through the South in 1877, this one with a Postal Commission, railroad 
president and banker Rufus McAden addressed the group in Charlotte, North Carolina. After 
cheering the end of sectionalism and crediting business as the “great liberalizer,” McAden called 
Key’s visit “auspicious” because “for the first time in sixteen years all the States are recognized 
as co-equal and co-ordinate branches of the government.” McAden was ebullient that “the 
attention of the government is turned to our section,” an attention which, of course, would not 
mean military interference, but “practical benefits, fast mail facilities, to quicken our commercial 
blood and by the aid of electricity and stream to annihilate time and distance, and to place us on 
the great highway of commercial prosperity.”38 
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 David Key’s presence became even more freighted with symbolic meaning later that 
same year when he traveled with the president, first through the Northeast, and then in the South. 
In New England, Hayes presented Key as a model of a reconstructed rebel. Introducing the 
Tennessee Democrat to an audience in Bennington, Vermont, Hayes made Key into the 
illustration of his southern policy. In Louisville, Nashville, Chattanooga, and Atlanta, Hayes 
shared the stage with Key as well as South Carolina’s Redeemer Governor Wade Hampton. 
Together, the three argued for the compatibility of American nationalism, legal equality, and 
state sovereignty.  
 The politics of being “reconstructed” proved difficult to navigate. Southern newspapers 
expressed indignation when they received reports of the northeastern tour. The New Orleans 
Times-Picayune gave a fanciful paraphrase of how Hayes introduced Key:  
See this man! A few years ago he was clad in gray, and with the leagued cohorts 
of treason he made war against the integrity of the Union and fought against the 
old flag. … Defeat could not conquer his obstinate disloyalty. He remained a 
Democrat after the war. … He voted for Seymour, Greeley, and Tilden. He voted 
against me. For all that we know to the contrary he still believes that I was fairly 
defeated at the polls, and that my inauguration was the consummation of the most 
gigantic fraud on record. Yet, there he sits, perfectly harmless. …That is what I 
have accomplished. I did it with my little policy.39 
 
Hayes and Key likely did direct a little humor at each other while presenting their unlikely 
alliance, but the Times-Picayune embellished their words to suggest that the South was being 
humiliated. White southerners wanted to see men of each section in a position of equality.  
Key’s words provoked even more outrage. In his speech at Bennington, the Tennessean 
referred to white southerners as his “erring brethren.”40 Even the leading journal of New South 
views, the Atlanta Constitution, called Key’s actions “boot licking” and “eating dirt.” Some 
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northern papers also thought Key had gone too far; one, defending Republican magnanimity, 
wrote, “Neither Mr. Hayes nor the Northern members of his Cabinet ask the South to renounce 
its manhood and exhibit itself on the stool of repentance. A frank and sincere acceptance of the 
political results of the war is all that is expected.”41 The Southern Home, a Charlotte paper, went 
farther: “Post Master General Key, is such an ass! ...Won't somebody please kill him!”42 Key 
said he meant the phrase humorously, and a few southern papers came to his defense. Another 
Charlotte paper pointed out that many North Carolinians shared Key’s belief that southern 
leaders erred by seceding. The reconciliationist Louisville Courier-Journal called Key’s revilers 
“the worst enemies of the South” and shot back that “but for their jabbering we should have had 
peace four years sooner.”43 
 During the president’s southern tour, Hayes and Key had another chance to define the 
relationship between the South and the nation-state. Hayes set the tone by interpreting the views 
of his white southern audience. Speaking from the train in Bowling Green, he said that though 
his audience might disagree with him on some points, he considered their attendance proof that 
they agreed the Union was perpetual, that the Constitution applied to everyone, that all parts of 
the country were equal, and that Americans had a duty to regard people of all classes and races 
the same.44 In Nashville, Key likewise saw meaning to the crowd’s enthusiasm, reflecting that it 
“indicates that you feel that the people of Tennessee, just as the citizens of all the other States, 
are to control in their own way, under the Constitution of the United States with all its 
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amendments, your own affairs; that all your citizens are equal before the law.”45 Wade Hampton 
said he would not have given his hand in peace while South Carolina “was pinned down by 
bayonets,” but “when we felt that every State was equal, every man in every States was equal, 
white and black” and northern leaders treated ex-rebels with respect, he said, “I felt as a Southern 
soldier, as a Rebel if you choose, I could come back.”46 Hayes and his team declared that the 
mission was accomplished; they took the white South at its word that it was reconstructed and 
rejoiced that the states were now equal members of the nation.  
By the time they reached Atlanta, state sovereignty had never seemed so complete, 
natural, and even harmless. Hayes explained his southern policy to Black listeners, telling them, 
“I believed your rights and interest would be safe if this great mass of intelligent white men were 
let alone by the General Government.”47 Governor Alfred Colquitt, perhaps in an oblique 
reference to the furor raised by Key’s northern speeches, declared that his support of Hayes was 
rooted in “the generous confidence that you believe what we say, and your magnanimous trust 
will not exact cringing and servile guarantees.”48 At a later banquet, Hayes and Key broke bread 
with Governor Colquitt, Joseph Brown, Benjamin Hill, Henry Grady and other elite proponents 
of the New South and the Lost Cause. Brown had declared himself a “reconstructed rebel” at the 
1868 Republican National Convention but had since returned to the Democratic Party, and here 
he echoed Hayes’s view that local white southerners would do a better job taking care of Blacks 
than the federal government. Though, he qualified, “We do not make them our social equals. 
You would not do so yourself. God didn't intend it, probably, but as legal and political equals we 
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intend that they shall be protected.”49 Benjamin Hill, who had denounced both the 
Reconstruction Act and Joe Brown in 1868, had in short time embraced accommodation and 
obtained a reputation as a reconstructed southerner and spokesman of the New South. Hill told 
the presidential guest and fellow diners that both sections had learned a lesson from the disputed 
election of 1876. Southerners, who had been taught to fear the Republican Party as one of 
centralization, saw in the report of the eight Republicans on the commission that resolved the 
election “the strongest declarations of state sovereignty that have ever been made in our history.” 
Northerners, for their part, had been taught to fear that if former rebels got into power they 
would create another civil war, but in the 1876 electoral crisis, they said no to war.50 Henry 
Grady, the New South editor of the Atlanta Constitution, also spoke at the Atlanta gathering, and 
a letter was read from another reconstructed rebel who rejoiced that Hayes “has inaugurated 
municipal [and] state sovereignty upon every portion of this continent.”51 
David Key also used the tour to walk back his “erring brethren” comment. He “had no 
repentance or confession to make” for his service as a Confederate soldier, though he “would say 
frankly that we made a very great mistake—committed a very serious error.”52 American 
nationalism seemed to require a measure of regret for the war and its consequences, as well as 
rejoicing over reunion, but it also carried an assertion of white manhood, sectional equality, and 
state sovereignty. Following similar remarks in Lynchburg, Key alluded to a recent massacre of 
Mississippi Republicans, including African Americans as well as ex-Confederate sheriff W. W. 
Chisholm and his daughter. Despite the national attention it received, Key reassured white 
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listeners that he considered it only a local disturbance, an anomaly not representative of southern 
loyalty to the United States.53  
Key’s self-presentation as the embodiment of reconstructed southern identity suggested 
several lessons about American national identity. First, Confederates did not have to apologize 
for being rebels, but they did have to acknowledge equality before the law. Second, “equality 
before the law” was no longer a principle claimed exclusively by the Republican Party. In other 
words, national identity had become independent of partisan ideology. Third, though 
reconstructed rebels sung the praises of nationality, they were proud participants in the 
government because of a different kind of equality—the equality between states and their 
sovereignty over internal matters within constitutional bounds. The concept of Reconstruction 
had always implied that southern states would eventually be able to regulate their own 
populations like the northern states did. Key’s recognition as a cabinet member implied that the 
time had come.  
 
Solid South and Solid North 
To a Republican faction that opposed Hayes’s southern policy—men known as 
“Stalwarts”—the 1878 election proved the policy’s failure. For the first time since before the 
Civil War, the Democrats gained control of the Senate, and they retained a majority in the House 
as well. Only three Republicans were elected from former Confederate states. Even more 
damning, 83% of the southern representatives had served the Confederacy in either a military or 
official capacity. In the run-up to the 1880 election, Republican pamphlets denounced the new 
“Confederate Senate and House of Representatives” as an oligarchic force that threatened the 
	




nation as much as the old slave power. Because Southern Democrats used violence, intimidation, 
and fraud to reduce Black turnout, the region had a representation in Congress disproportionate 
to the actual number of voters. Republican Stalwarts worried that Democrats would use this 
power to pay Confederate pensions and reverse the northeastern orientation of the political 
economy.54  
Earlier attempts to reconstruct the South undermined the force of these arguments. The 
problem was not merely Hayes’s policy of conciliation. Reconstruction had restored the southern 
states to equal membership in the nation and ex-Confederates to equal citizenship. The Grant 
administration had rewarded ex-Confederates with prime patronage spots when they held the 
right political views. Indiana’s Democratic Senator Daniel W. Voorhees reminded Republican 
Stalwarts of this when he jeered that, by voting Republican, the former attorney general Amos 
Akerman had “washed away all his sins, and made him clean and pure in their eyes.” Akerman 
and David Key had both been confirmed by the Senate to cabinet positions. John S. Mosby of 
Virginia, Thomas Settle of North Carolina, and James L. Orr of South Carolina were given 
diplomatic posts. North Carolina governor William Holden, after being impeached, was 
appointed postmaster of Raleigh. Longstreet was surveyor of the port of New Orleans and 
dozens more Confederate veterans that Vorhees named had received positions in the State 
Department, Post Office, Treasury, and Justice Department after becoming Republican. Using 
the language that Republicans had used to justify such preferment, Voorhees mocked his 
opponents: “I have heard of the means of grace. I used when a boy to attend camp-
meetings…but I have never before heard of a fountain of grace so wide, so deep, so exhaustless, 
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so spontaneous in its unceasing flow as that of the republican party to confederate officers if they 
will only vote the republican ticket!”55 
Stalwart James G. Blaine retorted that Voorhees’s list only proved that the Grant 
administration did not discriminate against white southerners in patronage, while its recipients 
were persecuted by their white neighbors.56 However, the Stalwart rhetoric of a “Solid South” 
convinced white southerners, including many former Republicans, that Republicans had given up 
on supporting the party there. Stalwarts, they said, were abandoning the South with a 
determination to carry the election with a “Solid North.”57 In fact, Stalwarts continued to support 
measures that would use the army to protect the integrity of local election in the South, 
culminating in the failed Federal Elections Bill of 1890. Such men as the bill’s author, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, continued to hope that the rights of Black and white Republicans in the South 
could be protected through military intervention. What many in the North and South perceived as 
renewed sectionalism was actually the legacy of Republican’s earlier nationalist vision.58  
As Voorhees’s speech indicated, Reconstruction had also yielded another legacy, that of 
reincorporating southern states and former Confederates into full participation in governance. 
The vision of a unitary nation and protecting Black rights notwithstanding, Northern Republicans 
as a whole were less worried about southern home rule than Democratic ascendency in Congress 
and what that could mean for their own states and the Republican political economy. The drive 
to preserve the Republican political economy combined with Reconstruction’s legacy of 
restoring the political power of states and individual ex-Confederates to create a model of 
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nationhood that accepted Southern Democratic home rule, as well as state sovereignty more 
generally.   
 
Reconstructed Rebels on the Failure of Reconstruction 
Reconstructed rebels offered a variety of postmortems for Reconstruction. Some blamed 
southern violence and Northern Republicans’ lack of will. For example, Attorney General Amos 
Akerman wrote in 1876 that Southern Democrats still aimed “to keep the Confederate cause and 
Confederate ideas popular” and that “most of the Southern whites have not yet been able to 
dismiss the ideas, the feelings, and the hatred” that grew out of slavery.59 The following year, he 
criticized President Hayes’s southern policy as one that pretended to end “lawlessness by letting 
the lawless have their own way.”60  
Akerman’s indictment was accurate, but most reconstructed rebels placed the 
responsibility elsewhere. Instead of blaming government weakness and white racism, they 
blamed the North for not putting the right people in control. National policy, they argued, had 
alienated southern white elites like themselves. By arguing that Congressional Reconstruction 
had placed “carpetbaggers” and former slaves in control, reconstructed rebels not only stretched 
the truth, they redeemed the reputation of native white elites as the South’s rightful leaders.   
Northern Republicans who moved to the South after the war were a frequent target of 
acrimony, not only from Democrats, but also from reconstructed rebels. For example, Daniel 
Lindsay Russell, a Republican judge from eastern North Carolina, blamed the government’s 
preferment of “the carpet bag class” in federal officeholding for the failure of Reconstruction. 
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Russell believed that “reconstruction can only be maintained by enlisting the support of a 
respectable portion of the Southern Whites.”61 In fact, except in a few states and counties with 
Black majorities, white southern elites held the majority of elective offices at the state and local 
levels during Reconstruction. Congress’s policy of selectively lifting the officeholding ban from 
reconstructed rebels also exhibited a preference for natives. Malcontents like Russell were right 
that northern settlers tended to be overrepresented in non-elective patronage positions like the 
post office and customs. Russell and other reconstructed rebels felt pushed aside by strangers 
who they sometimes saw as colonial administrators. William Woods Holden, shortly before he 
was impeached by North Carolina Democrats, threw some barbs at northerners. “The South is a 
sort of plantation,” he wrote to his wife, Louisa. “It ruled the North forty years and now the 
North is ruling. That explains all.”62 Reconstructed rebels believed that northern-born 
officeholders lacked legitimacy and blamed them for the unpopularity of the Republican Party in 
the South.63 
President Hayes adopted this view himself, appointing Postmaster Key, and through him, 
replacing northern-born officials with native southern whites. The fact that many of the new 
appointees were Democrats irritated some reconstructed rebels, but the greater outcry came when 
the Republican Party moved away from Hayes’s southern strategy after the 1878 midterm 
elections. To mobilize turnout in their own states, Northern Republican leaders began to hammer 
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the white South as unrepentant Confederates. Both Southern Democrats and reconstructed rebels 
objected to that charge and revived the argument that Reconstruction had failed because of a 
policy preference for northerners.64 In the run-up to the 1880 election, a meeting of native white 
Republicans issued an address renouncing their party loyalty. In doing so, they gave they fullest 
expression to the argument that Republican policy neglected white southern elites, and as a result 
failed to establish sectional reconciliation and non-racialized two-party politics in the South.  
Eleven white southerners signed the letter; four more subsequently wrote letters to show 
their agreement. Most of them were from white majority states in the Upper South—especially 
North Carolina and Virginia—but even those names included men like William Rodman and 
John Pool who hailed from heavily African American plantation counties on the coastal plain. 
There, reconstructed rebels often vied with northern settlers for the loyalty of African American 
voters. Nearly all of the signers shared the experience of electoral defeat or being passed over for 
patronage.65    
The address charged that the Republican Party had disfranchised southern elites and 
alienated others by preferring outsiders in patronage appointments. Through these northern 
settlers, Congress had aimed to improve race relations, subverting “ideas, habits and conditions 
fixed by the usage and experience of generations.” This, plus the “disfranchisement of the 
principal property-holders, coupled with the enfranchisement of the whole body of former 
slaves,” had stirred fear among whites. However, they were not as angry over the Reconstruction 
legislation so much as they were outraged over Reconstruction’s management. Regardless of 
their apprehensions about Congressional Reconstruction, they thought that it could work if 
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properly managed. When “the persons intrusted [sic] with the execution of this new order of 
things” engaged in “disgraceful and reckless conduct,” though, the national administration, rather 
than replacing them, “continually extended to them special countenance and favor 
and…repressed the exertions of the more worthy and judicious supporters of reconstruction.” 
National leaders had driven white southerners out of the party and thus destroyed its only chance 
of permanent viability.66   
The bolting Southern Republicans never suggested that Democratic tactics like terrorism 
might have been a factor in their failure. The South was “solid” for the Democratic Party because 
the Republican Party had created a Solid North prejudiced against them. The Republicans, they 
argued, were campaigning in 1880 on “section grounds,” which “have forced us to distrust their 
disposition to regard the Southern people as equals in the Union, or worthy to be trusted as 
participants in the common government of their country.” An earlier connection between 
American nationalism and the Republican Party had been severed; to reconstructed rebels, the 
Democratic Party was no longer the party of secession.67  
Having assigned blame for the failure of Southern Republicanism, the bolters then 
assessed what Reconstruction had accomplished and what it had not. Implying that the 
disfranchisement and the officeholding ban had been the principle objection of southern whites, 
they claimed that general amnesty had led to “a general acquiescence in the principles involved” 
in Reconstruction. “The Union has been reconstructed upon the basis of freedom and political 
equality” for Blacks, they proclaimed, “and there is no element in the South that would attempt 
to have it otherwise.” However, there were other goals which could now only be achieved by 
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supporting the Democrats. Electing the Democratic presidential nominee, they said, would 
remove further obstacles to “the perfect establishment of reconstruction,” restore “complete 
reconciliation and confidence between all sections of the country and among all classes of 
people,” and cause southerners to “divide upon other issues, with no regard to race distinctions.” 
National unity, reconciliation, and the end of color-line politics—these were goals which they 
associated with a successful Reconstruction, but they required a party influential enough to cross 
the Mason-Dixon line. Republicans had failed; perhaps, they hoped, the Democrats would do 
better.   
John Pool, formerly a Republican Senator from North Carolina and the lead signatory of 
the address, made many of the same arguments in a campaign document. Though he was not 
running for office himself, he endorsed the Democratic presidential nominee, Winfield Scott 
Hancock. Pool covered much of the same ground as the joint address, but this time he provided 
more commentary on race relations. In a complete reversal of earlier pronouncements about 
African Americans, he described “the colored race in the South” as “ignorant, unthrifty, docile 
and submissive, and altogether unfit to play the part of a governing power.” Taking up the 
argument of unreconstructed rebels, he implied that the Reconstruction Acts had sought to make 
whites inferior to Blacks. Nevertheless, he assured readers that “the Southern people feel as 
humanely and kindly towards the colored race among them as the Northern people possibly can.” 
This view—that white paternalism proved that southerners were reconstructed in their attitudes 
toward Blacks—would soon become a staple of New South ideology and sectional 
reconciliation.68  
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African Americans were not to blame for the situation, Pool assured. Rather, he blamed 
northern Republicans who inflamed white prejudices “by making the negro a central object of 
political discord.” It was “cruelty” and a “crime” against Black people, he said, to do this to 
them. “Indolent and peaceful, patient and forgiving, they are unconscious of the terrible part they 
have been made to play in the fierce and bitter contentions of the Anglo-Saxon element around 
them.” Pool believed that Democratic home rule would mean the safe division of African 
Americans between parties and the erosion of their ability to control governance. Like his 
paternalist rhetoric, this prophesy foreshadowed how African Americans would eventually work 
sometimes with white Democrats to obtain necessary resources for their communities. Moreover, 
Pool’s logic led naturally to the argument of white supremacists in the 1890s that Blacks should 
be disfranchised altogether because it would prevent white men from using the Black vote 
against each other.69 
It would be easy to dismiss Pool’s bolting movement as the work of disgruntled 
patronage-seekers who now sought to curry favor with the other party. Certainly, given the 
centrality of patronage to their arguments, self-interest was a driving motivation. However, the 
arguments of these Republicans had greater significance. First, their work reshaping the memory 
of Reconstruction attests to the combability of white southern Republicanism, Democratic home 
rule, and New South ideology. Second, their indictment of “carpetbaggers” and Republican 
management of the South legitimized home rule by native white elites. Finally, their words 
signaled the separation of postwar American citizenship from Republican ideology. When 
reconstructed rebels joined the Republican Party, they considered the two inseparable. Now, 
	




however, the Democratic Party was less clearly the party of disunion—if Pool and other 
defectors were to be believed, it might even be the more national party.70 
 
Well-Nigh Reconstructed 
 In 1879, Albion Tourgée published A Fool’s Errand, a semi-autobiographical novel 
diagnosing the failure of Reconstruction. Originally from Ohio, Tourgée served the Union cause 
in a New York regiment before relocating to Greensboro, North Carolina. From his experiences 
as a Republican leader in his adopted state, Tourgée concluded that Reconstruction “was a 
failure so far as it attempted to unify the nation, to make one people in fact of what had been one 
only in name before the convulsion of civil war. It was a failure, too, so far as it attempted to fix 
and secure the position and rights of the colored race.” He blamed southern racism and national 
policy, but also indicted his own cultural arrogance. “The North and the South,” he reflected: 
are simply convenient names for two distinct, hostile, and irreconcilable ideas,—
two civilizations they are sometimes called, especially at the South. At the North 
there is somewhat more of intellectual arrogance; and we are apt to speak of the 
one as civilization, and of the other as a species of barbarism…. We tried to 
superimpose the civilization, the idea of the North, upon the South at a moment's 
warning. We presumed that, by the suppression of rebellion, the Southern white 
man had become identical with the Caucasian of the north in thought and 
sentiment; and that the slave, by emancipation, had become a saint and a Solomon 
at once. So we tried to build up communities there which should be identical in 
thought, sentiment, growth, and development, with those of the North. It was A 
FOOL'S ERRAND. 
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Tourgée faulted Reconstruction on strategy, but not on its mission. He had come to believe that 
only national support for education could, over the course of several generations, transform the 
South.71  
 Three years later, a native Southern Republican published Monon Ou or Well-Nigh 
Reconstructed: A Political Novel, in direct response to Tourgée. Its author, William S. Pearson, 
had been too young to serve in the Civil War, but his family was among the elite of western 
North Carolina. His father was a merchant and a banker who had owned 57 slaves.72 Despite this 
upbringing, when he graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1868, he gave a 
valedictory address that took effusive joy in Confederate defeat. “The Calhoun school of politics 
is dead forever,” he declared, “and happily so. Slavery and State Sovereignty have sunk together 
into the same grave.” Slavery was “unnatural,” “unchristianlike,” and “unprofitable.” He hoped 
that unlike their elders, the young men of the South would “throw [their] whole energy into the 
task of reconstruction,—reconstruction in our finances, in our society, in our politics.”  
Pearson’s speech led to a career in Republican politics, but by the time Tourgée 
published his novel, he had begun to consider his early ideas naïve. After returning from a 
diplomatic post in Italy, Pearson lost a patronage appointment and then a race for the state 
senate. The first defeat he blamed on “a long sneaking Yankee from Maine.” He complained to a 
political ally, “I assure you for seven years I have worked up our party among the good and 
respectable people of the county & at every hand the wretched aliens and low lived native 
followers of our great party have preferred men like themselves over me for every place in the 
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gift of the government.”73 Pearson remained a Republican in-name-only, repeatedly supporting 
Democratic candidates and at one point describing himself as “a Zeb Vance Republican.” The 
Redeemer governor had, in fact, financed Pearson’s novel.74  
Pearson started the book a year after Tourgée’s came out. Monon Ou or Well-Nigh 
Reconstructed—the first words being Greek for “All But”— follows the political development of 
a young white southerner, Archie Moran, who, like the author, rises to prominence in Republican 
circles because of a patriotic speech. Gratification from Republicans and vilification by 
Democrats sets him onto a course continually reinforced by pride. With time, the corruption of 
his associates and military overreach by the federal government causes him to realize his 
mistake. Alluding to Tourgée’s work, Pearson wrote that Archie awoke “from a long fool's 
dream of Yankeeizing his country in order to prove himself a good Union man.”75 
The novel does not begin with Archie, however, but with an authorial aside about James 
Longstreet. The general, Pearson opined, was “the highest in rank of the Southern men who have 
‘gone over’ to the Northern side since the war,” and asserted by contrast that “the South was 
made solid mainly by her women.” Longstreet was despised, while southern poetesses were 
loved and known in every household. With this comparison, Pearson implied that because 
women were ostensibly outside partisan politics, they had stayed true to the South. Men, by 
contrast, compromised their honor for office, monetary gain, or as in Archie’s case, youthful 
arrogance. Late in the story, the author writes that Archie had feared an attack of conscience 
“whenever he allowed himself to discuss politics, even casually, with a Southern woman.” To 
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Pearson, white southern women represented the “good morals and the well-being of society,” 
and he offered the story of his protagonist as an answer to the question of whether southern men 
like Longstreet had offended against southern womanhood. They had indeed, Archie’s story 
suggests, but it was out of understandable male hubris, and they could redeem themselves.76 
Like other reconstructed rebels who abandoned the Republican Party, Pearson focused on 
the role of elites like himself in Reconstruction. In one of his many authorial assertions, Pearson 
wrote that “the carpet-baggers and Southern Republican” wanted “respectable men” like Archie 
to take control of their party in order to cover up their own crimes with a shroud of legitimacy.77 
Similarly, Pearson insisted that there was nothing African Americans “would not have done 
under the direction of that class—the reconstructed Republican ex-slaveholders.”78 Pearson 
believed that southern birth, elite status, and whiteness combined to endow legitimacy; people 
like Archie were the natural leaders of their communities. Over time, though, Archie realizes that 
corrupt forces sought to use legitimate leaders like him as a front for their schemes.  
Archie had been drawn in by “the generously expressed sympathy of entire strangers,” 
especially after they helped him out of legal trouble “on account of the party,” but “self-
preservation” would bring him back to “his people.”79 En route to a diplomatic post abroad—
significantly, both the author and Longstreet held one—Archie ponders Reconstruction in the 
context of world history. Germany had taken Alsace from France in 1871, but France would 
never stop trying to retake it. Austria quashed the Hungarian Rebellion in 1848, but by the 1870s 
one of Hungary's own was the Austrian government’s foreign minister. “There was the Scotch 
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Union, it was true,” Archie muses, “and the Highlanders had been coaxed and legislated into 
wearing breeches; but had they yielded anything worth keeping, and had they not gained much 
from the richer English which they people were obliged to yield[?]” The subjugation of Poland 
and Ireland could never happen in America. If United States was not a similar exception, home 
rule in the South would be inevitable in time.80  
Pearson concludes with a political audit of Reconstruction. Forces working in favor of 
Reconstruction’s success included “home strength, political selfishness, rival ambitions, ante-
bellum prejudices, railroad and bank interests, immigration and in some cases positive 
patriotism.” These, Pearson argues, could have overcome the failings of its “ignorant and timid 
agents,” but what really tipped the scales against Reconstruction was the meddling from 
Washington.81 The breaking point for Archie is when Grant allows the military to intervene in 
Democrats’ attempts to control the Louisiana legislature in 1875. Pearson concludes that 
Reconstruction might have worked if Washington had not been so heavy handed, but the 
Bourbon Democrat “is at last vindicated by the results.”82 Archie “came to think the people of 
his State right in certain extreme views.”83 He was compelled to give up northern ideas about 
human equality and “fall back on inequality, as the rule of God speaking through nature 
everywhere.”84  
What was the lesson for those like Longstreet, Pearson, and the fictional Archie Moran, 
who had “gone over” to the northern side? White southerners universally “professed a love for 
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the Union, and was glad that the slaves were free, and had learned to respect the memory of Mr. 
Lincoln.” This was true patriotism according to Pearson. Those who took it to mean 
collaborating with northern colonizers, on the other hand, offended against good morals and 
civilization. In response to Tourgée, who had concluded that the South was still in a state of 
barbarism and needed to be reformed with programs of national education, Pearson said that the 
white South did not need to be educated. Embracing home rule, he concluded that white 
southerners were right about inequality and who should rule at home.85  
 
“Pig-Iron” Kelley’s Southern Tour 
Perhaps no Northern Republican better exemplified the idea that Southern Democratic 
home rule was not a threat to the Republican political economy than William D. Kelley. In 1867, 
he had gone on a speaking tour of the South to drum up white support for Congressional 
Reconstruction. He had supported the amnesty of reconstructed rebels like Joe Brown and 
fervently believed that high tariffs and a growing money supply were the key to industrial 
development in the South. By winning the support of white southerners, he hoped he could 
convert southerners to the high tariff position and Northern Republicans to monetary inflation.  
By 1875, Kelley’s hopes for economic development in a Republican South were still 
unfulfilled. In that year, he went on another tour down the eastern seaboard states and spent over 
a month in Florida. The trip was a personal one for leisure and health, but he could not help 
drawing conclusions about the impact of national policy on the South in the eight years since his 
last visit. On the one hand, he told reporters that monetary contraction was “rapidly driving the 
	




South towards insolvency.”86 On the other hand, his trip turned him against Grant’s intervention 
in the South and caused him to regret voting for a “force bill” that would post military troops at 
election sites. Kelley reported that he observed good feeling among southern whites. He told on 
one occasion of a Confederate memorial ceremony where the United States infantry band played,  
drawing from it the conclusion that he could not credit reports of violence in the cities he 
visited.87 Southern boosters made sure that when northerners like Kelley toured the South they 
did not see evidence of Black subjugation. White southerners carefully guided their guests 
through the growing cities and kept them away from rural areas.88 Nevertheless, such heavily 
curated impressions of the South were especially sound currency in northern industrial and 
financial circles. The editor of New York City’s The Iron Age wrote to congratulate Kelly on his 
views on “conditions and needs of the South, and your regrets at having voted for the force bill.” 
Kelley’s observations convinced him that military intervention would not bring about the 
kind of New South that would reflect America’s political and economic greatness. In late 1876, 
Kelley wrote to President-elect Hayes, “Your policy in the South, will, I am sure, not be that of 
the present administration. You will not maintain a non-resident Collector of the Port at New 
Orleans, or a gentleman who, having gone from Maryland to Idaho, and served one term in 
Congress a delegate from that Territory and then visited South Carolina, in the Collectorship of 
Charleston.” He also identified Grant’s “most fatal blunder” as his support of the northern-born 
Ames over the native Alcorn in Mississippi. Still, Kelley hoped that Hayes would not favor 
Southern Democrats like L.Q.C. Lamar with patronage, as he had heard rumors would be the 
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case. Hayes would disappoint Kelley on that last account—Hayes made the offer first to Lamar, 
then Key—but they shared a common faith in southern home rule.89  
Kelley’s final tour of the South in 1886 and 1887 gave him another opportunity to 
contrast “The Old South and the New,” as he titled a compilation of letters to the Manufacturer’s 
Record. Kelley attributed southern lag in economic growth to its prewar resistance to industry, 
but comparing the South of 1887 to that of 1867, he concluded that the South was a new frontier. 
He called it “the coming El Dorado of American adventure.”90  
Kelley’s reflections were targeted at an audience of northern investors, but he also had 
clear recommendations for southerners. Comparing Anniston, Alabama and South Pittsburg, 
Tennessee, he called the former town “a romance of the New South,” but lamented that the latter 
town, despite having great industrial potential, remained undeveloped. The reason, according to 
Kelley, was a matter of local governance. Anniston had a municipal charter that allowed its 
leaders to keep out whiskey and stop crime, and since obtaining this, Anniston’s iron furnaces 
began capitalizing their property and selling stock in New York.91 In contrast, South Pittsburg 
lacked a municipal charter. “What is required,” Kelley wrote, “is the organization of a municipal 
government under a charter that, in addition to authorizing a local magistracy and police, will 
permit the making of a loan of limited amount, and applicable exclusively to certain defined 
purposes.” However, “in the absence of any local government, discontent prevails,” and Kelley 
warned that “lawlessness will be provoked when hundreds of wage-earners, for whom no 
adequate accommodations will have been provided, shall be suddenly gathered together.” In the 
only reference to racial violence in the letters—and this one oblique—he commented that “the 
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conditions are such as frequently invoke application of lynch law in improvised towns in the Far 
West.” In Kelley’s analysis, the problem of the undeveloped industrial potential was not the lack 
of resources; nor was it due to southern racism. Rather, he faulted the lack of schools, street 
lighting, water supplies, and means for extinguishing fires—in short, Kelley concluded, “the 
demand for local home rule is as urgent in South Pittsburg as it is in Ireland.”92  
The invocation of “home rule” is telling, as is the comparison to Ireland. Democrats had 
argued that military intervention and corrupt northern-born officeholders had prevented the 
southern states from creating the government institutions necessary to attract investment. Kelley 
did not indict northern settlers now, though he had in the earlier letter to Hayes. Nevertheless, he 
suggested that the South’s problems were similar to the lag of Irish development and institutions 
under British rule. Kelley implied that white elites could be trusted with local governance, and 
indeed, that this was the only way forward for a New South characterized by stability and 
economic growth. Rather than looking toward the national center to transform the southern 
periphery, he saw local initiative as the best way to create order and attract investment.  
Just as was the case twenty years prior when Kelley toured the South, he could come off 
as preachy in his speeches. According to his account, some of the southerners he met objected to 
the suggestion that money could be made in any way other than growing cotton. Nevertheless, he 
was pleased with how he was received. In Talladega, Alabama, he spoke to an audience of 
“partisan Democrats.” The only Republican, according to Kelley, was the Black janitor of the 
building. “I never expressed myself with more freedom,” the Pennsylvanian wrote, and recalled 
the Republican janitor telling him afterward, that “he didn't know whether Judge Kelley had got 
	




the Democrats or the Democrats had got the Judge; but there was no difference between them 
when he was done speaking.”93  
Kelley obviously included this statement because he took it as a compliment on his 
ability to reach across the aisle. Perhaps, though, it was actually a Black man’s indictment of 
Republicans for abandoning civil rights, embracing the New South, and devolving power from 
national to subnational sources of authority. Republicans like Kelley had once suggested that 
equal rights would lead to peace and prosperity. Now they held to a different formula: stability 
and growth came from the wise leadership of white elites in their states and local communities.  
 
Reconstructed Rebels on the Success of Reconstruction 
Reconstructed rebels often blamed northerners for the failure of Reconstruction in the late 
1870s, but others—usually from a later vantage point—concluded that they had contributed 
something positive and lasting. Positing that the goals of Reconstruction were ratification of the 
constitutional amendments and the restoration of the southern states to statehood, they decided 
that they had achieved what they set out to do. This was substantially less than had been intended 
by the more progressive members of Congress in 1867. The constitutional amendments, 
furthermore, were frequently violated in practice. Nevertheless, Democrats’ lip service regarding 
the amendments’ legitimacy provided some grounds for thinking that the constitutional 
revolution was complete. Though historians have shown that there was plenty of violence and 
fraud to contradict these claims, taking them seriously can help explain how the reconstructed 
rebels constructed their self-delusions. 
	




In 1895, John H. Caldwell wrote his reminiscences about Reconstruction. Caldwell had 
been a Methodist minister, an educator, a detective for the Justice Department, and a Republican 
in the Georgia legislature, but he had also fiercely criticized the administration of Governor 
Rufus Bullock. In his reminiscences, he argued that the collapse of Bullock’s administration 
actually meant the triumph of Reconstruction. Bullock fled the state in 1871 to avoid 
impeachment by a Democratic legislature that Republicans would never control again until the 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, Caldwell saw in the event a consummation of Reconstruction, 
writing that “all that I had labored for during nearly six years of strife and turmoil was now 
happily achieved.” Caldwell saw “an era of good feeling and cheering hopes set in,” and to hear 
him tell it twenty-five years later, peace still reigned in 1895. Caldwell admitted that 
occasionally there were lynchings, but he saw no difference between racial violence in the South 
and that in other regions.94 
Caldwell remained a Republican. Nevertheless, by defining Reconstruction as a success, 
he diluted the project’s aims and absolved Democratic Redeemers from blame for the collapse. 
Negating the distinction that historians usually draw between Reconstruction and “home rule,” 
Caldwell argued that by restoring Georgia to the Union, Republicans saved the state from 
“protracted military rule and a condition of anarchy.” Republican success, according to Caldwell, 
created a “New South”—a term he claimed to have coined in the early days of Reconstruction—
and produced twenty-five years of “peace and prosperity” under the Democrats.95 Had Caldwell 
changed or had the Democrats? Caldwell claimed that it was Democrats. Additionally, 
Caldwell’s appropriation of the term “New South” in his 1895 reminiscences would have had 
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little purchase if it were not for the “New South” movement of Henry Grady and other boosters 
in the Democratic Party. Since Caldwell defended the Redeemers along with himself and the 
Republican Party, it is less surprising that he also dismissed the significance of lynching.  
Even Rufus Bullock came to see his role in Reconstruction as a conservative triumph. 
Five years after fleeing the state, the Republican governor returned. Though the Georgia 
legislature repudiated the state bonds that his administration had issued, juries found Bullock not 
guilty of financial wrongdoing. After being acquitted, and distancing himself from the state’s 
Republican organization, he became president of Atlanta’s first cotton mill and the city’s 
chamber of commerce. With Reconstruction over, he had an easier time in achieving the 
reputation he had desired since he joined the Republican Party—that of a New South booster.96  
Bullock played a leading role in planning Atlanta Cotton States and International 
Exposition of 1895, and on the opening day, he was the master of ceremonies. Newspaper 
commentators do not seem to have noted any incongruity in the former Republican Governor 
taking his part. To Bullock, it was “the greatest hour in the history of Atlanta and the South.”97 
One by one, he introduced each of the day’s speakers. One cannot be sure what he was thinking 
as he listened to Booker T. Washington, whom he praised as “the representative of negro 
enterprise and negro civilization.” Washington was critical of the role that men of his race had 
played in Reconstruction. The recently emancipated, out of ignorance and inexperience, “began 
at the top instead of at the bottom,” he said. To them, Washington claimed, “a seat in Congress 
or the State Legislature was more sought than real estate or industrial skill.” Washington urged 
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African Americans to “dignify and glorify common labor.” For white listeners, he had different 
but complimentary advice: that they help and encourage Black industrial education. Washington 
made labor and capital into racial as well as economic categories, but he thought they could be 
harmonious and mutually beneficial. African Americans would unite their “industrial, 
commercial, civil and religious life with yours in a way that shall make the interests of both races 
one.” Though “in all things that are purely social, we can be as separate as the fingers,” 
Washington argued, they would be “one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.”98  
Nearby on the stage, Bullock sat listening. He had been a key mover of Reconstruction in 
Georgia; he helped to write and implement a state constitution, which he praised for 
guaranteeing “equal, political and social rights.”99 When the state legislature denied the right of 
African Americans to hold political office in 1868, he asked for congressional intervention. 
Since then, though, he had either soured on Black participation in governance, or more likely, he 
had never intended his support for Congressional Reconstruction to lead to Black political 
power. When a New York paper asked why the interest in material affairs exhibited in Atlanta 
had not manifested in a growing Republican Party, Bullock responded by blaming the leadership 
of the state organization. As an illustration, he pointed to the selection of delegates to the most 
recent National Republican Convention; the state party had chosen a Black hack driver. Bullock 
thought him “a very worthy colored man in his line of business but not well fitted to choose a 
president.”100 Bullock repeatedly interpreted the Atlanta Exposition in northern newspapers as 
proof of the economic opportunities for African Americans in the South, while simultaneously 
dismissing their political capability.  
	
98 Cooper, The Cotton States and International Exposition and South, 98-99. 
99 New York Times, 27 Jul 1868. 




At a time when southern whites were increasingly condemning Reconstruction as a time 
of misrule, Bullock both assented to white supremacist memory of Reconstruction and made an 
emendation. In a view that he refined throughout the 1890s and shared publicly, he argued that 
white southern elites had successfully steered the South through the dangers of Reconstruction. 
While the North was focused on the Atlanta Exposition, he instructed New Yorkers on the 
history of Reconstruction. The congressional policy was “illogical,” he said, but the “personnel 
of the organization which decided to accept” that policy were “almost entirely…southern men—
many of whom had been prominent in the confederate service,” such as himself. They were 
“men of the highest personal character and financial strength”—he might have said, such men as 
now put on the Atlanta Exposition. In choosing Reconstruction, “they made this acceptance only 
a choice of evils,” the alternative being a continuation of military government that would have 
crippled “all financial, agricultural and industrial enterprises.”101 Repeating and refining this 
memory of Reconstruction several years later, he concluded, “The prosperous conditions of our 
State to-day, far beyond our reasonable hope or expectation, are chiefly due to the foundations 
wisely and conservatively laid by the brave men who in 1868 accepted a situation they could not 
change and made the best of it.”102 
Bullock simultaneously defended the role of native white elites in the Reconstruction-era 
Republican Party and praised the return of home rule. “Now that we are happily relieved from 
outside interference with our domestic affairs,” Bullock predicted that “our people [will] divide 
according to their interests and their judgement upon practical issues, as presented in this great 
object lesson [the Cotton States Exposition].” He hoped that the “mingling of business men” at 
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the exposition would teach non-southerners about the South’s opportunities and that “there is no 
‘problem’ about the race question.”103 The race question, Bullock said, was a “humbug” which 
politicians used to keep the South solidly Democratic and the North solidly Republican. Now, 
perhaps the Republican Party could spring into action in the South, offering an alternative to the 
Democrats on industrial and financial policy.104 He did not, however, want help from the party’s 
national organization: “Safe growth must be from within. Outside help will be regarded as an 
intrusive interference. This is our affair, and we will work it out right. Politically speaking, let us 
alone.”105 To this reconstructed rebel, the exposition confirmed the rightness of his course in the 
1860s, while also justifying Reconstruction’s political outcome—home rule.    
 
The Reconstructed Nation and Black Disfranchisement 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, southern 
states enacted literacy tests and grandfather clauses to remove African Americans from formal 
politics. When subjected to criticism, white southerners responded that these were not peculiarly 
southern institutions. Indeed, many northeastern states passed laws during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century to restrict the voting rights of working-class immigrants and the poor. For 
example, in 1881, Massachusetts lawmakers barred paupers from the polls, and in 1892, they 
instituted a literacy requirement. The Supreme Court also upheld a Mississippi literacy test in 
Williams v Mississippi (1898).106 With these conservative readings, even reconstructed rebels 
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were able to convince themselves that their states were in compliance with the Constitution and 
that despite variations between the states, they were fully national.  
Unlike those reconstructed rebels who joined the Democrats, Daniel Lindsay Russell 
continued to play a role in opposition politics despite his disdain for “carpetbaggers.” In 1878, he 
won office as a Greenback Party congressman. In a speech on the House floor, he called for 
“unqualified loyalty to the flag, universal obedience to and absolute equality before the law, 
complete toleration, entire freedom of speech, of thought, and of action.” Painting his enemies as 
unreconstructed, he argued that the goals he listed could not be achieved “until the last vestige of 
Bourbonism is trampled out; until the white South shall cease to whine and weep over the lost 
cause, and shall frankly and sincerely confess that the God of battles was right and we were 
wrong.”107 Nearly two decades later, in 1897, he was elected governor of North Carolina by a 
coalition of Republicans and Populists.108  
For Russell, “the most important mission of the Republican party” was “to enforce the 
principles of broad Nationality, as taught by John Marshall and Washington and Hamilton.”109 
This did not mean African American control of local or state government. In the late 1880s, he 
proclaimed that white men would never “submit to negro rule.” Though he considered the 
transatlantic slave trade a “monstrous wrong,” he concluded that slavery had “degraded them so 
that they are no more fit to govern than are their brethren in African swamps.” According to 
Russell, “misrule” in heavily Black counties could be corrected by Republican as well as 
Democratic administrations.110 Though he thought Blacks should be “treated with liberality and 
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justice,” he doubted this could be achieved “so long as the negro indicates by his political 
conduct that he only wants power to enact in the South the scenes which have demonstrated his 
incapacity for self-government in Hayti, Jamaica, and San Domingo.”111 When Russell became 
the Republican-Populist “Fusion” candidate for governor, he walked back some of this rhetoric, 
perhaps to encourage African American voters, or maybe to palliate the fears of whites. 
Adopting the white supremacist memory of Reconstruction, he denied that he supported 
“anything like we had in reconstruction days” and assured skeptical whites that “the negro does 
not want on top.”112 William Pearson, the author of Well-Nigh Reconstructed, considered Russell 
“a blessed alternative” to the Democrats.113  
Russell’s understanding of American nationalism made him a persistent opponent of 
states’ rights, and he denied the constitutionality of disfranchising schemes at the end of the 
century. At the same time, he continually urged African Americans to follow white leadership, or 
even abandon politics entirely. Like earlier reconstructed rebels, he hoped to move politics away 
from racial issues, including both disfranchisement and civil rights. Despite his conservative use 
of state patronage, white supremacists destroyed the Republican-Populist majority in 1898 and 
overthrew Wilmington’s city government in a violent coup. The General Assembly proposed a 
disfranchising amendment a year later. Russell, still governor, called the amendment 
unconstitutional and said he would not vote for it. He also, however, urged Republicans not to 
make the amendment a party issue. When party leaders did anyway, he called the state-level 
candidates a “machine ticket” and urged substituting businessmen who would be more likely to 
carry the state for the Republican presidential nominee. Moreover, he advised Black people not 
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to vote in the referendum, saying that doing so would exacerbate prejudice. “Let them leave it to 
the white people,” he counseled.114 The difference between Russell and his opponents was that 
he believed Black suffrage and white control were entirely compatible, while his opponents 
believed that the best way to solidify white supremacy was to eliminate the possibility of 
interracial political coalitions based on class.   
  Rufus Bullock agreed that white control was already secure without disfranchisement. 
Ten years after serving as master of ceremonies at the Atlanta Exposition, white Georgians were 
considering following the lead of other states in disfranchising African Americans. Bullock 
offered a variety of responses to this wave of suffrage restriction. He claimed that rabid 
proponents of racial hatred like Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina were not representative of 
“the south.” On the other hand, he added, each state would decide the suffrage issue for itself 
within constitutional bounds. He argued that the nation should enforce the 14th and 15th 
Amendments, and in one case suggested that disfranchising measures were unconstitutional. 
However, he then suggested that if the nation did not enforce the amendments, the South could 
not be blamed for failing to do what the nation would not.115 On another occasion, he suggested 
that laws which restricted the vote to “the hands of intelligence and virtue” would “apply 
uniformly to black and white” and might not violate the constitution after all.116 
 Of the original reconstructed rebels, James Lusk Alcorn of Mississippi may have gone 
the furthest toward embracing Black disfranchisement. After Reconstruction, he continued to 
identify as a Republican, but made it publicly known that he voted for Democratic candidates 
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like President Grover Cleveland. In 1889, in an interview with the Washington Post, he re-aired 
his grievance that the Republican Party could have been established in Mississippi if Grant had 
favored him over Ames. That chance was gone, he said, and “the Southern people will not have 
negro rule.” Deploying a biological racism that he had not used before, Alcorn continued, “The 
negro is not a white man with a black skin. He is a different race. He is a barbarian, and 
barbarians cannot rule civilized people. His head is covered with wool; he is a sheep. The white 
man has straight hair like a lion. The negro is an infant. He has the flat nose, the retreating chin, 
the protruding lips of an infant. It will take centuries of development to thoroughly fit him for 
civilization.”117 The following year, Mississippians in the heavily Black Delta county of 
Coahoma elected the seventy-four-year-old planter to the state constitutional convention. The 
convention register listed his political preference as “Conservative.” Alcorn maintained he was 
not afraid of Black supremacy, but ultimately, he supported the proposed literacy test. The fact 
that he opposed a loophole for ignorant white voters also suggests that he was more interested in 
preserving elite rule than making white supremacy work for all whites.118  
 While others like Russell and Bullock did not actively advocate Black disfranchisement, 
their overall diffidence on the issue is striking. During Reconstruction, they had insisted on 
obedience to national law and defied their white neighbors by supporting Black citizenship. They 
had believed that white control was still possible in the new political framework, and 
Redemption seemed to prove them right. Disfranchisement was a step too far, a needless 
assertion of state power at variance with national supremacy. Though, if the Supreme Court 
decided otherwise, as it did in Williams v. Mississippi (1898), then perhaps disfranchisement was 
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a valid expression of home rule. True, some reconstructed rebels like Russell still relied on Black 
votes to obtain office, but Democrats used Russell’s Black support against him, and now younger 
generations of white southerners were confronting the question of what the best way was to 
preserve white supremacy. The old answers were no longer needed.  
 
The Reconciliation of James Longstreet 
Like Rufus Bullock, James Longstreet also found forgiveness and vindication at the 
Atlanta Exposition of 1895. After the opening exercise on the 18th of September, Union and 
Confederate veterans assembled the next day at nearby Chickamauga for the battlefield’s 
dedication as a national park, and then returned to Atlanta for “Blue and Gray Day” on the 21st. 
Longstreet was present on stage at both events. When he came forward the second time, “there 
was a dramatic scene.”119 The resounding applause that greeted him made it, according to the 
Atlanta Constitution, one of the most notable moments of the day.120  
The path for Longstreet’s welcome at the Exposition had been set by another event in 
Atlanta nine years earlier. At the unveiling of a statue of recently deceased Senator Benjamin 
Hill, Jefferson Davis was the keynote speaker; Longstreet had not been invited. During 
Reconstruction, Davis had reportedly compared Longstreet unfavorably to Judas Iscariot. When 
Longstreet showed up uninvited during Davis’s speech at the Hill statue, a hush fell over the 
crowd. Then, unexpectedly, the two men embraced. The crowd exploded in cheers and applause. 
Though the shapers of Lost Cause remembrance worked ceaselessly to make Longstreet a villain, 
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that view was not universal in the 1880s and 1890s, when he was continually cheered at 
veterans’ reunions.121 
This was a curious turn from the furor that had met Longstreet when he joined the 
Republican party in 1867. Since then, much had changed. After the collapse of Republican 
control in Louisiana, Longstreet moved to Gainesville, Georgia. He held positions as postmaster, 
minister to Turkey, and U.S. Marshal in Atlanta. Longstreet continued to be active in Republican 
organizing, though as a member of the “syndicate,” which was largely composed of native 
whites. When African American leaders from an opposing faction tried to break into one of his 
meetings, he had local authorities arrest them.122 Unable to counteract the influence of northern 
settlers and African American leaders, he continued to support the party’s presidential 
candidates, but repudiated the state organization. “There is no Republican Party in this state,” he 
told a reporter for The New York Times. “I don’t recognize their organization and don’t care 
anything about them.”123 In another interview, Longstreet reflected on his momentous decision to 
support Reconstruction:  
I stopped fighting…at Appomattox Courthouse, while my comrades, defeated in 
war, transferred the conflict from the arena of battle to the arena of politics, with 
the result that they have antagonized the party having possession of the National 
Government for years, without gaining a thing for their section and its people. I 
believed that it was the true policy of the South to accept reconstruction and go in 
and control their own State Governments by acting in harmony with the 
Republican party, instead of being controlled by carpetbaggers and negroes, 
which resulted from their alliance with Democracy.124  
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Longstreet had not stated this intention publicly in 1867, but he did write privately about 
it. He had said that “since the negro has been given the privilege of voting, it is all important that 
we should exercise such influence over that vote, as to prevent its being injurious to us, & we can 
only do that as Republicans.”125 He went on to lead Louisiana’s biracial militia against white 
insurgents in 1873, and again in 1874. They all swore to “accept the civil and political equality 
of all men.”126 Still, a year later, in 1875, he told a friend that his ultimate goal was “the 
restoration of the Southern people to their natural and proper influence.”127 Nearly a decade later, 
now living in Georgia, he wrote to a northern correspondent, “The whites or democrats, for 
nearly all of the whites are democrats, seem to have a horror of the idea of negro rule; 
particularly the white women. If republicanism involves negro rule, they are not so far wrong, 
and all whites must sooner or later, become anti-Republican. I presume that argument is hardly 
necessary to convince you that the white people of America will not be ruled by the blacks.”128 
Northern settlers, Longstreet averred, would be treated graciously by white southerners, so long 
as they are not “engaged in trying to establish colored rulers over the whites.” 
White southerners in the “New South” mold increasingly gave him credit for white 
supremacist motives. Henry Grady, after giving Longstreet an exculpatory interview, concluded, 
“he is restored to his old place in the hearts of his people, since the wisdom of his advice having 
been passed, he is allowed credit for purity of motive in giving it.”129 In another interview, 
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Longstreet spoke cheerfully about the economic progress of African Americans in the South. All 
they needed, Longstreet added, was “less politics and meddling from politicians.” The reporter 
responded, “You begun [sic] to talk like a Democrat, General.” “No,” Longstreet replied, “I talk 
as I always did, like a friend of the South.”130  
At Chickamauga, and then in Atlanta on the Exposition’s Blue and Gray Day, Longstreet 
played to the common theme of sectional reconciliation, while also adding his own twist. The 
seventy-four year old soldier asked both sides to unite in “extending, broadening, confirming and 
perpetuating a government of the people, by the people and for the people.” He did not mean that 
there was any need to perfect American government at home. Rather, he thought Americans 
needed to extend their democracy abroad. Referring to recent British interventions in Central and 
South America, he condemned the “steady purpose of Great Britain to nullify or encroach upon 
the Monroe doctrine.” Since the end of the war, Longstreet had been interested in the 
construction of transcontinental railroads into Mexico. If Americans would put aside sectional 
prejudice and increase the nation’s military power, he boasted, they would stop European 
encroachments on the western hemisphere and “the ‘yankee huzza’ and the ‘rebel yell’ will 
resound along the British seacoast.”131 In Longstreet’s mind, and perhaps in the minds of his 
audience, white southerners became agents of American power, rather than its subjects. 
For Longstreet, Reconstruction meant white restoration as citizens and agents of 
American empire, no longer colonial subjects of the North. In 1898, Longstreet offered his 
services to the United States to fight in the Spanish-American War. He was too old, but when 
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Longstreet passed at the beginning of 1904, his son and namesake was serving in the Philippines 
as a captain in the Thirteenth Cavalry, fighting to secure a new territory for the United States.132 
Sectionalism was not dead. Southern leaders like Ben Tillman would continue to curse 
Yankees for some time to come. In the context of national white supremacy at the end of the 
century, though, the South did not look so peculiar anymore. White southerners and white 
northerners now seemed like suitable partners for a project of global reordering. For this tragic 
consensus, much is owed to reconstructed rebels like James Longstreet.  
	










SHOULD THERE BE MORE MONUMENTS TO PEOPLE LIKE LONGSTREET? 
 
On June 6, 2020, protestors in Richmond, Virginia toppled the statue of a slaveholder and 
Confederate general. Throughout the summer, activists responded to the police killing of George 
Floyd by demanding the removal of Confederate statues throughout the country. 
Overwhelmingly, these statues had been erected in the early twentieth century, mostly in the 
South, when a new system of white supremacy was built through legal segregation, 
disfranchisement, lynching, and cultural symbols like these Confederate memorials. In the 
summer of 2020, over one hundred Confederate statues were removed, either by protestors or by 
local authorities in response to the protests. The one that came down on June 6, however, was 
unique. Williams C. Wickham had been a leader in Virginia’s postwar Republican Party.  
No major news outlet mentioned this detail. If protestors knew, it likely did not matter. 
What was important was that Wickham was a slaveholder and had fought in a war to preserve 
slavery. In 2017, after the white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, two of Wickham’s 
descendants asked the Richmond mayor to remove the statue of their great-great-great-
grandfather. “As a plantation owner, Confederate general and industrialist,” they wrote, “General 
Wickham unapologetically accrued power and wealth through the exploitation of enslaved 
people.”1 A Black man, also descended from Wickham, said in a reporter’s paraphrase, that the 
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statue was “a painful reminder of the abuse his family suffered and of America’s refusal to fully 
acknowledge its past.”2  
Williams C. Wickham’s postwar Republicanism does not redeem him of his sins. 
Historians should question how much he and reconstructed rebels like him really changed after 
the war, and to what extent the alternative path that they offered would have benefited the South 
and its people. Could they have led the white South in a different direction? Could they have 
helped build a more authentic racial and sectional peace, instead of letting the white South follow  
the Bourbon Redeemers and the Jim Crow white supremacists who made the region even more 
sectional, racist, and violently oppressive at the turn of the century than it had been at the start of 
the Civil War? If the preceding analysis in the preceding chapters is correct, then the 
reconstructed rebels were too short-sighted, racist, and opportunistic to undertake such a colossal 
transformation. That being the case, are their actions even worth remembering?  
 Reconstructed rebels are not worth commemorating, but they should be remembered as 
key players in the abandonment of Reconstruction and the political restoration of the South’s 
prewar elite. Racial terrorism and white insurgency help explain the return of home rule, and so 
do changes in the North that made white northerners increasingly less willing to stay the course 
on Reconstruction and to become more sympathetic with white southern elites. Reconstruction, 
however, also meant reconstructing the white southern elite. White northerners wanted to see 
evidence of change. Reconstructed rebels presented themselves as having seen the light. At first 
this gave them an advantage over their rivals in the South, but it also rehabilitated the image of 
the southern elite more quickly and broadly.   
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 Two weeks after Appomattox, Wickham told white Virginians that the Confederacy had 
deserved defeat. He was not alone in embracing Confederate defeat and arguing that white 
southerners should focus on rebuilding the southern economy. As chapter one demonstrated, 
reconstructed rebels often held such attitudes even when they supported Presidential 
Reconstruction under Andrew Johnson. Then, after Congress took control of Reconstruction in 
1867, they began moving into the Republican Party. An especially important moment was when 
Frank Blair, the Democratic nominee for vice-president, threatened to disperse the reconstructed 
governments and return the South to a state of violent uncertainty. Wickham denounced Blair’s 
threats and announced his view that electing Grant was the only path to peace and prosperity. 
 In 1869, Wickham’s officeholding disabilities were removed by Congress. As chapter 
two showed, reconstructed rebels like him benefited from their opponents being kept under the 
ban while newly minted Republicans received amnesty. Northern Republicans in Congress 
understood the influence that such men had and saw them as the South’s natural leaders. As long 
as they supported legal equality for African Americans, white southerners could be trusted with 
political power. Wickham did not run for office until the 1880s, but he and his business partner 
Collis Huntington nevertheless made their influence felt in Virginia. 
 By 1873, Wickham and Huntington had completed the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
from the Virginia coast to the coal mines of West Virginia. The C&O was privately-owned by 
then, but it benefited nonetheless from a bipartisan effort to attract outside investment from the 
North and Europe. Chapter three explored the multiple strategies that Republicans used to make 
the South safe for investment: compliance with Congress’s demands, public aid for railroads, the 




state governors look like they were dependent on federal law enforcement. They were not wholly 
successful, but their Democratic successors adopted many of the same policies.  
 In 1883, Wickham was elected to the Virginia state senate by a coalition of conservative 
Republicans and Democrats who opposed readjusting the state debt. In his campaign speeches, 
Wickham emphasized the sanctity of public credit, a traditional Republican position that 
benefited bondholders—including some in the northeast—over taxpayers and public schools. 
This was not Wickham’s only message, however. He also objected to the popular mobilization of 
African Americans in the Readjuster Party. He accused Readjusters of “drawing the color line,” 
that is, playing the politics of racial solidarity, and ruining the good relations between Black and 
white. Nevertheless, he was a “friend” to Black voters, and he promised to defend their rights—
they were already equal to those of whites, according to Wickham—so long as they voted for 
him. As chapter four argued, reconstructed rebels embraced Black political participation because 
they had long cultivated patron-client relationships with yeomen whites that did not undermine 
their power, but actually reinforced it.  
 In the 1860s and 1870s, reconstructed rebels were answering a question that younger 
Democratic elites would tackle again later in the century: what was the best way to preserve 
white supremacy? Wickham and others attempted to capture the Republican Party in the South to 
make it work for white elites. Black Republicans, however, fought back. Reconstructed rebels 
responded with the same indignation that Wickham later expressed toward the Readjusters. 
Some reconstructed rebels left the party, while others found vindication despite remaining 
Republican. Chapter five began with Southern Democrats like L.Q.C. Lamar and David Key, 
who argued that the white South had accepted the legitimacy of the Reconstruction amendment 




should have refuted the truth of their claims, but white northerners increasingly saw moderate 
Democrats as reconstructed.  
 Williams C. Wickham died in 1888 and three years later, veterans of his cavalry brigade 
commemorated him with a memorial in bronze. The seven-foot statue portrayed Wickham in his 
Confederate uniform. The base of the statue carried the inscription, “Soldier, Statesman, Patriot, 
Friend.” The nephew of Robert E. Lee, Fitzhugh Lee, gave the oration. Lee was Wickham’s 
former commander in the Confederate cavalry and Wickham enthusiastically supported Lee in 
1885 when he ran a successfully campaign to become Virginia’s Democratic Governor. Lee 
returned Wickham’s affection in full. After giving a historical defense of states’ rights and 
secession, Lee listed the recent statues that had been raised to Confederate heroes and then 
reviewed the military career of Wickham and his cavalry brigade. Lee did not ignore Wickham’s 
postwar politics. He mentioned that Wickham joined the Republican Party, a course which Lee 
attributed to Wickham’s habit of opposing Democrats as a former Whig, his desire for sectional 
reconciliation. Still, Lee insisted that the audience “forget dead political issues” and “bury bitter 
animosities engendered by party strife.” Instead, he said, “we recall the cavalry general.” He 
mentioned the lowly railroad employees who wept at Wickham’s passing and made small 
contributions to the monument fund. Lee credited Wickham for supporting Democratic measures 
as an independent in the state legislature, and finally returned to Wickham’s wartime valor.3   
 At roughly the same time that white Virginians were honoring Wickham for his service to 
the Confederacy, states across the South were passing laws to segregate society and disfranchise 
African Americans. Some reconstructed rebels raised muted concerns, while others participated 
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in the new method of preserving white supremacy. In this final decade of the nineteenth century, 
however, they could rest assured that they were part of a national trend to restrict democracy and 
protect the interests of capital. White supremacy in the South was never about the supremacy of 
all whites. It was a new way to preserve the power of a new generation of elite and middle-class 
whites.4 Disfranchisement was not the solution put forward by reconstructed rebels, but by 
restoring the reputation of southern elites, they had made it possible.   
 To fully understand the abandonment of Reconstruction it is necessary to ask who was 
reconstructed and how the answer to that question varied based on who was making the 
assessment. Ex-Confederates in the Republican Party were able to convince northerners that they 
were reconstructed, and northerners in turn admitted that it would be for the best if white 
southern elites ruled their own states. Even though Southern Democrats came out on top, they 
owed much to the reconstructed rebels: not only the chance to hold office, but also their 
economic policies and general approach to race relations. Reconstructed rebels set the South on a 
different course from the one it had followed before the Civil War, but they also set it on a 
course toward Redemption and Jim Crow. 
 Humanity’s capacity for change is worth remembering. Change by itself, however, is not 
worth commemorating. Reconstructed rebels adapted in a unique way compared to their white 
contemporaries, and it is important to appreciate the complex ways that people adapt to new 
situations. Reconstructed rebels can teach us about the mutability of white supremacy and the 
vulnerability of institutions to capture by different elites. Commemorating reconstructed rebels 
would not help the fight for racial justice, but a more accurate understanding of them just might.  
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